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This dissertation is an examination of the foundations of what I call a “fourth” 
tradition of analytical-scientific philosophy, the tradition of “structuralism”. It is a 
disavowal of a metaphysics of substances and/or entities in the pursuit of scientific 
theory and truth. We look, in particular, at the current manifestation of this tradition, 
which advances the thesis of “structural realism”; we ask how tenable this thesis is, 
and whether we can weaken it. I argue that we should focus on methodology—a 
program for the formulation of scientific hypotheses about the sorts of things there 
are—rather than on metaphysics per se. We replace “substance” with “relation” as the 
basic ontic posit, and hold that substances or entities are metaphysically derivative 
from relational structure. Thus, the thesis is not that “there are no things” (or that 
“everything must go”, as Ladyman et al. suppose); rather, the thesis is that the things 
(entities or substances) are relational structure, and there is no complete specification 
of an independent entity that is not itself more relational structure (so a metaphysics 
of substances is merely secondary to that of relational structure). I also suggest that 
 
 
there is no complete, unitary or monistic theory of what ‘structure’ itself is. That is, I 
hold that there is no “total” structure of which everything that is relational structure is 
a “part”, on the grounds that this would constitute an “illegitimate totality” in 
Russell’s sense (the claim that “everything is structural” does not mean that there is a 
single structure which everything has—what a monistic theory of structure seems to 
demand). We then turn to the question of scientific explanation in light of structural 
realism: can there be explanation without a metaphysics of substances? I  answer 
affirmatively. I then turn to two cases where, I argue, structuralism (and the specific 
thesis of structural realism) is in play regarding scientific explanation: quantum 
information theory, and the recent attempt to render quantum mechanics local by re-
interpreting physical law time symmetrically. I conclude with a consideration of some 
objections to structuralism, and an articulation of the general view of metaphysics 
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Chapter 1: On the “fourth” tradition of analytical-scientific 





1. Three Traditions. In the history of scientifically-oriented philosophical thought
1
 
since the mid to late nineteenth century, we can find at least three traditions. Each 
tradition associates itself differently to the scientific tradition and each takes there to 
be some important relationship between metaphysics and scientific/empirical inquiry 
(sometimes a negative one), though they will differ as to exactly how the two are to 
be related. 
 As a reaction to the excesses of post-Kantian (mainly continental European) 
philosophy, there arose a tradition of linguistic-analytic philosophy whose main 
purpose was the investigation of the structure of thought, in particular, a logical 
analysis of concepts. The rough motivating principle here is that only by clarifying 
our concepts (derived from experience) can we get a handle on what there is in the 
world to be investigated. With analytically-scrutinized concepts in hand, science and 
philosophy (and, in general, human intellectual inquiry) may proceed unencumbered 
by specious metaphysical propositions. The method of this tradition is to take “pre-
reflective” or “pre-philosophical” notions, subject them to logical/conceptual 
analysis, and to discover the rationally-purified concept worthy of belief and 
intellectual use. Only such purified concepts can be used to construct (or reconstruct) 
                                               
1 By this I mean those thinkers who were explicitly concerned with science or who were themselves 
scientists or mathematicians or logicians engaged in philosophical pursuits (people like Poincaré, 
Frege, Russell), or who, aided by the methods of formal logic, puzzled over philosophical problems as 
problems of the use of language (people in the tradition of “analysis”). For a historical-philosophical  
sketch, see Beaney (2009)). These thinkers are all “scientifically-oriented” in spirit if not by the 
character of their actual written work. 
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human knowledge by which we may then (as rational agents) engage the world in 
science, ethics, politics, and the other disciplines of human knowledge. In 
metaphysics, we are, then, guided rigorously by this analytic method, licensed, that is, 
in asking such questions as what is the “ontological status” of anything at all—
numbers, fictional objects/characters/events, properties, time and space, ‘abstracta’, 
etc. We may ask whether there are any “concrete” objects and what their nature is: 
tables, trees, people. We are also invited to inquire into the ‘nature’ or ‘status’ of such 
notions as personal identity, freedom (of the will), ethical values, the mind, and other 
classic philosophical problems, guided by the tools of conceptual analysis. Some have 
pointed out that this analytical tradition of metaphysics is a form of neo-Kantianism, 
where the focus is on the structure of our concepts of the world, since it is concept 
that links (subjective) human knowledge and understanding to the (objective, mind-
independent) world. 
 But some, like Dummett, Quine and Putnam (in different ways), have called 
into question the very idea of a “mind-independent reality”, arguing that the notion of 
‘truth’ that underlies such an idea is suspect or untenable (Loux 2002, xiii). As a 
reaction to this skepticism, some have called for, and engaged in, a return to “a 
traditional view about the relationship between thought/language and the world … 
which can be traced back to the origins of philosophy in the Greek period” (ibid.). 
This strand of analytical metaphysics is not so much concerned with the structure of 
thought per se but with, following Aristotle, “being qua being”—the (mind-
independent) nature of the world, “correspondence to which makes our 
beliefs/statements true” (ibid.). Thus, we find a reintroduction to such (perennial) 
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problems as realism/antirealism, universals/nominalism, concrete 
particulars/substrata/bundles/substances, and “the necessary and the possible” and 
“persistence through time” as putative philosophical questions in their own right, 
which can be investigated more or less independently of the details (or history of) 
science – i.e., systematic empirical inquiry. I shall dub this the “first tradition”. 
 Roughly at the same time as we saw the rise of “analytic philosophy”, we saw 
the emergence of what we can call “scientific philosophy”—philosophy concerned to 
purify metaphysics by not so much conceptual or logical analysis per se, but by the 
subjugation of metaphysics to scientific hypothesis, methodology and the rigors of 
mathematical/logical thinking. In its extreme form, this scientific philosophy became 
positivism—the infamous “Vienna Circle”, for example—an extreme renunciation of 
metaphysics as a positive thesis about the nature of reality, from Plato and Aristotle, 
through Kant and those who reacted to him. Experience and observation is all we 
need, says this school of thought. Even if it makes sense to talk of a reality “behind” 
appearances, to which some of our concepts may refer, and correspondence to which 
they are made true, such notions are irrelevant to the discoveries and activities of 
science and hence may be ignored. Human knowledge is produced only by systematic 
empirical inquiry, and the ‘nature’ of knowledge is not truth qua metaphysical 
relation between concept and world, but truth as empirical reliability and theoretical 
success/ predictive power and technological advancement. Reflexive, second-order 
questions such as “what is the nature of X?” are fruitless, futile and meaningless and 
cannot be answered whenever detached from experience and systematic empirical 
inquiry. This school ranges from metaphysical agnosticism to complete rejection of 
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metaphysics in favor of “experience” (“sense data”) and observation. Let us dub this 
the “second tradition”. 
 There is also a third tradition (perhaps more of a sub-tradition of the second), 
going back to at least Quine
2
, which is a kind of middle-ground between the first and 
the second traditions—between the linguistic analyticity of the Anglo-American 
schools of the twentieth century and the trenchant metaphysical avoidance and 
extreme skepticism of the scientific philosophers of more or less the same time. These 
are, roughly, the philosophers of science who respect Quine’s dictum: to get your 
metaphysics (ontology), quantify over the theoretical entities referred to by your best 
science. Working from this rather minimalist metaphysical method, though, this 
tradition quickly fills with much more than simply a happy set of metaphysicians-
cum-quantifiers: Quine’s dictum leaves much to be (metaphysically) desired. And 
here is where this tradition explodes with a variety of metaphysical/philosophical 
views: reductionists vs. emergentists; Humeans and anti-Humeans; ontological holists 
vs. reductionist atomists; and so on. In this tradition of serious engagement with 
science (i.e., bothering to learn the details of a science or sciences), we see a 
proliferation of metaphysical debates no less rich than in the first tradition, and 
certainly more metaphysically sophisticated than we saw in the second. This tradition 
is complicated by the fact that it employs some a priori tactics and metaphysics (from 
the first camp) for the needed task of philosophically interpreting scientific theories 
(the basic task of this camp is, to again refer to Quine, to work out exactly “what 
there is”). Out of this reciprocity between science and philosophy, these philosophers 
                                               
2 See especially his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Quine (1999) From A Logical Point of View. 
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provide a fairly sophisticated and subtle picture of the nature of the world, carefully 
guided by science (a source of fact about the world). Part of the potential virtue of 
this tradition is that it isn’t committed to there being a radical separation between 
“speculative metaphysics” and natural science (recall that Quine’s rejection of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction bought him, he thought, just such a blurred distinction
3
). 
Thus, for this tradition, part of the act of science itself—of what scientists themselves 
actually do—is to engage in speculative metaphysics
4
. 
 But, the ontological minimalism of this tradition is both a blessing and a 
curse: we have gained a clear ontological program (quantify over theoretical entities 
referred to in mature science!), but broader metaphysical questions (like the 
metaphysics of properties, substances, etc.—the purview of “traditional” 
metaphysics) are left unchecked and unconstrained, it seems. For example, we are left 
with a metaphysical carte blanche when it comes to the following central, interpretive 
questions regarding scientific theories and science in general: 
What entities are there (possibly, apart from the propositions scientists 
utter, or the mathematical structures of a given theory), and what 
‘form’ do they take? 
How do the entities of one science relate to the entities of another—are 
some more ‘fundamental’ than others, more ‘real’—what? Is there an 
‘ontological hierarchy’ as it were? 
Must we always accept the implicit assumption in Quine’s dictum that 
we should quantify over the entities—indeed, why must we accept that 
there are ‘entities’ at all? Can’t an ontology other than an entity-based 
                                               
3 He writes: “[o]ne effect of abandoning [the analytic/synthetic distinction] is … a blurring of the 
supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science” (1999, p. 20). 
4 And indeed, we find many of these philosophers publishing in both academic philosophical journals 
and (highly reputable) scientific ones. With respect to physical science, many of these philosophers 
participate in a community that concerns itself with the “foundations of physics”. Frequently, these 
philosophers are also highly trained physicists, and often hold a graduate degree in some physical 
science. The sentiment of this community seems to be one of deep engagement with science, and even 
one of helping science develop. 
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one be found or motivated by science? Indeed, is ontology even 
possible without ‘entities’? 
Is the only task of the philosopher-metaphysician to be a logician, carefully 
quantifying over the theoretical propositions of science (aside from the quandary as to 
whether such a logical interpretation of theories is ultimately tenable)? Are there no 
more metaphysical tasks than exercises in predicate calculus? 
 Indeed, we may be left with the suspicion that Quine’s dictum is too 
minimalist, and that the fears of the old positivists might have been somewhat 
justified: what, we might ask, counts as idle metaphysics and what counts as helpful 
or ‘good’ metaphysics—cannot scientists, or theories, go awry? Surely we might be 
able to answer this question without being as naively minimalist as Quine, or as 
skeptical and empirically-obsessed as the scientific philosophers, or as a priori or 
obsessively linguistic as the analytic philosophers. Might there be yet another—
perhaps deeper and more subtle—middle ground? 
 
2. The Fourth Tradition. There is, finally, a fourth tradition, one that is the focus of 
this present study
5
. It is an altogether different tradition of philosophic and 
metaphysical thought associated with systematic empirical inquiry (the scientific 
tradition of the European Humanists, continuing to the present day). As with many of 
the traditions just discussed, we can find intimations of it throughout the history of 
philosophy, in the obsession with number and form in the Platonic and Pythagorean 
                                               
5 My focus is less on situating the fourth tradition historically so much as shoring up its basic 
philosophical framework and drawing out the implications it has on some current philosophical views. 
In so doing I will, naturally, be offering my own view of this tradition and as such this study cannot be 
considered a piece of historical scholarship. 
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schools, in the nominalist traditions of the Mediaeval scholastics, to the metaphysical 
agnosticism of Isaac Newton, who (infamously) refused to provide an ontological 
resolution of gravity into a substance or concrete mechanism (a “reality”, as it were, 
“behind” his mathematical equations which accurately captured the “appearances”). 
This tradition, though, most clearly emerged in close association with scientific 
thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the writings of such 
thinkers as Poincaré, Duhem, Eddington, Cassirer, Weyl and Wigner, and which has 
seen some development (and sometimes renovation) recently in the writings of 
Worrall, Zahar, French, Ladyman and Chatravartty, to name a few professional 
philosophers taking up this tradition. We shall dub this tradition “scientific-
philosophical structuralism” or just “structuralism” for short
6
. This fourth tradition 
shares some tactics and concerns of the other three traditions, but is also very critical 
of them (either implicitly or explicitly). 
 One common characteristic of what we can call this tradition’s “early” 
phase—one whose spirit is still alive in structuralism today— is a distaste for talk, 
especially in science, of anything like Aristotelian “substances”. Such unchecked 
metaphysical liberty, they thought, threatened to introduce an unwarranted 
proliferation of substances into our scientific conception (or speculations) of the 
world, one for every theoretical term in each theoretical domain: heat, energy, electric 
                                               
6 In the history of philosophical thought, the term ‘structuralism’ has been used may times and with 
many different senses. While I do believe, as a matter of the history of ideas, that you can trace similar 
kinds of ‘structuralism’ in different intellectual traditions (scientific, philosophical, theological and so 
on), throughout this dissertation I use the term to mean a certain metaphysical/ontological and 
epistemological disposition when it comes to thinking about science and scientific theories. Sometimes 
the structuralism takes the form of a specific, positive, metaphysical thesis (e.g., the thesis that “only 
structure is real”), and sometimes it is more of a retreat from metaphysics (e.g., the thesis that “we can 
only know structure”, and not the nature of that which the structure is structure of). 
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and magnetic phenomena all seemed to cry out for an underlying substance to which 
the mathematics and physics corresponded. Theories were offered that postulated 
such substances as “caloric”, or “phlogiston” or “aether” to provide a putatively 
“physical” (or at any rate, metaphysical) ground for thermodynamics or 
electrodynamics. The nineteenth century, for this reason, has become the modern-day 
anti-realist’s favorite proving ground: many theories were accepted to some measure, 
yet their theoretical entities (now) are hopelessly non-referring. The structuralists of 
the late nineteenth century retracted in horror at this proliferation of metaphysical-
cum-scientific speculation; but they argued for an abandonment not of metaphysics 
per se, but of metaphysics as the postulation of substances or entities to which 
theories are supposed to refer. The structuralism of this period was characterized by a 
blend of what we would now call “instrumentalism” and anti-realism (but about 
substances or entities—what you can call “cautious realism”
 7
), reinforced by an 
epistemological thesis about the nature of human knowledge—that all we know or 
can access is structure and so our theories only reflect the nature of human 
knowledge as such, and do not reveal the “things in themselves” or the “inner details 
of nature”, as some liked to say. Thus, we have a Kantianism about knowledge, 
married to an anti-Aristotelianism about metaphysics: the early structuralists didn’t 
want to provide a positive ontological thesis about the nature of the reality behind our 
(structural) knowledge of it—and so were agnostic about nature’s details and 
substance—yet they were happy to embrace the instrumental/predictive value of 
theories and their mathematical content as providing structural knowledge of the 
                                               
7 See Frisch (2005) for a discussion of what he calls Lorentz’s “cautious realism”, which he argues is 
“remarkably similar to the motivational realism Arthur Fine attributes to Einstein, which Fine 
characterizes as “half skeptical, half humble” (p. 661). 
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world (a decidedly epistemic stance, to be sure). Up until the mid to late twentieth 
century, little in the way of positive (constructive) metaphysical theses were advanced 
by structuralists for fear (it seems) of running afoul of Kant’s powerful critical and 
synthetic philosophy, which claims to reconcile the metaphysical excesses of the 
rationalists with the metaphysical skepticism, both explicit and implicit, in 
empiricism. 
 The Transcendental Idealism we are left with from Kant seems to prevent any 
positive metaphysical thesis from being advanced in the domain of empirical inquiry, 
for the principle seems to be that no thesis about the things in themselves—which is 
tantamount, in Kant’s view, to “the way the world is”, the mind-independent world 
supposedly speculated on by the rationalists and ancients of ages past—is justifiable 
purely a priori and so cannot be itself the object of science. There are some concepts 
that we (must) bring to science for science to be possible at all (concepts of space, 
time, causality, etc.); but science itself does not provide us with metaphysics—that is, 
we cannot take metaphysical notions from science (or, at any rate, we cannot justify 
such notions as being true knowledge of the mind-independent world of “things in 
themselves”). 
 The early period of structuralism leaves us in the shadow of Kantian Idealism, 
and room enough for only an epistemic structuralism focused on knowledge of 
nature, rather than nature “itself”, and in particular about knowledge derived from 
science: scientific theories reveal only knowledge of structure, not the things in 
themselves. In what amounts to an attempt to turn structuralism into a positive virtue 
in the philosophy of science, rather than merely a Kantian retreat from metaphysical 
10 
 
‘natures’, John Worrall advanced the thesis that what is preserved in theory change—
what remains true—is structure, not the theoretical entities to which a given scientific 
theory is assumed to refer (Worrall 1989). And it is this structure, therefore, not 
theoretical entities, one ought to be a realist about, if a realist at all, argued Worrall. 
Making the case with examples from physics, Worrall tried to show that there is a 
chain of structural continuities amidst the change from one (mature) physical theory 
to the next. One example (not the primary one) was the switch from Newton’s to 
Einstein’s physics: the former’s theory still obtains as a limiting case of the latter; 
hence, is restrictedly ‘true’. There is structural continuity between the two in the 
sense that the structure of Newtonian mechanics is derivable from the structure of 
Einstein’s, given the appropriate restrictions on the latter (velocities much lower than 
light’s). 
 Having crept out from Kant’s shadow ever so slightly, the question for the 
structuralist now becomes, “what is structure such that one can defensibly be a 
‘realist’ about it?” Was Worrall advancing a positive metaphysical claim, some mind-
independent feature of the world about which we ought to be realists? What seems 
clear, in any case, is that the very least that Worrall was advocating was the thesis 
that there is some mathematical structural continuity between theories, and, should 
we take theories to be about such structures, then, supposing those structures are true 
(in some sense) of the world, our theories got something ‘right’ about the world—the 
structure. The questions that remained for Worrall, however, were: what is the 
relationship between mathematical structure and physical reality, and what are you 
metaphysically committed to when (as a scientific realist) you hold that theories refer 
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to (true) mind-independent structure? Assuming that these questions could be 
satisfactorily addressed, the larger question that would be left unanswered, though, is 
what about Kant? Can the epistemic structuralism of the (neo)Kantian be reconciled 
with this new, metaphysically-leaning, form of structuralism? Or have we gone back 
(regressed?) to a kind of Platonism? 
2. 1 Structural Realism: varieties and aims. There are two general aims that the 
structural realist has. This first aim is epistemological: science provides us with some 
knowledge of the world; but what is that knowledge knowledge of, given that theories 
are usually overturned in time but yet might be highly confirmed or make relatively 
successful predictions (predictions which, we might add, can maintain their validity 
over time, through theory change)? That is, the structural realist wants to 
simultaneously answer the “pessimistic-meta-induction” (PMI) against scientific 
realism, and satisfy the “no miracles argument” for scientific realism in terms of what 
genuine knowledge science provides of the world. PMI insists that  most, if not all, 
present theories will likely be overturned in the future, and so it seems implausible to 
regard them as now literally ‘true’ of the world. Famously, Larry Laudan (1981) 
provided philosophers of science with a long litany of scientific theories that were 
overturned, along with the entities they postulated. Despite the criticism against 
Laudan’s argument—that most of the ‘theories’ he offered as examples of failure 
were, in their day, only marginally successful, if at all—there is something to 
Laudan’s central worry. Science does change over time, and drastically (Aristotelian 
science vs. modern relativistic mechanics, e.g.). Yet, there is something right about 
some theories even though they may be overturned: Ptolemy’s model of planetary 
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motion, despite its Aristotelian trappings, does manage to capture the movements of 
(the visible) planets relatively well (though not precisely—but no theory is exact), and 
can still be used to predict their positions. To the extent to which older, now 
overturned, theories still have such usefulness, we may call them “relatively 
successful theories” and hence, in their day, mature. Only mature theories of this sort 
should be part of the PMI, not immature or unsuccessful theories (that is, those that 
didn’t make many interesting or lasting predictions in their own day). But if only 
mature theories in this sense are part of PMI, then the suspicion is—at least according 
to the structural realist—that we don’t have reason to be so pessimistic after all! It is 
precisely this suspicion that, in turn, dovetails with the “no miracles argument” 
(NMA), to which we briefly turn. Both PMI and NMA form an interlocking pair for 
the structural realist, in a kind of turning-of-the-tables on both the realist and anti-
realist. 
 NMA says that the successes of some theories (especially those at present, 
like quantum mechanics and relativity) implies that they get something right about the 
world, even though they will most likely turn out to be false, or be otherwise 
overturned in the future. It would be a miracle, says the NMA adherent, if a theory 
were as successful as, for example, quantum mechanics (so very highly confirmed) 
and yet it turns out that the theory was entirely, or literally, false. It surely gets 
something right about the world; indeed, every successor theory must account for the 
relevant data at least as well as its highly successful (and hence mature) predecessor. 
But just what is right about a mature and highly well-confirmed theory? 
13 
 
 Structural realism is an attempt to answer just this question. If successful, the 
structural realist would have satisfied both an argument against scientific realism and 
one for it. In other words, the structural realist would have gotten, as John Worrall 
sub-headed his now-famous 1989 paper, “the best of both worlds”
8
. Let’s linger a bit 
longer on this first aim of the structural realist. It helps us to better understand the 
epistemological dimension of structural realism, as opposed to the ontological 
dimension (which is the one we’ll ultimately focus on in the dissertation as a whole)
9
. 
2. 2 Epistemic Structural Realism. In the context of the PMI argument against 
scientific realism, the structural realist points out that there is some continuity 
between overturned but relatively successful theories like Fresnel’s theory of optics 
and the theory that replaces it (in this case, Maxell’s theory of electrodynamics)
10
. 
The structuralist says that the right structure of nature was discovered, and this true 
                                               
8 This suggests to me, although I won’t try to defend this thesis at length, that there might be 
something very dubious about the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Indeed, given that 
Ladyman et al. in their defense of “Ontic Structural Realism” (OSR hereafter) propose that (their 
version, at least, of) OSR implies a kind of “naturalized” Platonism, where there is no fundamental 
metaphysical distinction between mathematical and physical structure, which, assuming also the 
viability of the overall structuralist reconceptualization of entities, individuals and so on, implies that 
there’s little to dispute over between the realist and anti-realist. E.g.: no more “physical entities” as 
opposed to “abstracta”, “numbers” etc. Perhaps the only lingering worry would be the old 
philosophical boogeyman of idealism/mind-dependence (though, as for this latter duality—that 
between mind-independence vs. mind-dependence—given that ‘substances’ have no fundamental 
metaphysical status, even this distinction is dubious from the structuralist point of view: ‘minds’ are 
just as much features of the modal/causal structure of the world as anything else, including the act of 
theorizing). 
9 Briefly, in the epistemological dimension of structural realism we try to explain just what sort of 
knowledge—relatively secure and lasting knowledge—we get from mature, successful scientific 
theories: and that is knowledge of structure, rather than “natures” or “essences” or “entities” per se. In 
the ontological dimension, we then attempt defend either of two theses, both of which are taken to be 
logically independent from the epistemological thesis that what we get from science is knowledge of 
structure: (i) what there is in the world is structure, as opposed to entities or essences or natures, and 
science is about that; or (ii) structure is ontologically prior to entity, nature, or essence (i.e., the 
mechanisms and things proposed as underlying explanations for phenomena), and so everything may 
be understood in terms of structure (note that this thesis is orthogonal from the first because the first 
tries to distinguish structure from ‘natures’, etc., whereas the second thesis does not). More on this 
below. 
10 See Worrall (1989), p. 155-160. 
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(or at any rate, phenomenologically accurate) structure gets preserved under a 
superseding theory. So, from the perspective of Maxwell’s superseding theory, 
Fresnel’s got the details all wrong, but the structural relationships captured by the 
mathematical equations of Fresnel’s theory are structurally accurate, and consistent 
with the superseding theory (Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Notice, that the 
structuralist (more specifically, structural realist) has an advantage here when it 
comes to theory change, the temporal dimension in this debate: science (or more 
specifically: scientific knowledge) is accumulative insofar as true, stable and invariant 
structures of nature are gradually discovered; and it is revisionary insofar as 
mechanisms, entities and “inner details” are gradually discarded in favor of richer, 
more successful theories. As for the NMA for scientific realism: there surely is no 
miracle that (mature) theories are successful, or that science can produce successful 
theories, on account of the fact that they get the structure of nature right—and, as the 
Fresnel case demonstrates, this structural success can be had irrespective of whether 
or not the true “inner details” of nature have been found. Let us call this aim—to find 
a tenable form of realism that avoids the primary arguments against it—a “second-
order” aim. These second-order aims, so far, are consistent with “epistemic” 
structural realism, which is the (positive) epistemological thesis that all we (can) 
know is structure—that, as with Kant, all we have access to, given the creatures that 
we are, is structure and not “reality as it is” (“things in themselves”) apart from our 
conceptual relationship with it. But this thesis treats scientific practice and theory as 
merely an epistemic lens out of which comes only knowledge, knowledge which is 
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necessarily and always mediated knowledge—implying that one cannot “know” what 
is unmediated. 
2.3. “Ontic” Structural Realism. The structural philosophy of science of Steven 
French and James Ladyman draws on some of the work of earlier structuralists like 
Cassirer and Weyl, and embraces an altogether radical form of structural realism 
Ladyman has called “ontic structural realism” (OSR). It claims to be more than a 
mere “epistemic” structural realism, and to offer us a positive metaphysical thesis: 
(relational) structure is all there is; individuals/entities are metaphysically derivative 
from (relational) structure. And it is this relational structure that is captured by our 
(mature) scientific theories. However radical this thesis is, these philosophers claim to 
be motivated not by some a priori philosophical commitments; rather, they argue, 
their metaphysics of structure is motivated by fundamental physics itself (adopting the 
maxim that one’s deep metaphysics—ontology proper—ought to come from 
fundamental physics, a maxim it shares with the third tradition). 
 
3. Proposal: altering the foundations of structuralism. Implicit in this fourth tradition 
is, it seems, a strong criticism of what I have dubbed the third tradition, the tradition 
to which, for example, Tim Maudlin subscribes. In his recent book The Metaphysics 
Within Physics, Maudlin put his finger (albeit unwittingly) on the central bone of 
contention (as I see it) between the third and fourth traditions (which is, at the same 
time, exactly what separates it from all the other traditions), and it has to do with the 
old question “what is Metaphysics?”. Maudlin succinctly articulates the third 
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tradition’s answer to this when he writes quite plainly that “metaphysics is 
ontology”—with the (Quinean) proviso that ontology is provided by science (the 
doctrine seems to be that fundamental physics gives us fundamental ontology). And 
with this the structuralist tradition takes issue: the claim that “metaphysics is 
ontology” requires a reconsideration as to what counts as “ontology”. 
 For the structuralists, ontology isn’t a discovery, via science, of “what there 
is” in the entity sense of that term
11
. The general thought of the fourth (structuralist) 
tradition is something like the following. Science proceeds by postulating an entity or 
entities (or, more generally, a mechanism) by which its investigation into nature for a 
time proceeds but, says the structuralist, what we discover, finally, is not what the 
world is made of, or composed of, or what its “furniture” is. Rather, says the 
structuralist, science reveals a gradually widening breadth of structures, letting go of 
specifically postulated ‘entities’ in favor of the invariant structural details of nature 
which those entities revealed (whenever they were successful). The physical or ‘inner’ 
details of nature are merely scaffolding by which we find nature’s general structure
12
. 
The specific entities and mechanisms advanced by prior sciences are, on this way of 
construing structuralism, a merely temporary means of grasping the structure of 
nature, and as such, this project is inherently open and changeable in its details 
(mathematical and conceptual).  Thus, metaphysics is not, as Quine would have it, a 
                                               
11 This renders Occam’s Razor useless in one important sense: there are no “entia” to be multiplied, let 
alone shaved. 
12 And thus “reality” versus “appearance”—a classical distinction of philosophy that seems to have 
crept into natural philosophy (physics) itself—is changed by the structuralist from “natures” or 
“essences” underneath of “phenomena” to structure manifested by the physical processes and events 
observed in nature. How things appear is part of the structure and order of nature too, so that there is 




discovery of ‘what there is’ but what form or structure there is to what there is, come 
what may regarding the entities science does (or has or will) postulate—that is, what 
empirical relations there are, given a postulated theoretical framework. As the early 
structuralists (19
th
 century) would have agreed, mechanisms, substances or entities 
are always put forward as hypothetical explanations for  natural phenomena, and are 
therefore merely the entry-way into nature’s workings, not the complete or final story, 
nor one that reflects the “way the world truly is, in itself” (the emphasis here is on 
truth as complete and final, and as theories as mirroring or corresponding to this 
ontological truth). Structure is left behind in any mature scientific theory (and this, 
finally, seems to be the simple thesis Worall attempted to defend in his now-famous 
1989 paper). The entities are the scaffolding which allow us to discern the invariant 
structure of nature; they are conceptual instruments that, like our material instruments 
of technological experimentation, allow us to glimpse a reality not graspable by 
ordinary means (by means of pure unaided observation or unsystematic, common 
sense notions). 
 I would like to propose that if we invoke a fundamental distinction
13
—that 
between questions of an “ontological”, as opposed to what I am going to call merely 
an “ontic” sort—and if we drop the (metaphysical) realism from structuralism (and 
hence from the debate altogether), we end up with a more defensible attitude towards 
science (and physics in particular). 
                                               
13 This distinction will be clarified in the next section. The distinction was learned from Heidegger’s 
well-known and influential study of metaphysics Being and Time, specifically deployed in the 
Introduction in order to clarify the “question concerning Being”. However, the distinction actually 
goes back to Aristotle (cf. Book IV, Gamma of Metaphysics, for Aristotle’s classic treatment). I use the 
distinction, though, to slightly different ends, and obviously in a new context. 
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 According to the resulting view, it is better to understand the position of 
researchers like Steven French, James Ladyman and Don Ross (called “Ontic 
Structural Realism”) as offering a general methodological program for science (and 
physics in particular) that advocates the replacement of a naïve materialist causal-
mechanical philosophy, which thinks that the only valid form of explanation and 
scientific understanding must ultimately be given in terms of an ontology of 
fundamental things or stuff/substances (Lewisian-Humeanism), with a more general 
and sophisticated construal of physical reality in which ‘relation’, rather than ‘thing’ 
or ‘independently existing substance’, is the more basic ontic-explanatory category 
(and from which one may recover, as less fundamental, but nonetheless physically 
usefully, concepts like ‘object’ or ‘individual thing’ or ‘independently existing 
substance’, etc. as special cases). Accordingly, the materialist causal-mechanical 
philosophy is taken to be merely a narrow form of the more general structuralist 
methodology, in which we presuppose some notion of object (the specific content of 
which is provided by some physical theory), and try to construct some (relatively 
limited) interpretation of the world using a single fundamental relation (that of 
composition, involving “mereological relations”) from that point of view.
14
 
 Two notable features of this project emerge. 
  First, all of the specific ontic details (substances, relations, etc.) are left open 
and a matter of whether or not one paradigm of thinking can or will be successful 
over others (or that possibly there will be a combination of them). Thus, from a 
                                               
14 One example might be the so-called theory of “Bohmian Mechanics”; another would be the sort of 
picture of the world that Lewis himself seems to derive (shared by some of his readers and critics) 




purely descriptive point of view, there are several proposals on what the fundamental 
nature of physical reality will require of our fundamental theories—some propose 
new entities (strings, loops), some propose that fundamental theory is going to be 
about ‘information’, and some, more abstractly, propose a more ‘relational’ view 
which replaces the view in which there are entities moving or changing in largely 
independently given spacetime
15
. None of these proposals are excluded from the 
running on purely conceptual or analytic grounds (logical consistency/cogency of 
concepts), because the assumption is that there is no prior fact of the matter as to 
“what reality really is”. All of these proposals are taken to be valid possibilities, any 
one of which, if successful, would still only be taken in a conjectural sense. 
 Second, following on from the above remarks, the question as to the “truth” of 
some structuralist hypothesis (like “ontic structural realism”) merely becomes the 
question as to whether or not the facts of our world tend to support the notion, and, in 
turn, whether or not such a hypothesis may be a viable empirical postulate. As for the 
                                               
15 I will have more to say about this point of view, which is the view that, among others, Lee Smolin is 
pursuing (I have also published on the idea, though in a more philosophical vein; see Silberstein, 
Cifone and Stuckey (2008b), which has been appended to this thesis). I will be describing it in contrast 
to the view that entities are the fundamental ontic units of a theory (the basis upon which the world is 
divided, in terms of which fundamental explanations are advanced). For “relational” theories, the very 
means by which changing/moving entities are individuated (this has been space and time, or, since 
Einstein, “spacetime”) is itself a dynamically evolving structure. This is the basic significance of 
general relativity, and it constitutes a rather radical departure from Newtonian physics (even more so 
than does special relativity, which really showed that space alone and time alone cannot really be 
considered as separate—general relativity added matter to this interdependency).  Thus, matter and 
spacetime may be said, according to general relativity, to “co-evolve”. Some theoretical physicists, like 
Lee Smolin (see his 2007) take this to imply a general principle (a meta-principle governing the form 
of fundamental theories), which is that no fundamental theories should be background independent 
(that the spacetime structure, which is fundamental to all physical constants and basic to our 
measurement of all matter, and the structure of matter, are coupled). Thus, part of Smolin’s task is to 
find a consistent quantum theory of some kind that satisfies this principle. This is one way of 
specifying what “relational” really amounts to in physical theories, and I take it to imply that ‘entity 
changing’ and that which provides the arena of change are coupled in a way in which they were not for 
Newtonian physics (thus making a kind of atomism or mechanical philosophy more plausible). We’ll 
return to this later. 
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question of support, the proper relation between science and hypothesis is, as Einstein 
held, one of “epistemological correlation”: we drop the idea that science provides 
truth in the sense of correspondence to some ontological truth, since the supposition 
of such a truth is a trivial assumption of doing science, rather than that thing which 
science is aimed at “discovering”. In other words, science does not aim at “Truth”—
ontological sense—but “truths” in a limited and local sense
16
, the totality of which 
does not constitute Truth. Let me explain what I mean here. 
3.1 A fundamental distinction. In my view, ‘metaphysics’ is a study of, as Aristotle 
famously said, “being as such”. We might say: a study of the “Being of beings”. And 
so metaphysics is ontology, but ontology in this (older sense) is not properly a result 
of science—it is prior to science and, as it were, beyond it. The mistake has been to 
regard this “Being of beings” as yet another something among things, of perhaps a 
different ontological sort (of a “higher-order” level of reality), that can be studied in 
its own right and for which we may supply specific conceptions in order to make its 
nature explicit, and in order that we may have a “true view” of it (like we are taking a 
picture of a scene that stands already there before us). 
 Although I regard this as a flawed view and pursuit of ontology proper, I 
cannot defend that claim here. What is important is to distinguish the question of the 
Being of beings—ontology proper—from a more properly scientific or empirical 
question, which I shall call “ontic”. Questions of this sort—what is the structure and 
nature of this specific being or domain of beings?—require the use of conjectures 
                                               
16 That is, the sense in which science must demarcate a limited domain of investigation, and on the 
basis of this limited scope, advance hypotheses, which in turn may, or may not, correlate with the facts, 
both established and potentially newly discovered. 
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(hypotheses), the aim of which is either to correlate them with the facts or, in the case 
when a conjecture is put forward as a postulate of a theory, to allow us to advance a 
general theory (which Einstein called a “theory of principle”) which proposes to 
coordinate a certain classes of facts together into a theoretical whole (I am thinking of 
Einstein’s remarks about classical thermodynamics here
17
). 
 In particular, when I speak about “ontic structuralism”, I am speaking about 
the sort of metaphysical point of view that holds to the idea that entities are derivative 
from structure—structure being the primitive metaphysical category. This is “ontic” 
and not “ontological” in the sense that ontological claims stand before the empirical 
investigation and serve as a final and closed statement about the nature or essence of 
the beings science investigates (i.e., the provide us a theory of ‘objects’ or a theory of 
‘properties’, etc.), whereas ontic claims follow empirical investigation and stay close 
to the empirical relationships that warrant the particular conceptions of ‘objects’ that 
are put forward hypothetically—without thereby implicating a “theory” of objects, 
properties, etc. For example, the concept ‘electron’ is controlled by our use of that 
term in the context of experimentation and in theorizing about the subatomic world; 
the ontic structuralist says that the concept ‘electron’ may be an ‘object’, but the 
object in question is inherently relational in character—no entity “stands outside” the 
structure of physical relationships that warrant the concept ‘electron’. It is from those 
                                               
17 The advancing of a hypothesis, that is, may take one of two general forms: 
(1) that of a specific mechanism (advanced on the basis of some preexisting or implied—possibly 
untested—theory). One famous example due to Einstein is the kinetic theory of gases, which 
presupposed classical Newtonian mechanics in order to write down the specific details of the 
interactions between gas molecules—the ontic units that formed the physical basis of the 
proposed theory. 
(2) that of general postulates (like those of the Special and General Theories of Relativity), which 
actually regulate or constrain the form of the laws that govern any specific mechanism that 
may be proposed within the domain of those postulates. 
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physical relationships that we derive the concept ‘electron’. Indeed, an ‘electron’ qua 
object is, according to the ontic structuralist, what we can manipulate and control in 
the context of high-energy experiments, electrical-magnetic experiments, etc. We say 




 Science does study things—“what there is”—but it is not in the business of 
revealing the complete and self-standing ‘nature’ of reality, of giving us the ‘nature’ 
of any particular being upon which it sets its study, nor is it in the business of giving 
us the (metaphysical) ‘truth’ of nature. Indeed, nature is not the ‘thing’ we are 
inquiring into when we do science (nature may be a collection of things to which a 
                                               
18 In other words, I am objecting to the formulation and search for a completely ‘monistic’ theory of 
objects to which all instances from any special or general discipline are conceptually bound (it seems 
to me that any monistic, a priori theory in analytical philosophy will have this character—i.e., 
constitute a regulative/prescriptive criterion as well as a theory to which all conceptions of ‘object’, 
‘individual’ will be held accountable). In other words, I presuppose a pluralism of the ‘nature’ of 
objects, individuals, etc.—that is to say, the ‘nature’ of an object will be a function of the details 
particular to a domain of empirical inquiry, and the description of this will not necessarily constitute, 
nor need presuppose, a general, monistic theory of ‘object’. I submit that such a theory be unnecessary, 
and at any rate, insofar as the details of it must be measured against our best scientific theories, in the 
face of theory change, such “theories” will be as changeable and mutable as any scientific ones—thus 
we must be open to the odd fact that our notion of object if open, unstable and hypothetical. Such a 
demand (for a general, monistic theory of objects, individuals, etc.) seems to be too high: for we are 
always probing new areas of nature, and must therefore leave the nature of the individuals and objects 
open. It may be useful to construct a view of objects/individuals on the basis of scientific theory, 
experiment and experience (and I do this on the basis of a collection of “modal structures” encountered 
in the act of theorizing and experimenting with nature—the “happenings” and “doings” and, generally, 
counterfactual truths that are revealed as we manipulate and intervene in nature—objects just plainly 
are that abstraction we advance on the basis of this modal structure, whether or not the object has a 
kind of endurance or persistence across the variety of modal structures where we use the appropriate 
term, such as when we invoke the concept of ‘electron’). But usefulness—even if it clarifies ‘what we 
mean’ by an object in some domain or collection of domains, does not constitute nor depend upon a 
general, monistic theory in the analytic philosopher’s sense. If anything, which is required is a 
phenomenological/biological and psychological account of the acquisition of the concepts ‘object’ and 
‘individual’ (something, e.g., Ladyman et al. (2007) allude to many times)—not an analysis of the 
concept as such in terms of the analytic conception of philosophical theory (often called ‘metaphysical 
accounts”). Any such analysis will serve to obfuscate rather than illuminate the actual basis for the 
concepts in question, and so fail to comprehend what we actually (rather than theoretically) refer to by 
concepts like ‘individual electron’ etc. See Ladyman et al. (2007), and references therein, for a more 
thorough articulation of this worry, as it is not the purport of this dissertation to take up this rather 
extensive and interesting problem. We must leave it to the side here. 
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science devotes its attention, but this collection is not itself another thing about which 
science may theorize, to borrow from Russell and Whitehead’s theory of logical 
types). This sort of enquiry—into ‘nature’ as such—would be to slide back into a 
properly ontological enquiry, and thus to give up on science per se. Science proceeds 
in part by dividing off beings from one another (species, for example), or certain 
domains or collections of phenomena (celestial and terrestrial motions, for example), 
and postulates a theoretical framework for thinking systematically about those 
individuated beings or collections of phenomena. That is, we get a methodology, 
within which specific conjectures or hypotheses are put forth so as to allow the 
methodology to move forward in the sense of allowing for specific models to be 
constructed and later tested by means of laboratory experimentation (or by means of a 
systematic comparison of the regularities already present in nature without the 
intervention or mediation of technological devices per se—the “devices” in this case 
are the (conceptual) hypotheses put forward, in conjunction with a statistical 
coordination of observable facts, so as to produce a relevant and illuminating 
comparative study, from which further inference may be drawn).  
 In this act of giving definition and division to the things it studies, science 
moves away from ontology (the study of Being as such). From the point of view of the 
details of the beings that it sets out to study, it would be an error for science to turn 
back and reflect on what the nature of reality as a whole is, for ‘reality as a whole’ is 
what Russell once called an “illegitimate totality”, and so not a proper object of study 
(we might call it a pathology of thinking). Nonetheless, we make speak about such 
things in their proper domain of enquiry (and this I take to be philosophy proper—or I 
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should say, metaphysics); but we may do this only when we ask, anew, what is 
Being?, and only when we let go of the pull towards engaging this enquiry by 




 It is the nature of these postulations that they are temporary and tentative, not 
eternal and final. Science—and especially physics—changes as it pushes its 
postulates into wider and more remote domains of inquiry
20
. Thus, insofar as a 
definite ‘nature’ or ‘substance’ in the older metaphysical sense is understood to be 
something ultimate, or at any rate final and complete in itself, science does not 
purport to provide such a thing. Science does not take a “picture” of “ultimate 
reality”. In other words, the very worry that Kant was addressing—that the “things in 
themselves” are beyond science, and that, therefore, we should understand empirical 
inquiry as providing an understanding of “things as they (merely) appear to us”, rests 
on a series of false premises, the collection of which implies what Russell would have 
called an “illegitimate totality”—defined by the ideas of ‘natures’ or ‘substances’ 
which in turn ‘compose’ or in some sense ‘constitute’ an ‘ultimate’ reality, one that is 
supposed to be ‘independent’ of ‘mind’. In other words, my argument is that the sum-
total of the old metaphysics of substances, natures, etc., constitutes a conception of 
“ultimate reality”—the totality of what there is—which is entirely illegitimate. Hence, 
                                               
19 It is not the purpose of this thesis to dwell on this particular issue, so these remarks will have to be 
put to the side so that our present study may proceed more or less unencumbered by such general 
issues. 
20 That is to say: those domains which are phenomenologically and instrumentally distant from the 
postulates and assumptions the science began with, as when we conjecture that ordinary classical 
thermodynamic considerations apply to blackbody radiation, which was famously discovered not to 
obtain. So science involves the gradual widening, elaboration and potential complete renovation of 
certain notions that it brings to bear theoretically. 
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we reject this metaphysics. Kant seems to think that this means we are bound to mere 
appearances, therefore. I say that insofar as the very idea of “appearance” itself 
depends upon the prior assumption of an ultimate reality in the sense I just 
mentioned, and insofar as that ultimate reality constitutes an illegitimate totality, 
mutatis mutandis for the “appearances” too. It follows that neither substances, 
natures, etc. (“ultimate reality”) nor the appearances which “cover” this ultimate 
reality (which, again, are the “things-in-themselves”, defined by their natures, 
substances, etc.) is the proper object of science. This is not Kantianism, and it is not 
neo-Kantianism. This is a new philosophical space which I believe ontic structuralists 
like Ladyman et al. are attempting to adopt, but which they have not fully articulated. 
 This new philosophical space—one which the modern day structuralists are 
struggling to define—lacks a reconsideration, and an up-turning into the light of 
critical reason, of the very foundations upon which the whole Kantian, and neo-
Kantian, dialectic is founded. Kant, in essence, was responding to a philosophical 
problematic that arose out of Descartes’ methodology and metaphysic, which itself 
encapsulates much prior medieval thinking about substance, essence and so on—all 
of which is itself a reconfiguration of Aristotle along Christian and neo-Platonist 
lines
21
. It is the Cartesian notion of substance, and what constitutes the ‘nature’ of 
things (‘things’ being instances of some underlying substance, of which, according to 
Descartes, there are two)—it is this particular construal of metaphysics (one of 
substances in the Cartesian-medieval sense) that, Kant argues, cannot be the (proper) 
                                               
21 My characterization of this vast historical period is rough, needless to say. For a beginning into this 
territory, I refer the reader to Josef Pieper’s many lucid essays on the topic (see esp. his 
Scholasticism[1960]), and to Paul Tillich’s History of Christian Thought (1967). For Descartes’ 
metaphysical views, see Burtt’s synthesis of original source materials in his Metaphysical Foundations 
of Modern Science (1932). 
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object of science per se, or even of human understanding more generally. Rather, 
such notions are the conceptual—and merely conceptual—foundations of our mode 
of knowing the world. The “things in themselves”, which these notions are supposed 
to be capturing, always remain outside of, and are the so-called transcendental 
ground of, our inquiry into reality (or, a bit more specifically, into nature). The best 
we can do is to articulate the fundamental categories by which all knowledge of 
reality is made possible, and which all empirical inquiries must presuppose. So Kant 
does not so much as overturn the Cartesian metaphysic, as correct his methodology 
and the proper aim of that methodology: we can only know the appearances of nature, 
and can only supply the necessary presuppositions of that knowledge; everything 
else—the metaphysics of substances, ideas of causality, space and time, etc.—are the 
epistemic background, or rather, the conceptual ground we stand on when we gaze, 
philosophically, at nature. 
 But there is a prior question to Kant’s, which is: upon what ground—prior to 
the realization that certain categories are perhaps necessary for there to be any 
knowledge whatever—does the notion of ‘substance’ rest? Kant says that that very 
question is unanswerable, since it asks something about the ultimate nature of reality 
(i.e., something outside the question itself), of which only appearances and the 
transcendental ground are knowable by creatures such as ourselves, confined to the 
use of senses, in possession of a limited mind, etc. But I say that this argument is 
entirely independent of my question, which is a question about what grounds in 
reality the notions of ‘substance’ or ‘essence’—to which an epistemological thesis or 
a transcendental one is inadequate, because it presupposes that all questions of reality 
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are of an ultimate sort and hence outside the domain of human knowledge. Why 
assume that? It is not clear, for example, that Aristotle, whose scholastic successors 
Descartes specifically has in mind—would have agreed with Kant that all talk about 
‘reality’ presupposes an inquiry into ‘things in themselves’ as opposed to ‘things as 
they (merely) appear to us’. Indeed, our own essence was certainly a fundamental 
mode of our experience, that is, our very thinking itself is the essence to which we 
refer when we call man a ‘thinking being’. 
 Aristotle’s notion of ‘essence’, arguably, is not ‘metaphysical’ in the same 
sense that both Descartes and Kant, roughly two millennia later, took it to be. 
Descartes took himself to be articulating that ‘nature’ of reality in the sense of 
providing the mind-independent, unchanging verities which allow for certain 
knowledge of reality. In other words, the dialectic surrounding the Cartesian and 
Kantian notions of essence, and substance, was fundamentally epistemological, 
whereas for the earlier Ancient Greek tradition, it was exactly reverse: the essence of 
anything was its ‘inner principle’, and insofar as we think, we ‘know’ (directly and 
immediately) our own essence, and from that certainty, we arrive at the inner 
principle of any other being distinct from our own
22,23
. At the top of this system was a 
Mind thinking Itself—Aristotle’s “prime mover”—and so the very essence of reality 
was just a grander or more abstracted form of our own inner essence. That is, the 
                                               
22 Aristotle was the first great methodologist, we may say: he proceeded by induction, and his thinking, 
importantly, begins with Ethics, not Metaphysics; that is, Ethics actually constitutes the basis of 
Aristotle’s thinking. Recall that the “prime mover”, as “thought thinking itself” is such as to think only 
the best, which is itself, so it must be “thought thinking itself”. The notion of “best”—an ethical 
concept—is the heart of Aristotle’s metaphysics (i.e., “Being qua being”). 
23 Obviously, I do not have the time, nor is it the purpose, to defend this claim, which would take us far 
afield of this purport of this thesis; but nonetheless, we should at least note that the general point that I 
am making was defended by, for example, Schopenhauer (this in direct response to Kant’s view). 
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basic structure of reality—its teleological structure—was of a piece with Mind. All 
things, by their inner principle, were “aimed” or “directed towards” the One Mind, 
which is like my own, but just more abstract (literally, self-absorbed in thought). No 
problem of certainty arose under this system, and there is no clear distinction between 
“mind-independent” and “mind-dependent”, because even the “mind-independent” 
things—the beings distinct from my own mind—are comprehended under one 
Intelligence, and whose own inner principle (i.e., the inner principle of motion or 
movement of things) is inextricably bound up to the One Mind. Indeed, there is 
nothing “mind-independent”; the idea is incoherent for Aristotle. Only later, after the 
Scientific Revolution, when the Scholastic-Aristotelian system of predicaments (or 
“predicates”) was effectively reduced to just a few (figure, shape, etc. or what later 
were called “primary qualities”), did the question of certainty arise—and this only 
after Descartes called into question all knowledge by way of his epistemic isolation of 
the knower to a metaphysically isolated domain mysteriously (by his lights) 
“interacting” with the outside (mind-independent) world of “extended bodies” (“res 
extensa”). 
 Descartes wanted to know what absolutely certain foundation there could be 
upon which knowledge might be erected anew, and proceeded from his own, 
individual existence outward, via the notion of a Deity (absolutely benevolent 
guarantor of the verity of clearly perceived ideas in the mind’s theater), to what he 
took to be certain knowledge of “external world”. This is a methodological 
requirement that in turn leads to a certain, definite epistemology and which, in its 
turn, leads to a certain ontology (in fact, we have a closed loop between metaphysics 
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and epistemology). But in the end, Descartes could not call into question—by his own 
lights—a fundamental presupposition of this inquiry, which is, that “I am a thinking 
being”. He simply reasserts this as a necessarily true foundation. But where does this 
notion of individuality come from? Where is it that we arrive at the notion of an 
independent thinking thing, among a collection of other things outside of the 
substance of the thinking thing, for, by the lights of his methodology, every idea must 
itself have some certain foundation outside itself? In other words, part of the 
presupposition of Descartes’ starting point is already a distinction between internal 
reality vs. external reality. The former is the realm of the “mind-dependent” and the 
latter is the realm of the “mind-independent”. Science can know and study the latter 
exactly, for the nature of the external world is pure extension (i.e., geometry) itself; 
the former remains outside of its grasp (thinking substance is un-extended, and hence 
un-geometrical—therefore literally ungraspable). Kant corrects this by coming to 
terms with the Empiricism that comes roughly after Descartes: what we know is 
bounded by the limited nature of our senses, and so our rational deductions must be 
constrained accordingly; we don’t, properly speaking, ‘know’ that reality is composed 
of two independent substances (res extensa and res cogitans for Descartes), we must 
presuppose certain categories of thinking (substance, individuals, universals) by 
which we may acquire any knowledge at all, and those are merely the 
transcendentally necessary grounds for our thinking, not the ultimate nature of 
reality
24
. Keeping the distinction between “mind-independent” vs. “mind-dependent” 
intact, Kant simply fuses the two by way of his transcendental argument: certain ideas 
                                               
24 Or at any rate, insofar as this ground is itself part of the reality we grasp, it is the most we can know 
of the reality itself—as it ‘is in itself’, as the old phrase goes. 
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are necessary only insofar as knowledge is not possible without them; but as to 
whether or not those ideas reflect the mind-independent reality, we cannot, properly, 
have knowledge of that. These transcendentally necessary ideas (the categories) 
refract the things-in-themselves and return to us their mere appearances, colored by 
those necessary ideas. Kant, thus, manages a tenuous synthesis between Empiricism 
and Rationalism
25
. Kant does not go underneath the foundations of either; neither 
does Descartes. 
 We must face a question, though—one which has in it the heart of the 
question of “realism”: what is science “about”, if you have just parted with the 
tradition of thinking of nature in terms of ultimate reality (natures, substances, etc.) 
and appearances? The right reply is that we have dropped (indeed, we must drop) the 
“correspondence” notion of truth in regard to our scientific hypotheses (there is, in a 
sense, nothing of an ultimate, final sort that to which theories refer—the idea of 
“correspondence” presupposes an illegitimate totality), so the question of what 
science is “about” becomes instead: What does science involve us into? When the 
predictions and manipulations and interventions of a science are fairly reliable, then 
what may we say that we have understood, or grasped, by that science? Here is 
where, when the question as such is posed, we must take a stand
26
. This is where we 
                                               
25 Knowledge is a refraction of experience by way of necessary categories of thinking; so, rational 
deductions are, inasmuch as some of the elements/premises of that deductive activity are taken from 
this refracted conceptual-sensory knowledge, a function of our epistemic limitations and so are not 
necessary truths. Some rational deductions are, but those are of a purely conceptual nature and are 
devoid of any empirical content: they are, as all mathematical theorems are, “tautological” in the 
extreme, and can never tell us anything about the nature of reality, or anything else outside the realm 
of those conceptions. 
26 There is of course the retreat to yet another point of view, which says that there’s no need to take a 
stand at all—I leave that issue, which is “instrumentalism” to the side. It will become clear that the 
position being defended here actually entails a kind of instrumentalism, but it does so not by 
construing instrumentalism as a retreat from realism since the question of ‘realism’ is simply 
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articulate our attitude towards science, where we take a critical and reflective pause to 
think about it as a whole, as a certain sort of human endeavor among others. 
 As we do science, we are involved into the world—into ‘reality’—more and 
more deeply. Our notions of what reality ‘is’ must, therefore, fluctuate according to 
our deeper engagement with it, and according to our widening horizon of experiences 
(for example, our experiences with particle colliders, telescopes of various sorts, of 
the diversity of organic life, and so on). Thus, we arrive at notions of reality which 
are to some extent ‘close’ to our immediate, unsystematic and ‘pre-theoretical’ 
understanding of nature, and to some extent further from this. For example, my notion 
of what matter is—what even a table is—is to some extent a function of my 
immediate contact with it, and also to some extent may reflect what we know is true 
of all matter (that it is fundamentally quantum mechanical). This may seem a trivial 
observation, but it remains to be seen, for example, whether or not, and to what 
extent, macroscopic objects of various sorts may manifest quantum mechanical 
features. Supposing that this is a coherent possibility (and physicists like Anthony 
Leggett, for example, are exploring exactly this possibility), we must modify our 
notion of matter, and even tables (or whatever objects are subjected to quantum 
mechanical manipulations) accordingly. Thus, the notion that there is a radical break 
between what Sellars called the “scientific” (or we may say, “theoretical”) vs. the 
“manifest” view, is misguided. We must face the eventuality that, as science teaches 
us something new about even our most basic categories of experience, we may indeed 
need to depend upon those theoretical determinations in even the understanding of 
                                                                                                                                      




our own immediate experiences with reality. So, if anything, the distinction between 
the “scientific” and “manifest” views is fluid, and at any rate, indefinite. So too the 
notion of “theoretical” as opposed to “observable” entity. 
 So, the only problem with the notion of ‘substance’ or ‘essence’ is that it may 
just be too general and abstract, and perhaps not rich enough to account for specific 
experiences or experiments, not that it is overly metaphysical, or that it points to 
realities that are beyond the purview of science (which is, as Kant has it, just about 
the “appearances”, not “things-in-themselves”); and, that such notions may lead to 
misleading characterizations of reality, like that all things may be reduced to 
elementary parts interacting in space and time and that, furthermore, all 
understanding of nature must presuppose such a conceptual reduction. In a sense, all 
that the structuralist philosophers of recent days are saying is that ‘substance’ or 
‘essence’—ontology in the sense in which analytic philosopher have used the term—
needs to be generalized in order to account for new physics and new experiments, and 
that ‘substance’ is not a notion that stands outside this empirical endeavor nor is it an 
attempt to grasp the “nature” of reality. That is, when it is said that “structure is all 
there is”, this is a radical thesis only insofar as it is taken to be a claim that “reality is 
ultimately composed of structure”, but it is a relatively conservative thesis insofar as 
it is taken not to be a statement about the “ultimate nature of reality” but rather a 
statement that entities (whenever studied empirically) are just relational structure 




 Notice, that as I’ve construed the whole issue, one does not have to show that 
metaphysics, as the study of substance, essence, etc., is absurd or wrong or that it 
should be avoided. Rather, it just puts metaphysical—I would say, “ontic”—
speculations in the service of empirical inquiry, and not the other way around (this is 
the thesis, indeed, of Ladyman et al.’s “polemical” introductory chapter). As for a 
study of “Being as such”—what I would call “ontology” proper, and what is usually 
called “metaphysics” proper—that is certainly an important endeavor, but it is one 
that is not directly relevant in the construction of scientific theory or experiment. It is 
relevant, though, when it comes to fundamental questions concerning time, and our 
experience of it, and this sort of questioning becomes the fertile soil from which truly 
insightful scientific work often springs. You cannot separate human experience from 
metaphysics proper—a study of Being as such—but it is often our drive to depart 
from our single human experiences that is the backbone of science (the ideal of 
objectivity). 
 As I understand it, then, structuralism wants to be reflective about what is 
scientifically known without slipping into what I have called an ontological enquiry; 
but it wants also to be able to accurately describe the whole endeavor of science itself, 
and to come to some understanding of scientific knowledge that is sensitive to 
changes in what is known without having significant and unbridgeable discontinuities 
in that knowledge from one age to the next. In other words, it is important to have a 
coherent narrative of science in order for us to make sense of it as a human endeavor, 
in order for us to understand what it is that we are doing (and perhaps to give us an 
inkling into why we are doing what we’re doing). 
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 In this light I offer the following thesis as to what science is “about”: 
 Within each relatively well-defined and well-understood domain of 
application, a science is in the business of giving us a relatively good and accurate 
description of what we can call the “modal structure” of each domain of phenomena; 
it gives us ways of manipulating and intervening into that modal structure (which, of 
course, becomes part of that modal structure itself). Our attitude towards the 
successes (and failures) of science should be that it provides us a relatively limited 
means of describing and manipulating the modal structure of relatively isolated 
domains of phenomena
27
. What we learn from science, then, is how to reliably “make 
things happen” and how to systematically interfere into how things go, by means of a 
theoretical framework which in turn enables us to systematically relate together into a 
theoretical whole the goings on, the interfering, and the making of things happen. It is 
this aspect of theoretical unification—the pulling together of possibly diverse 
phenomena under one theoretical framework—that constitutes what I will call an 
“ontic” enquiry: the postulation of concepts (axioms, definitions, or even explanatory 
mechanisms and entities), and their marriage to observation and experimentation. 
This we call science. 
 By “modal structure” I mean the relatively stable, recurring patterns of 
activities, and the relatively stable and recurring systems of counterfactual 
dependencies (which we often find as we attempt to intervene/interfere with those 
relatively stable and recurring patterns of nature). This constitutes an empirical 
                                               
27 It is consistent with this thesis that there may exist bridges between these relatively isolated domains, 
and that would constitute yet more modal structure—so-called “inter-theoretic” relationships. 
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structure of relationships, representable by mathematical structures to which, with the 
aid of fundamental concepts like ‘length’, duration’, etc. in conjunction with readily 
constructible material correlates (like ‘meter stick’, ‘laser beam’ or ‘clock’), we 
ascribe what we call measureable, “physical” quantities. These numbers, in turn, 
reflect our mathematical representations, and must have (at least in principle) clear 




 Notice that I am taking a particular view about science, and in so doing it may 
seem that I lapse back into what I called an ontological enquiry, where the 
presupposition is that there is some ontological truth behind the object of enquiry to 
which my study is directed—which would be a confusion on my part. Such is not the 
case. When I speak about “science”, and advance a view as to what it is “about”, it is 
not inconsistent with the general view adopted here that we take this thesis to be just 
another empirical hypothesis that is open to being epistemologically correlated with 
the facts. But what are the facts, you may wonder? Here, we enter a kind of 
anthropological, sociological and historical domain of enquiry. By ‘science’ I simply 
understand a particular tradition and method of conjecture and experimentation that 
has given rise to several successful and fruitful theoretical systems, systems which are 
relatively fixed in the historical record. 
 Curiously, there seems to be a disturbing theoretical and conceptual regressus 
ad absurdam, looming in the background here, for it seems to be implicit in the 
                                               
28 However, as is the case with the infamous “measurement problem” of quantum mechanics, this 
relationship sometimes threatens to break down. 
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position I am stating that in order to understand anything at all, some conjecture must 
be advanced for it, and found to either epistemologically correlate with the facts, or 
fail to (in which case the conjecture is let go of, and the processes begins again)—
including notions such as ‘fact’, and so on … ad infinitum. Here you might think that 
the notion of ontological Truth might actually do some good, that it provides a kind of 
wall, or at any rate, slows and greatly limits this simultaneous calling into question of 
everything, which includes the very grounds of questioning itself. But this problem is 
only an appearance, a pathology of thinking, we may say; there really is no problem. 
It is only a problem if you think that understanding and knowledge are inextricably 
linked, and that either requires a complete explication of that in virtue of which the 
concepts of understanding or knowledge are true. This is not the case. 
 Firstly, I distinguish knowledge proper from understanding; the former is 
grounded in systematic theory and ends in a coordinated system of some sort
29
, the 
grasp of which constitutes, by definition, knowledge in full, whereas the grasp of a 
part of it (on the assumption that the whole is true) constitutes (again, by definition) 
knowledge in part. But like a musician who has grasped either a whole or part of a 
theoretical musical system, there needn’t be present in him a grasp of that system in 
terms of an explicit conceptual grasp of that system. Rather, knowledge of a system 
may be demonstrated in his understanding, which is more general in nature 
(comprising the movements of his muscles—what we could call “somatic” 
understanding—in addition to his being able to articulate specific concepts and their 
                                               
29 We may call this the highest aim of science—something like what Aristotle tries to achieve in his 
Physics, but which had to be overturned given the failure of his basic notions to correlate with the facts 
dictated by a new view of the universe developed by the line of natural philosophers from Oresme, 
Galileo, Kepler, to Newton. 
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logical connections). Thus, understanding is rooted in the actual being of a person, 
whereas “knowledge” is objective in the sense of being a coherent/consistent 
collection of propositions (that may be said to be “learned” or “taken in”), which, in 
their turn, may or may not epistemologically correlate with the relevant facts (here—
and only here—I take science to be the only source of knowledge proper). 
 As knowledge in the sense we use here is itself going to depend on the 
specific form it is given (where that means its specific conceptual/intellectual 
representation), such knowledge will be dependent upon many contingent things, 
like, choice of logical axioms or postulates, physical concepts, etc.—all of which, to 
paraphrase Einstein, are free inventions of the human intellect. But since we have 
abandoned the correspondence notion of truth in regard to this conjectural mode of 
enquiry (which we call science), the need to clarify or analyze some notion or other 
which that enquiry requires is not problematic, for the simple reason that its aim is to 
become epistemologically well correlated with the facts. Perhaps our very notion of 
‘science’ itself might have to be called into question—and this is left as a viable 
possibility. 
 Perhaps, too, our notion of ‘fact’? Here we come to a crucial question, which 
concerns the foundation of this conjectural enquiry, the asking of which threatens to 
render the whole view advanced here incoherent. But we may easily answer this 
quandary: ‘fact’ is partly a function of the theoretical domain that seeks to correlate 
its conjectures with those facts—the two cannot be neatly separated. Inasmuch as 
theory (and so also what ‘fact’ is) depends on a free invention of the human intellect, 
and inasmuch as we have relegated ontological truth to a separate domain of enquiry 
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(the purely metaphysical), and insofar as we take science to proceed tentatively, then 
our problem of a regression to absurdity is really a fiction, conjured on the basis of 
premises which we are rejecting (the problem is more a question of ontology, and so 
is unfair to judge the merits of our present thesis by its standards). To put the point 
differently: if ‘fact’ is restricted to a question concerning the “essence” of fact, the 
nature of it, then even more clearly is this a question that is ontological (and not 
properly ‘ontic’), and which, in the probing of the question, leads inevitably to a 
question concerning a “mind-independent reality”—all of which, as I’ve said, are, 
properly, ontological questions, and these questions do not concern us here. 
Nonetheless, there is a perfectly clear and cogent sense of a question concerning 
‘fact’, and that is the extent to which facts and our theories are intertwined. 
Sometimes a theory might require a revision in what counts as a fact, on the basis of a 
new theoretical system. I take it that the switch from the Aristotelian view to the 
Newtonian one entailed just such a switch (in a perfectly clear and specific way—
which is not a question relevant to, nor to be considered from the point of view of 
ontology proper, a question concerning truth and being as such). 
 In a way, the distinction I am drawing here corresponds to so-called 
“internalist” (coherence theory) vs. “externalist” (semantic or correspondence theory) 
notions of truth—but the similarity does not go very far, for such a distinction 
between theories of truth presupposes an investigation into (or analysis of) ‘truth’ as 
such, that is, it concerns itself with ‘what truth is’. Nothing like that is implicated in 
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my present discussion; all of such concerns are, according to the position adopted 
here, to be relegated to the properly ontological domain of enquiry
30
. 
 Our concerns should rather be directed to what is meant by “epistemological 
correlation between conjecture and fact”, as this relation supplants our concern for 
“truth” as in “correspondence of the proposition or idea to an ‘external reality’” 
(having, of course, rejected the view that science consists, essentially, in scientific 
theories viewed as collections of propositions or atomic statements
31
). We turn next 
to this issue, as it will be of fundamental importance to my overall thesis. 
 I borrow this epistemological idea from Einstein, whose reflections on physics 
and philosophy (epistemology really) are often overlooked or misread. Before I turn 
to Einstein’s treatment of this idea, I want to remark about the character of the 
relation in regards to two general types of conjectures, one we call simply a “local 
conjecture” and the other we will refer to as an empirical postulate, axiom or perhaps 
                                               
30 I think there is only a singular answer to that question, for which a “theoretical account” in the sense 
of logical analysis is inadequate (possibly confused), and that is “truth is Being”. 
31 That is, I reject both the “syntactic” view of theories, and the “semantic” conception, inasmuch as 
these conceptions are meant to explicate what a theory is, or what the nature of theories in general is. I 
do not subscribe to such a flat-footed monism, and treat either view as partial and tentative. My own 
view is that if the distinction between the two, roughly, amounts to the distinction between theories as 
sets of propositions (axioms and theorems) vs. collections of models (Monton 2008), then it seems that 
both views constitute together an accurate description of theories as we have come to know them, and 
as working theoreticians use them. Again, even regarding the question of theories, we are engaged in a 
conjectural enquiry (according to the general philosophical position advanced in this dissertation). 
However, it has become commonplace for most academic philosophers of science to take a second-
order, “philosophical” approach to the analysis of concepts—such an approach I say is confused, if 
taken to be an ontological pursuit; if, rather, we take it as an “ontic” one—a matter of empirical 
enquiry (science)—then we take it to be by its nature conjectural. Thus, I am at liberty to marry the 
two conceptions of theory as each case may require. (I am also, by the way, rejecting the view that in 
order to even call a theory a ‘theory’, one must advance a general account of the term ‘theory’, that in 
order to know what a theory is—what scientists have done for centuries—one must have a fully 
explicit theory of theories in place, or that there must be an implicit system of rules that may be made 
explicit in virtue of which a theory is a ‘theory’. Such questions are perfectly valid as an 
anthropological or sociological or even a purely linguistic matter (the use of terms, grammars, etc.); 
but as scientific questions, they are, as I’ve said, inherently conjectural.) 
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simply, “principle”. The former sort of conjecture stands alone, and invokes a theory 
in order for it to be applied to a physical situation that constitutes its test. 
 A “local conjecture” may be a singular statement, but is often more of a 
collection of statements that suggests a model-explanation of some physical situation 
that is under investigation. The germ theory of diseases, for example, constitutes a 
conjecture of this sort: the postulation of the existence of microscopic organisms 
(with their own causes and conditions of growth) that purports to explain the 
manifestation of a disease or collection of diseases. This theory, as it is corroborated 
by the relevant facts, will in turn be folded into a larger theory or theories involving 
the fine structure of the microorganisms themselves, which can then be related to 
theories of human anatomy, metabolism, and so on—and thus we build to a larger 
theoretical picture of disease that involves the human organism and the 
microorganism in a larger dynamic whole (a kind of symbiosis). We may, in its turn, 
fold this understanding into a more general theory—say, evolutionary biology and 
genetics—in order to understand how the microorganism, over larger periods of time, 
evolves in relationship to the drugs we might use on the human organism to destroy, 
or interfere in the life-cycle of, the pathogens we have been able to isolate. 
 Local conjectures—like the germ hypothesis and resulting theoretical model it 
suggests—are different from conjectures we are calling postulates, axioms or 
principles. These are of a general character (like the principle of biological evolution, 
or the principles of classical thermodynamics) and are often not themselves strictly 
testable but become part of the very constraints on any particular, local hypothesis in 
its domain. In other words, they will often function as regulating principles on the 
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sorts of local conjectures that may be advanced. Inasmuch as any particular 
experiment may potentially call into question the specific assumptions it makes, 
including the local conjecture for which the experiment was fashioned and the 
assumptions required in order that the experiment itself may be built, any particular 
experiment always implicates the entire theoretical paradigm under which it is 
subsumed (this is Quine’s theory-experiment holism). And so we may say that, in 
general, it is not possible to “isolate” as general a conjecture (we call it a principle) as 
the light principle (for example), or the prohibition of perpetual motion machines of 
various sorts (the context of the first and second laws of classical thermodynamics). 
Rather, such principles may be overturned only given a conceptual counterexample, 
or else be overturned on the basis of another set of conjectures which is more fruitful 
(for example, Einstein’s theory of special relativity is of the second sort relative to its 
aether theory rivals, which in turn presupposed principles of Newtonian physics
32
). 
                                               
32 And here I would say that Einstein’s theory did not overturn as false its rivals (aether theory or 
otherwise); rather, it merely proposed simpler postulates from which simpler explanations for the 
apparent incompatibility of the laws governing electromagnetic radiation and the principle of relativity 
followed (that problem for which Lorentz offered a more complicated program, one of deriving the 
right form of the laws from a consideration of the mechanical forces exerted on an electron’s orbit in 
motion relative to absolute space). Since an overturned theory is not “false” (strictly speaking, it still 
may manage to correlate rather well with its facts, given a sufficiently restricted set), nor an accepted 
one “true”, it would be wrong to deduce consequences from theories that are taken to be about the 
“nature of reality”. The conjectural nature of science demands humility here, rather than metaphysical 
extravagance. Nonetheless, our theories do lead us to new ways of thinking about reality, which may in 
turn becomes facts that we must live with. I am thinking of the possibilities of time travel that General 
Relativity implies, or the minimal sort of holism that some take as a consequence of the quantum 
superposition principle: they may certainly make us see the world and our experiences in a different 
light, but until they become actual features of the experiences of human beings (upon which we would 
have occasion to reflect), they are strictly of a conjectural-theoretical sort, and have little to do with our 
human understanding as such (recall the distinction I made between knowledge and understanding). I 
say “until”: I take it that there is no radical or permanent dichotomy between what Sellars has called 
the “scientific” vs. the “manifest” view, and that it remains to be see what consequences of our theories 
may become elements of human experience, and hence made “manifest” to us. Reflections of this sort 
may be found primarily in works of literature and poetry (art in general).  For example George 
Gamow’s works, though not of a strictly academic sort, raise the sorts of questions raised here 
(interestingly, Hans Reichenbach, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, reflected on this sort of thing in his 
well-known study The Philosophy of Space and Time, p. 138—139, where he considers the issue of 
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 The distinction I have drawn between local conjectures and principles 
corresponds to a large extent with the now famous distinction Einstein liked to make 
between theories of principle (like special relativity and classical thermodynamics) 
vs. theories of a “constructive” nature (like the kinetic theory of gases). I have not 
employed this distinction exactly as Einstein used it, and it has come under some 
scrutiny recently (i.e. by Prof. Michel Janssen), but I do see there to be a deeper 
epistemological and methodological lesson here, and that is one having to do with the 
nature of the conjectures central to either sort of theory
33
. 
 When Newton proposed his theory in the Principia, it was largely on the basis 
of a series of principles, which in turn allowed for a large collection of local 
conjectures to be formulated (all manner of mechanical theories resting on his 





centuries. In contrast to the approach of his rivals (namely, Descartes and the so-
called “corpuscular” school of natural philosophy), Newton proposed a theory of 
universal gravitation that did not attempt to build up the phenomenon from 
independent units carrying mechanical force which, only in concert, would constitute 
gravity (e.g., the famous “vortex” theory of the Cartesians). Nonetheless, Newton, as 
well as most other natural philosophers of his day, proceeded in an “axiomatic” 
fashion, which involves the stipulation of general principles (axioms or laws of 
                                                                                                                                      
time order, and what it would be like, from the point of view of an observer on what he called a 
“closed causal chain”. I think his considerations raise interesting questions about the unity of 
consciousness along causal loops, and what an ‘individual being’ is that could meet itself at different 
times). 
33 Obviously, as to whether or not the distinction between principle and constructive theories is itself 




motion, as Newton termed them). Newton succeeded simply because his principles 
were of the most general sort, the most universal in scope. 
 It becomes an interesting epistemological question as to how exactly these 
principles may be justified. It is an interesting historical fact that while his axioms and 
definitions are not entirely clear, or sometimes seem to be circular, the theory led to a 
great many successful applications in the next two centuries of its use, expanding its 
domain of application considerably. On this, Dijksterhuis writes, therefore, that 
[p]roperly speaking, the whole system can only be understood in the 
light of the subsequent development of the science. But even then it is 
still difficult to discover Newton’s precise intention in every case, and 
consequently many differences of opinion have persisted to our own 
time about the meaning of some of his statements (1961, p. 466). 
 So, we cannot treat the question of the justification in too strict a fashion (i.e., 
as a matter of deductive logic), since the general principles need only to be consistent 
with the phenomena they purport to cover, and to form a self-consistent whole 
themselves, even though the specific meaning of each statement individually 
considered may not be entirely clear
34
. We may take these as minimal conditions, and 
not conditions for the truth of the principles—only for their initial correlation with 
the facts and for the theory’s internal, rational coherence (this last condition of which 
may not at all be necessary in any important sense
35
). Once such a conjectural system 
passes those minimal conditions, it may then be used to derive consequences that 
may, in conjunction with other assumptions or local conjectures (i.e., ones attuned to 
                                               
34 Indeed, there may always be an ineliminably “tacit” component to what is expressed in any 
axiomatic formulation of any science, in mathematics and well as in physics (mechanics). This was a 
topic of interest for Polanyi, for example (see his 1974 book Personal Knowledge). 




a more limited domain of application, say to hydrodynamics or collisions between 
massive bodies in motion), be tested experimentally. 
 Having made the distinction between local conjectures and general principles 
sufficiently clear, we then must pass on to what I mean by “empirical correlation” 
between conjecture and the facts relevant to that conjecture. Our ultimate concern is 
what the nature of the ontic commitment is regarding the structuralist about science, 
i.e., we want to know: “what is it” that one thinks science is “about”, if one is a 
structuralist? 
 We have already distinguished between two separate modes of enquiry, the 
one properly called “ontological”, and the other I have dubbed “ontic”
36
. With ontic 
modes of inquiry we study beings in their individuality, and seek to inquire into their 
specific natures; here, we put forward conjectures of various sorts (local hypotheses 
and general principles). With the ontic mode, it is a presupposition that there is a 
reality to be inquired into—the act of looking and posing questions about particular 
beings is proof enough here (should we cite Moore’s infamous proof?). As such, this 
presupposition, inasmuch as nothing further of it is required in order that particular 
beings may be studied (just that they exist at all), is entirely trivial and vacuous 
regarding ontic enquiry as such. It may be tossed aside. It was only on the assumption 
that there must be some clear connection between an “external” reality and those 
propositions of science that make a coherent science possible—it was only on account 
of that assumption that we had to worry about “reality” as such (its existence), and 
                                               
36  Though I haven’t bothered to use that term much; this is so that we do not conflate the general 
domain of enquiry I have called “ontic”—basically, empirical research into the nature of particular 
beings— with another position which is called ontic structural realism. 
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whether and to what extent we could have true or justified knowledge of it. The ontic 
pursuit is one in which we always begin with a conjectural specification of the nature 
of particular beings (perhaps even occasionally calling into question what the nature 
of the ‘particulars’ are that are under study, and whether or not a refinement of that 
concept is called for
37
), with the perpetual understanding that it will be overturned in 
light of new facts or theories. It is not the “nature of reality” as such (a reflection of 
the “eternal truth behind appearances”) that we are discovering; rather, we are 
uncovering relatively well-corroborated empirical relationships that exit. We may 
say: what we are learning about the world is what conjectures constitute relatively 
stable correlations with the relevant facts—specific conjectures being our way of 
rationally knowing reality
38
. Whenever a conjecture does manage to reliably correlate 
with the relevant facts, we may call that an “epistemological correlation”, after 
Einstein, as pointed out by Northorp in his analysis of Einstein’s conception of 
science. 
                                               
37 One simple way to understand “ontic structural realism” is just this way: a proposal that a richer and 
more sophisticated notion of ‘individuals’ is called for, possibly (for example) by both relativity and 
quantum mechanics. That is, rather than worrying about the nature of individuals per se as a strictly 
metaphysical question, we worry about whether we can coherently extend the notion in a particular 
theoretical context to account for seemingly anomalous findings, like the issues raised by particle 
label-swapping in quantum statistics. (There, thus, is a kind of metaphysical underdetermination (see 
Ladyman and Ross 2007)). 
38 Recall that I have made a distinction between knowledge and understanding; accordingly, scientific 
knowledge would not exhaust understanding. Nonetheless, the only valid knowledge would be 
scientific knowledge, where ‘valid’ means ‘epistemologically correlated to the relevant facts’. In a 
sense, just about anything may constitute scientific knowledge (inasmuch as there is a theoretical 
component to it, which itself is, to borrow again from Einstein, a free invention of the human 
intellect)—“let a thousand flowers bloom”, as Feyerabend once remarked (quoting Chairman Mao). 
But that some conjecture gets to become an element of scientific knowledge depends on the extent to 
which it correlates to the relevant facts. Something like astrology, for example, may simply be beyond 
a true test qua science in our sense, i.e.: the experiments it would take to discover whether the facts 
correlate with its conjectures may be beyond our present abilities, or—and this may be more 
reasonable a judgment—astrology just doesn’t have nearly a general enough theoretical form 
(formulated in terms of principles that relate the actual motions of heavenly bodies to the births and 
lives of individuals) to make testable predictions. We make no pronouncement as to whether such a 
thing is somehow inherently impossible—nor should we ever try to demonstrate a claim of such 
obviously impossible generality. 
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4. Summary of the proposed position. In summary, there are two major changes to our 
orientation towards the fourth tradition that the position I am developing here entails. 
 I am proposing a change to the nature of the second-order presuppositions of 
the fourth tradition, and, on the other hand, I am suggesting that structuralism can be 
understood as a methodological program for the doing of science itself (i.e., it is also 
a first-order project). Here the thesis is that the fourth tradition may actually 
constitute a part of science, rather than being a merely second-order, normative 
project. I would like to show that this methodological program of structuralism is 
already working in physics itself: we can see it in both the switch from Newtonian to 
relativistic physics (as Einstein envisioned it) and in the switch from Newtonian or 
classical physics to quantum mechanics. It is a program that has as its central element 
the removal of the criterion that scientific/physical explanation must presuppose a 
description of either matter in motion, or self-subsistent entities with intrinsic 
properties that “cause” or “bring about” certain effects (which will themselves be 
characterized in the same ontic terms). According to structuralism, physics is the 
search for invariant mathematical structures that may be applied to nature irrespective 
of the material constitution of that to which the structures are applied. The 
structuralist, furthermore, says that even the material constitution of an object of 
physical investigation will be understood structurally. The structuralist, therefore, is 
committed to the idea that the notion of an ‘object’ is derivative from structure. 
Beginning with a roughly individuated, well-localized, relatively independent ‘object’ 
(say, an atom) of study, physics subjects it to a theoretical scrutiny to learn its 
properties. The thesis of structuralism, qua methodological program, is that upon this 
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further analysis, the ‘object’ under study will be just more structure. More 
particularly, the thesis here is that ever since both relativity and quantum theory, 
physics has discovered that there is more relational structure to nature than previously 
thought, and that the idea of an independent, self-subsistent entity evolving against a 
background spacetime in terms of which all features of nature may be explained was 
too naïve a picture, and that particles of matter are like self-contained, relatively 
independent, permanent/continuous objects akin to the macroscopic objects of 
everyday experience is mostly inapplicable in both the relativistic and quantum 
regimes. 
 As has been noted by many philosophers of science, there are no “pure 
observations” (ones sealed off from any theoretical presuppositions of a more or less 
scientific sort), just as there is no “pure theory”. Any time a conjecture is put forth to 
be tested against experimentation, we bring to the table some understanding (however 
rough) of how the theory and the experiment itself are linked, and what it is that is 
going into the experiment, and what it is that comes out—all of this is established by 
traditions of experimentation and observation that any experimentalist has been 
steeped in (implicitly or explicitly). More importantly, a crucial aspect of theory 
confirmation is the interpretation of the data. Fundamental to any interpretation is 
some way of coordinating the results into a sensible whole, and fundamental to that 
are certain basic categories and distinctions: system, subsystem; experimental 
apparatus, object of experiment; space, time; mass, momentum, energy, and so on. A 
very fundamental category of thinking about the world is individual, and object, and 
we usually tend to think of these as entities bearing certain properties or physical 
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quantities (charge, spin, mass, etc.). When we do science, these fundamental 
categories become very important to our interpretation of the data to which we hope 
to successfully correlate with our conjectures. These categories help the scientist to 
do science with more understanding; they help to orient the scientist in the world of 
theory and experimentation by answering the question: what is it that is being 
studied? But in doing science, we are opening up our fundamental categories to a 
kind of test; we ask of them can they be successfully extended to such and such a 
theoretical domain? Occasionally, the confrontation of conjectures with experiments 
requires abandoning some fundamental assumptions that perhaps were hidden in the 
science one was working with, and which, when made explicit and finally overturned, 
might very well lead to a an entirely new theory, which, in its turn, will lead to new 
ways of thinking about the world—and so the process goes, century after century. 
 The thesis being developed here argues that we are not overturning as false 
prior theories or prior ways of thinking about the world; rather, we are giving up what 
were always tentative conjectures about the world that proved not to correlate well 
with the facts (which of course leaves open, in principle, the possibility that older 
ways of thinking may very well return someday in the future). I propose that 
structuralism can be understood as offering a more general way of thinking about the 
world that is relevant to the act of making conjectures about the world, and so may be 
considered part of the doing of science itself. Structuralism (what I will call “ontic 
structuralism”) proposes that it is coherent to think about reality in terms of relational 
structure, rather than primarily in terms of individual entities (changing with respect 
to a background, independent spacetime). This is, as it turns out, exactly what Lee 
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Smolin (2000, 2006) is considering as part of his overall attempt to resolve the so-
called problem of “quantum gravity”. I propose that this is a first-order example of 
structuralist thinking that argues for a different conception of what fundamental 
physical reality is like, which also has the potential of becoming a new fundamental 
physical theory. It is part of Smolin’s proposal to actually derive spacetime itself from 
more fundamental structures, out of which, in turn, entities such as well-localized 
particles arise (they are called “knots” in his theory). Here, structuralism is simply a 
way of making sense of a theory in which there are no entities “at bottom”. I am 
arguing that, in other words, ontic structuralism is a conceptual aid in the putting 
forth of conjectures of theoretical physics, rather than a conclusion from such 
endeavors. Such a point of view must be considered admissible, for the simple reason 
that the task theoretical physics sets for itself in this case is to find laws governing the 
origination and evolution of spacetime itself,  on the basis of more fundamental 
structures (called “loops”). 
 Aside from the change in the presuppositions in the whole debate surrounding 
the main contentions of the structuralist (the fourth tradition) that I have outlined 
(changes which are largely negative, or, we may say, destructive of the Kantian 
tradition that frames any talk of ‘realism’), I want to offer a more positive second-
order framing. 
It is the hallmark of science that it aims for the greatest generality in its given domain 
of inquiry. Even if that domain be itself narrow, or there be a kind of patchwork of 
relatively autonomous domains, still the hallmark of science is the coordination of the 
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beings in its domain (however autonomous in respect to other domains of beings) by 
means of general principles. 
 We may call into question, though, the tenability of this claim about science’s 
generality. Perhaps it is unwise to conceive of science as aiming for greatest 
generality—perhaps the universe will simply not admit of that. My reply is twofold: 
the universe will not rule on an ontological question one way or the other, as, in 
accordance with the view advanced here, such implications from a scientific theory 
are never appropriate. Science will not “reveal” to us that our universe is “dappled” 
or “patchwork”, for example
39
. 
 Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the issue is understood as primarily 
epistemological, and here is where the structuralist has something positive to offer: 
there can be no true scientific understanding on the basis of scientific knowledge 
unless it is possible to coordinate the whole of that knowledge into a unified system. I 
will have occasion later to defend this rather brazen claim
40
, but suffice it here to say 
that what the structuralist also offers is a view which meets such an adequacy 
condition, insofar as structuralism is understood as the view that all there is to the 
world is structure, and that independent entities are themselves more relational 
structure upon further (empirical) analysis. This means that nothing is truly 
independent from anything else, inasmuch as both share the same world. This must 
be understood as an ontic claim that allows for the satisfaction of a greater 
                                               
39 Even if we have reason to take such a view—which we might, to be consistent with the openness of 
science central to my thesis—such a view would amount to yet another conjecture. And even here, 
such a view is independent of the epistemological thesis I outline in what follows. 
40 It requires a reconsideration of the distinction I drew between knowledge and understanding, and 
will also involve a discussion of Sellars’ distinction between the scientific vs. manifest views, among 
other things (cf. his Science, Perception and Reality [1963]). 
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epistemological desideratum (that of unity of knowledge). So we arrive at a kind of 
normative or regulative dimension of structuralism: that it is the conceptual 
mechanism by which an epistemological unification is made possible, and which 
builds on an ontic claim about the nature of individuals. 
 It cannot at this point be said that structuralism is the only conceivable ontic 
point of view that enables this unity of knowledge, but it is certainly plausible. Since 
it is the nature of ontic structuralism to entail as a consequence that there are 
individuals (they are just not basic entities or “simples”—they are derived), and since 
the relative boundaries between one class of individuals and any other is in principle 
open, it is possible in principle to arrive at a view in which each domain implies all 
the others, and so we would have a real unity (as opposed to merely a logical or 
abstract one). By ‘real’ unity I mean, simply, that the beings of one domain 
theoretically implicate (by virtue of their structural nature) all the others, rather than 
simply relate to the others by means of a purely logical relationship (like that of 
“supervenience” or “being next to”—neither relations of which involve the being of 
one domain in the being of another). But this can only be, so far, an ideal to which we 
might aim our sciences, the hope being that as our sciences become more 
sophisticated, and that their principles become more general, it is possible, in 
principle, to map the empirical relationships from any one being to all the rest, 
thereby providing content to the structuralist claim that even individual entities are 
just more relational structure (the implication being that even the domains of 
individual beings—that is, the domains of individual sciences—will themselves prove 
to be as relationally rich as the entities themselves). 
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Chapter 2: Scientific Explanation and Structural Realism. 
Explanations in science, in actual practice rather complicated, essentially break up the 
world into two parts and attempt to reveal some kind of link between the two which, 
depending on the strength and form of that link, is said to be explanatory. For 
example, take the famous case of the perihelion of the planet mercury. The problem, 
put simply, was that the actual observed orbital trajectory and speed of planet 
Mercury differed significantly from that which a simply application of Newton’s 
theory predicted. By taking into account an additional physical consideration that had 
eluded classical theorists—that the sun not only provides an attractive force on 
Mercury on account of its substantial local mass, but that this mass in turn alters the 
local geometrical structure (i.e., the local spacetime around the sun) such that the 
equations of motion for any object in its vicinity are likewise altered—Einstein, using 
his newly discovered field equations, was able to calculate the exact elliptical path 
that will be taken by Mercury at a given (known) distance from the sun, and was able 
to provide a formula for its orbital period (in radians per revolution; cf. Einstein 
(1922/2005), pp. 92-97). This proved to be in accordance with what had been known 
about Mercury’s orbital period from observation; thus, Einstein’s theory was 
corroborated and Mercury’s orbit was explained. The sense of explanation in this case 
seems to be rather clear and straightforward at first glance: planet Mercury’s orbital 
trajectory (given by the relevant equations of motion) and period follow directly from 
Einstein’s Equations, plus the appropriate idealizations, physical constants and known 
values for the respective masses of the sun and planet Mercury. The phenomenon to 
be explained (the orbit and period), which we can call the “explanandum”, follows 
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from a mathematical law of nature (Einstein’s Equation), which we may call the 
“explanans”. But so far, we only have solid grounds for believing that we have a very 
good description—as good as the fit between the observed data and the predictions of 
Einstein’s Equations. We are able to calculate that planet Mercury has a certain 
orbital path and period, and can see that this is more or less confirmed by looking at 
how the planet actually moves. But why does it move along that path, that is: in virtue 
of what is the path and period what it is? We are asking to have the relationship 
between the explanandum and the explanans developed in more detail in such a way 
that we may say that the content of one “explains” the other on account of some 
deeper analysis, and that the whole thing is more than merely a description of what 
can be readily seen and measured. 
 It is certainly true that the phenomenon, in virtue of the fact that it can be 
subsumed under a general law of nature, can be predicted on the basis of knowing a 
few physical constants and the masses of the bodies in motion, which in turn trace out 
a certain regular and observable trajectory in space and time. But this only seems to 
tell us that, rather than why, something will occur, and surely it seems odd to say that 
because the phenomenon is subsumed under a general law of nature, it will trace out a 
particular orbital path with a certain speed. 
 We do not need to rehearse the well-known objections to the deductive-
nomological view of scientific explanation
41
, but it is enough to mention that showing 
that a certain phenomenon can be subsumed under, and therefore be predicted to 
                                               
41 See, for example, Salmon (1984) for a detailed analysis (Salmon rules out the DN view in favor of 




occur on the basis of, a general law of nature is not sufficient for its being explained, 
at least not in any interesting sense of that term
42
. It seems, at least to some, that more 
is required for an explanation to go beyond mere description. How much more and 
what the ‘more’ is, so to speak, is now going to depend, crucially, on what you think 
the right explanatory resources are. You have to now make a certain normative 
judgment about the proper form that explanation will take, one that inevitably will 
either (1) take a certain metaphysical position, involving ontological choices, or else 
(2) attempt to avoid metaphysical commitments altogether, or at any rate be neutral 
with respect to them. This seems to be the basic decision tree for providing a 
scientific explanation of phenomena, and there have been several theories of 
explanation cooked up to meet the demands of this tree
43
. Since the structural realist, 
in particular the ontological structural realist, has very definite things to say about 
metaphysics (that is, it has some definite things to say about entities and individuals, 
and how best to understand ‘causation’), it would seem that the structural realist is 
going to have some very definite, perhaps surprising, things to say about scientific 
explanation. This section is going to explore exactly that question, namely, what does 
the structural realist have to say about scientific explanation? 
                                               
42 And here I basically side with Salmon (1984), who argues, briefly, that no explanation is 
satisfactory, or robust, unless it appeals to some feature of the world in virtue of which the explanans 
explains the explanandum. The D-N view presupposes that explanations are arguments, and so in this 
sense it is an “epistemic” form of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984, p. 121). This is to be 
distinguished, according to Salmon, from the “ontic” variety such as the Causal-Mechanical view. This 
view (which Salmon tries to defend comprehensively) appeals to the causal structure of the world 
(explicated in terms of casual connections and interactions)  which may be used to determine or 
otherwise produce the explananda. Thus, the link between the explanans and the explananda is about a 
feature of the mind-independent structure of the world and not about logical entailment as such (which 
is what the D-N view presupposes). 
43 Obviously, I’m taking the view that a theory or general account of scientific explanation is cooked 
up to meet the needs of certain phenomena, or classes of them, that are taken to require, or are 
otherwise plausible candidates for, a scientific explanation. The order clearly needn’t be like this. 
55 
 
1. The causal-mechanical view and “explanatory realism”. Rather than constructing 
a general decision tree of possible explanatory models and the metaphysics associated 
(or not) with them, we will simply work with a popular model of scientific 
explanation and one that may at first glance appear to be opposed to the metaphysics 
of the structural realist: the causal-mechanical view. From this we can work out a rich 
enough problem space for the structural realist to consider, and see what they
44
 might 
have to say. 
 Each term in its title—the causal-mechanical view—is problematic, and has 
received much attention by philosophers of science in the past four or so decades, 
stemming in large part from the seminal work of Wesley Salmon (1984 & 1989). 
There have been a slew of very recent attempts to analyze ‘causation’, focusing 
especially on whether or not Russell was right to have pronounced it, in an oft-cited 
essay of 1913, a dead concept in physics
45
. In addition to this, there has been recent 
renewed interest in the viability of ‘mechanism’ as a fundamental unit of scientific 
explanation and understanding, especially in the biological, neurological/cognitive 
and medical sciences (though the issue in physics has been more or less sidestepped, 
largely because of the problems such a view faced by quantum theory
46
). The 
renewed interest in mechanism stems mainly from a now well-known piece by 
                                               
44 Note that when I say ‘the structural realist’, I mean, basically, what my structural realist would say, 
not what any (“archetypal”) structural realist would say. 
45  The edited volume by Price and Corry (2007), for example, is largely devoted to this general 
question, and many authors reconsider both Russell and Hume, the grandfather, we might say, of 
“causal skepticism”. We should note in passing, though, as Salmon pointed out in his 1984, that 
Russell seems to have later receded somewhat from this dismissive stance. Nonetheless, whether or not 
physics needs the concept, and what, if anything metaphysically defensible, the concept refers to, have 
been problems for recent analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of science. Woodward, though, has 
a rather balanced view on this score in a paper (delivered in for a causation workshop in Pittsburgh, 
PA, on 26 January 2008) called “Causation with a Human Face”. 
46 See Salmon’s numerous provisos throughout his 1984. 
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Machamer, Darden and Craver entitled “Thinking About Mechanisms” (“MDC” 
2000). Much of the fallout from this article has resulted in a fair amount of 
sophistication regarding the previously denigrated or mishandled concept of 
‘mechanism’. 
 It’s not my intention here or in this dissertation to wade through these issues 
systematically, as philosophically important as they might be (we will, however, 
return to some of them later on). Rather, my intention here is to focus for the moment 
on the issue of explanatory realism and the causal-mechanical view of scientific 
explanation
47
. Despite the subtleties involved in each of the terms ‘causal’ and 
‘mechanical’, the philosophical pull towards the causal-mechanical view of scientific 
explanation has to do with the desire to provide a deep, realistic account—an 
explanation—of aspects of the physical world, from the subatomic and atomic realms 
up to the biological and beyond, and to also inquire as to how these various realms 
relate
48
 to each other (theoretically and/or ontologically). Explanatory realism and 
realism about scientific theories go hand in hand: those features of the world that, as a 
realist, you take a theory to be about will, at least in principle, provide the resources 
with which to provide, in turn, a realistic explanation of phenomena. You can explain 
relativistic effects on moving bodies in spacetime by appealing to features of the 
                                               
47 Jaegwon Kim (1987), in connection with Salmon’s work (1984), specifically speaks in terms of 
“explanatory realism”. 
48 See, e.g., Silberstein (2002) for a thorough discussion on what form that relation might take. In 
particular,  the relation may be construed in terms of reduction or emergence, each of which may be 
further distinguished along ontological and epistemic axes. As Silberstein points out, though, 
reductionism and emergence are not necessarily incompatible views; indeed, that they are compatible 
or not will heavily depend, as Silberstein shows, on what one means by the terms ‘reduction’ and 
‘emergence’. He even goes so far as to suggest that “emergentism and reductionism might form a 
continuum and not a dichotomy” (p. 99). We will revisit this issue again, especially when the question 
of “levels” and “levels fundamentalism” arise. 
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spacetime in which those bodies move, should you take a ‘realistic’ view of 
spacetime itself; or, if you are not going to be a realist about the spacetime itself, then 
you might appeal to the dynamical forces between moving bodies that can in turn 
explain where and why they move as they do. In each case, what you are a realist 
about with respect to the theory naturally comports with the features of the world you 
appeal to when providing a realistic explanation of the phenomena in the domain of 
that theory. 
 Wesley Salmon was one of the first philosophers to classify scientific 
explanations with this question of realism in mind. In Scientific Explanation and the 
Causal Structure of the World (Salmon 1984), he distinguishes between three kinds 
of explanations: modal, epistemic and ontic. According to the first: “the aim of 
scientific explanation is to show that an event, which at first blush looks as if it might 
or might not have occurred, in fact had to occur. The explanation renders the 
explanandum-event physically necessary relative to the explanatory facts” (ibid., 
111). The epistemic conception, on the other hand, basically takes the view that 
scientific explanations are arguments (or are otherwise to be understood 
propositionally), and may be further divided according to how the relation between 
the premise(s)/conclusion(s) is understood: is it simply (a) deductive-logical 
entailment, is it (b) information-theoretic or otherwise statistical/inductive, or is it (c) 
“erotetic”, that is, does it have to do with the logic of “why” questions
49
 (ibid., pp. 84-
111)? 
                                               
49 The distinguishing feature of this latter construal of the epistemic view is that the structure of the 
logic is going to be ineliminably pragmatic. This has been the position of van Fraassen. 
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 As for the ontic conception: “the aim of scientific explanation … is to fit the 
event-to-be-explained into a discernible pattern. This pattern is constituted by 
regularities in nature—regularities to which we often refer as laws of nature” (ibid., 
121). But not just any regularities are going to count if this conception of scientific 
explanation is going to be distinguishable from the epistemic and modal conceptions: 
only genuinely causal regularities will do. That is, an adequate ontic scientific 
explanation is going to have to fit the event-to-be-explained into the causal structure 
of the world, that is, roughly, the pattern of cause-and-effect. 
 Salmon takes it as his task to explore, and defend as best he can, a 
causal/mechanical view of ontic explanations throughout the rest of his book, after 
first trying to rule out both the epistemic and modal views. In so doing, he develops a 
variety of scientific explanation that comports well with theory realism
50
. It suggests 
that only theory realists would be motivated by the ontic conception, unlike, say, anti-
realists or a “constructive empiricist” (i.e., van Fraassen) who aren’t going to assume 
that you have to appeal to “features of the world” (such as Salmon’s favorite, the 
“causal structure of the world”) when providing a scientific explanation because, they 
would claim, theories (or the sciences in general) just aren’t about that sort of thing to 
begin with. 
 Let’s explore the causal-mechanical view in more detail as developed by 
Salmon, which is used to provide substance to the idea of “ontic” explanation. After 
this initial exploration, we will be able to relate structural realism to our discussion. 
                                               
50 And so I have called this, in recognition of the close relationship between theory realism and the 
ontic view of scientific explanation, “explanatory realism”. As with theory realism, we may take 
“explanatory realism” to be a certain kind of attitude regarding the scientific explanations. 
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What I would like to show is that the causal-mechanical view need not be overturned 
per se, but that it must be reinterpreted in light of the metaphysical lessons of physics 
(in particular, fundamental physics), and possibly in other areas of science as well
51
. 
What remains once this is done, perhaps to the chagrin of what we can call the 
“classical” causal-mechanist, will not be very close to the what I’ll refer to as the 
“classical” C-M view: which (as I’ll also show) is committed to at least two essential 
doctrines, that of “localizability” and “decomposability”, in addition to (as far as 
Salmon is concerned) some view of the nature of causation (in terms of causal 
processes, interactions and ‘production’). 
 The structural realist, let us recall before moving on, provides the needed 
philosophical framework for the proposed reinterpretation of the C-M view, since the 
structural realist (on the “ontic” construal of structural realism) is committed neither 
to the doctrine of localizability nor to the doctrine of decomposability. The resulting 
view, while it might be called “causal mechanical”, is, I claim, better understood as a 
species of what we shall term “structural explanation” (in this way we will see that 
‘causal-mechanical’ and ‘structural’ are not incompatible). This version of structural 
explanation, as we will see, differs rather significantly from what has gone by that 
title in decades past
52
. Furthermore, with this structural realist reinterpretation it will 
                                               
51 There is a growing community of scientists and philosophers who employ the methods of 
“dynamical systems theory” to model certain aspects of nature, especially biological systems and 
cognitive-neural systems. I will try to show that this calls into further question the adequacy of a 
classical causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation, and suggests the kind of reinterpretation of 
it offered here under the auspices of “structural realism”. 
52 Indeed, what R.I.G. Hughes has called “structural explanation” (actually, he draws on the work of 
earlier philosophers of physics like Jeffrey Bub and Allen Stairs) will be understood as a kind of 
“epistemic”, or possibly what Salmon calls a “modal”, rather than an ontic, form of structural 
explanation (and here I will borrow explicitly from Salmon’s taxonomy, once we have provided the 
appropriate structural realist reinterpretation). Hughes’ conception of structural explanation, which has 
since become the common way of understanding it, takes the position that an appeal to features of a 
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be possible to make contact with recent debates about the nature of ‘causation’ in 
science and the reconsideration of ‘mechanism’ or mechanistic thinking in scientific 
explanation outside of physics, thus furthering our understanding both of structural 
realism and scientific explanation. We return now to what we have called the 
“classical” causal-mechanical view, developed in great detail by the late philosopher 
of science Wesley Salmon. 
2. Salmon’s causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation. Salmon believes that 
the ontic or causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation “provides the most 
tenable philosophical theory of scientific explanation” (where explanation, we must 
recall, is understood to provide significantly more than mere description)—this only 
after the notion of ‘causation’ is suitably broadened to accommodate stochastic or 
probabilistic causation (as opposed to what we can call “strict” causation), and only 
after the notion of ‘mechanism’ is suitably modified to accommodate developments 




                                                                                                                                      
theory are explanatory in themselves, without having to provide a further account of the phenomena 
being explained in terms of causal mechanisms or in terms of entities, their interactions and the 
exchanges of conserved quantities. However, since theories are representations, or at any rate highly 
abstract portrayals, of the natural world, it is not clear that such appeals merit the title “explanation” as 
opposed to “theoretical description”. Without adopting an explicit view of how these theoretical 
features relate to the natural world—that is, in lieu of a coherent, plausible ontology—I will dub 
Hughes’ form of structural explanation “epistemic”. It might also be “modal” in the sense that 
appealing to theoretical features, such as the constraints on motion implied by, e.g., the principles of 
special relativity, in turn “necessitate” a certain causal structure, i.e., the light-cone structure 
characteristic of relativity. It then follows that all dynamical equations of motion must be compatible 
with those constraints, irrespective of the material constitution of the bodies in motion. This is a kind 
of “modal” explanation in Salmon’s sense (see Salmon’s definition given above). It is still “epistemic” 
in the sense of not providing (or at least being neutral with respect to) an ontological account of those 
theoretical features (the “constraints”) appealed to for an “explanation”. 
53 Salmon (1984), p. 124. 
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3. The causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation and ‘Humean’ metaphysics. 
David Lewis, one of the premier analytic metaphysicians of the twentieth century, 
articulated very clearly what had become (by 1986) a very widely-held metaphysical 
point of view in the analytic community, one grounded in the notion of “Humean 
Supervenience”. It’s worth quoting him at length: 
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the [great] denier of 
necessary connections [David Hume]. It is the doctrine that all there is 
to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one little 
thing and then another. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local 
matters of fact are mental.) We have geometry: a system of external 
relations of spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe points of 
spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether fields, 
maybe both. And at these points we have local qualities: perfectly 
natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at 
which to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of 
qualities. All else supervenes on that
54
. 
 Tim Maudlin, who has spent much of his career as an analytic metaphysician 
“trying to undermine” the Humean metaphysical view (as he himself said recently in 
The Metaphysics Within Physics), provides a rather illuminating gloss of it. Again, it 
is useful to provide a lengthy quote to focus our discussion: 
The Humean picture of ontology, as Lewis understands it, is founded 
on the notion of the Humean Mosaic: a collection of local quantities 
structured into a unified object by external spatio-temporal relations. 
At base, Lewis’s Humean believes that this is all there is: it is not 
merely, as Lewis says, that everything else supervenes on the Mosaic, 
but rather that anything that exists at all is just a feature or element of 
generic property of the Mosaic. If one wants to say there are laws, for 
example, then what the laws are is simply a matter of how the Mosaic 
is structured: the philosophical problem is to specify, as clearly as 
possible, which features of the Mosaic constitute the laws having a 
certain form. …These sorts of philosophical analyses then count as 
reductions of ontology supposing (as Lewis does suppose) that the 
basic elements of the Mosaic, in themselves, are not ontologically 
dependent on either the laws or the direction of time. … The elements 
of Lewis’s Mosaic must have intrinsic characters that depend on the 
                                               
54 Lewis (1986a), pp. ix-x, as quoted in Maudlin (2007), p. 170. 
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existence of nothing else in the universe, and these elements must be 
related by some purely external relations, so that all of ontology can 




While there is no necessary relationship between Humean metaphysics and the 
causal-mechanical view (one might adopt the causal-mechanical view without buying 
into the doctrine of the Humean Mosaic), they are nonetheless obvious companions: 
the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation provides a way of bridging  
(analytic) metaphysics to the content and method of science itself, our primary source 
for knowledge about what local matters of fact there actually are. The causal-
mechanical view is a way of spinning the specific threads, as it were, of the Humean 
Mosaic. A vast collection of successful causal-mechanical explanations of all known 
phenomena, coupled with a hierarchical arrangement of all known theories of all 
known phenomena (in terms of the ‘supervenience’ relation), from “most 
fundamental” to “less fundamental” (call this “theory fundamentalism”), would 
provide a specific example of a Humean Mosaic. 
 Salmon’s conception of the causal-mechanical view is related to the view 
sketched above. The basic link between the two is this: that whenever we have a 
successful causal-mechanical explanation of some phenomena, the phenomena will 
reduce to causal processes and/or interactions in the sense that the relevant causal 
processes and interactions, residing in spacetime, constitute the phenomena. In other 
words, there will be an underlying causal-mechanical process by which the 
phenomenon comes about and continues to exist. Thus, whenever we have a 
successful causal-mechanical explanation of phenomena in terms of causal 
                                               
55 Maudlin (2007), p. 170-1. 
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mechanisms, we may construct the former from the latter. But it is not enough to say 
that the construction is just representational or conceptual—that would threaten to 
collapse back into what this ontic view was supposed to avoid, which is the 
“epistemic” view of explanation. Rather, we must believe that the phenomena are 
really constituted by the causal-mechanisms; we may, as it were, unburden ourselves 
with the ontological autonomy of the phenomena having been successfully explained: 
the causal-mechanism is “what there really is”, mind-independently speaking. Of 
course, our perception of it, and our inkling that some phenomena or other exists and 
requires explanation is one thing (a feature of our cognitive apparatuses, which 
deliver to us information about which we, in turn, theorize); but having found the 
causal mechanism responsible for it is quite another (and might, as in the case, often, 
in fundamental physics, require our giving up certain beliefs about the phenomenon, 
like its seeming autonomy, etc.). And this, finally, is the Humean view sketched 
above with, perhaps, merely a promissory note that we may achieve a causal-
mechanical explanation (and hence reduction) of all phenomena, in time. In other 
words, it constitutes a general methodological paradigm in the main, and locally, a 
metaphysical view (i.e., about particular phenomena which have been successfully 
explained). It is, of course, a further question as to how to relate together, under one 
coordinating metaphysical/natural philosophical view, all of the cases of successful 
causal-mechanical explanations. This is the question, basically, as to how to relate the 
various sciences. The ideal Humean package is that the totality of the world—
everything there is—is a consequence of, in the causal mechanical sense, the 
fundamental ontology (provided to us by fundamental physics). Salmon needn’t be 
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associated with such a global Humeanism; minimally, he’s committed to a local 
Humeanism. 
 4. Towards a structural account of “ontic” explanation. This dissertation as a whole 
is an extended explication and defense of a thorough-going metaphysics of structural 
realism, ‘structure’ being understood as relational structure where the relata are 
themselves metaphysically derivative from the relational structure in which they 
appear (this is just to say that the relata are contextual or dependent entities, rather 
than being ontologically primitive or prior to the structure). Put in terms of more 
familiar metaphysical concepts, it is the view that self-subsistent entities, defined by 
the possession of intrinsic properties which in turn ground any extrinsic relations 
these entities bear with other entities, are metaphysically derivative from relational 
structure. In short, it is the view that reality is to be understood as “relations all the 
way down”, or “relational structure all the way down”. It is not a denial of the 
existence of entities with intrinsic properties; it is simply a view which ascribes 
relative ontological status to them—‘relational structure’, according to this thesis, 
being more ontologically fundamental than self-subsistent entities in the sense that 
the latter is derivative from the former. If we take a metaphysics of relational 
structure as defended here to replace a metaphysics of self-subsistent entities and their 
intrinsic properties, this has implications for the nature of scientific explanation and 
understanding. 
 The structural realist holds that science provides us with a characterization of 
the (real) structure of reality, come whatever entity-based ontology we choose to 
depict that structure with; the ontic structural realist argues that this structure is to be 
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understood, metaphysically, as relational structure and that the ‘entities’ postulated 
for any one scientific domain are themselves to be understood as relatively stable 
structures which depend for their stability on certain background conditions (and so, 
in a literal sense, it’s “relations all the way down”). Thus, entities, their properties, 
and the causal relations that they bear to other entities—the basic explanatory 
framework of science— are actually a convenient way of describing what is in reality 
a complicated relational structure. This stability in the background conditions makes 
possible our ordinary ways of talking about and carving up the world. And so we see 
that there is, obviously, conceptual value with, and usefulness of, the ‘entity’, 
‘property’ and ‘casual’ language employed by a good deal of the ‘mesoscopic’ 
sciences and beyond. But when exploring fundamental physics, we are not guaranteed 
the usefulness of such concepts. And, moreover, when providing a general 
metaphysical view, ordinary concepts as such are just not going to do. We are not 
guaranteed, for example, that our ordinary concepts (entity, property, cause) will 
apply to realms far beyond the domains in which those concepts arose; indeed, 
science progresses often by expanding the domain of certain basic organizing 
concepts (space, time, entity, cause), or by revising them completely. 
4.1 The suggestion for a broader notion of (ontic) explanation. Quantum mechanics 
shows that the notion of ‘entity’ in spacetime, and the general framework of causal-
mechanical explanation, need to be profoundly revised or given up entirely. There are 
many interpretations of QM that show just this (and some even try to retain all or 
most of an ordinary, classical point of view, as the resurgent interest in ‘local’ 
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interpretations of QM demonstrates
56
). But it remains to be seen whether or not a 
realistic explanation—that is, one grounded in a realistic ontology— of quantum 
mechanical phenomena without entities, causal mechanisms or the general framework 
of causal explanation is possible, one which is also not ontologically agnostic (in the 
manner of Arthur Fine) or instrumentalist (as with some information-theoretic 
interpretations of QM). More specifically, this chapter is devoted to showing what a 
realistic form of explanation and understanding grounded in ontic structural realism is 
like, and that such a view is tenable for—and even strongly suggested by—quantum 
mechanics. If this can be done, then we would have a structuralist alternative 
understanding of “ontic” explanation, one that is not causal-mechanical in Salmon’s 
sense, but which is realist and “ontic” nonetheless.  
 The intuition behind Salmon’s notion of an “ontic” explanation is that 
scientific explanation, in so far as it appeals to theories that can be construed 
realistically, should appeal to, or otherwise crucially depend on, real, objective 
features of the world. Hence, we may say, wherever possible, explanation should aim 
to be “ontic”. Salmon, though, appeals to causal mechanisms when he distinguishes 
between ontic, epistemic and modal explanations: explanation is “ontic” when it 
appeals, essentially, to the causal-mechanical structure of the world—features that, 
we might add, “bring events into being”, “produce” them or are otherwise 
“responsible” for them. The question we are exploring here is whether this construal 
of ontic explanation is overly restrictive; and indeed, we would like to know what 
                                               
56 See Lewis (2006), (2007) and Wharton (2007) for some recent examples. 
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good reasons there are for linking, as a matter of definition, ontic explanation to 
causal mechanisms. 
 As many have pointed out, to borrow from Ruth Berger, “causes are not 
enough” in scientific explanations, actual scientific explanations that hope to give us 
real understanding about the phenomena they purport to explain (Berger 1998). 
Importantly, Berger points out that non-causal features of dynamical systems are 
often essential components in their explanation; her example is of Dungeness crab 
population dynamics. In particular, she shows that you must appeal to the “one-
dimensional [approximately linear] distribution of larvae”—a spatiotemporal 
pattern—to explain the erratic nature of the crabs’ population dynamics (ibid. 318-9). 
Such a pattern is not an “event”, she points out, “involving an exchange of invariant 
quantities at an instant in spacetime” and so clearly fails to count as a (potential) 
causal-mechanism in Salmon’s sense (ibid. 318)—yet such a non-causal feature of the 
phenomenon being explained is crucial. We would like to say that such structural 
features (Berger’s own phrasing) of physical systems are real and explanatorily 
relevant features of physical systems, and that an appeal to such features allows no 
less of an “ontic” explanation to be achieved. But what is more surprising is that, 
when it comes to fundamental physics, sometimes all we have to appeal to are 
structural features (for example, the existence of a physical system in a certain 
spatiotemporal arrangement), and almost no possibility of devising a causal-
mechanical story (as Salmon often feared), as (I’d like to argue) with quantum theory. 
What, I ask, could underwrite an “ontic” explanation of such situations? The claim I 
am going develop (and defend) is that the structural realist has no problem in 
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principle appealing to structural features of systems when providing a scientific 
explanation of some aspect of them. This is because the structural realist adopts the 
general point of view that what theories get right about the world is not what entities, 
or mechanisms there are, but rather (for mature theories at any rate) captures the right 
structural features of the world. However, in specific cases, realistic explanation of 
the sort hoped for by Salmon with ontic explanations, is won by only isolating 
specific causal-mechanical features of the world that bring about the explanatorily 
relevant events. This is where structural realism is obscure: what ontological features 
of physical systems “bring about” the events, and how are we to construe these 
ontological features: causally, non-causally? If the former, then how do we 
understand “structure” causally? And if the latter, how do we understand the 
relationship between the causally relevant events on the one hand, and the structures 
that “bring them about”—i.e., that upon which those events are (explanatorily) 
dependent. Only a structural realism that supplies a coherent ontological picture that 
answers these questions can provide a satisfactory “ontic” picture of explanation that 
would satisfy a realist (such as Salmon). If such a story can be provided, the structural 
realist can fill in needed ontological details, rather than retreat to a general, purely 
philosophical, point of view about the sense in which well-confirmed, but overturned, 
theories are true of the world. Moreover, if such details can be supplied, then we have 
something further to add to the notion of “structural explanation” appealed to by 




                                               




5. Structural Realism and “Structural Explanation”. Realistic or “ontic” explanations 
in science presuppose some physical ontology by which we can grasp the details of 
nature, and thereby gain (we might think) true, physical insight into a mind-
independent reality. However, when it comes to (at least) theory realism, the 
prevailing view seems to be a realism of entities, and we are vexed, when it comes to 
quantum theory, when philosophers want to avoid (or are otherwise neutral about) 
such a realism. We are, in particular, vexed when philosophers substitute 
“information” for “matter-in-motion [i.e., a physical ontology]” (Bub 2005), or 
characterize their interpretations by invoking “measurement” as a fundamental 
category, thus offending the Bell dogma (‘measurement’ cannot be a primitive in a 
fundamental theory; it must itself admit of a further theoretical/physical analysis). 
The vexation often stems from the underlying assumption, expressed by Salmon and 
Kim among others, that adequate scientific explanations are going to be ontic in 
nature, fitting the phenomena-to-be-explained (measurement, information 
transmission, entanglement—some now-classic items in quantum theory) into the 
patterns and regularities of nature itself. The explanatory relation is going to be what 
                                                                                                                                      
interpretation of quantum theory. The generation of “mechanisms” capable of revealing the 
spatiotemporal, causal pathways between entities is quite besides the point for Bub (2005, e.g.): what it 
means to explain is to find the appropriate functional instantiation of an informational system, one of 
whose components is “information”, and with this abstract specification in place, we may then prove 
certain quantum-computational facts about the informational system. It’s not clear that a causal 
analysis is even relevant; and if Bub’s overall thesis is right—that any attempt to provide a complete 
analysis of all physical processes (including, importantly, those of measurement itself) will run afoul of 
a general quantum information-theoretic principle (“no universal cloning machines”)—then it’s not 
even clear that quantum theory allows for a complete resolution of physical systems into interactions 
amongst its ‘fundamental’ parts. In other words, the claim is that is inherent in the causal-mechanical 
view that such a final decomposition is always and in principle possible; on Bub’s view, the non-
commutativity of QM shows that this cannot be done—or else you face a measurement problem. I look 
at this more closely in chapter three. 
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it is in virtue of something holding between or among things or events or processes in 
the world, and will not be merely logical or propositional in nature (the modal and 
epistemic views—i.e., that the connection between explanans and explananda is 
entailment or some modal connection i.e., ‘necessity’ etc.). This underlying 
assumption rests on a further assumption, that mathematical or logical 
representations, and the relations holding between them, are one thing; relations 
holding among things/events/processes in the world are quite another. That is, there is 
a fundamental difference between a mathematical theory in which I may 
(successfully/adequately) represent the world as having a certain structure (logical, 
etc.), and a theory’s actually capturing the causal structure of the world (this latter 
item would constitute the “real” relations among things/events/properties that an 
ontic, as opposed to epistemic or modal, explanation is supposed to provide to us). 
Not all mathematical representations of the world (theories), so the thought goes, 
express the causal (or “real”) structure of it, and if they lack such a connection to the 
world, they’re not good scientific explanations after all. Supposing (claims Salmon) 
that one can provide a convincing philosophical analysis of what (metaphysically 
speaking) those relations are (a convincing analysis of the “causal structure of the 
world”, for example), then we may interpret our scientific theories (their 
representational structures, their predictions, etc.) in light of this philosophical theory 
(Salmon 1984). Note the conceptual order: the philosophical account of causal 
structure comes first (and we may add the constraint that it must account for, or at 
least not conflict with, what we already know to be true of the world, which is a 
function of both experience and well-confirmed scientific knowledge); scientific 
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theories are then interpreted with this (now background) metaphysics of causation in 
place. We may now say that scientific theories are revealing to us the causal structure 
of the world; we now know exactly what it is that our theories are describing because 
we now know something—a bit of deep metaphysics—about what the world is really 
like (it’s by and large a causal world, with causal regularities and patterns to it, all of 
which science is trying to capture, for various purposes). 
 What differentiates the ontic structural realist, in particular, from the causal-
mechanical view (at least with respect to Salmon’s conception of it) is that whereas 
the former analyses causation in terms of production and interaction—that causes 
“bring about” their effects, and that interactions are responsible for changes in the 
“order and structure” of nature, the structural realist thinks that a description of the 
structure is all there is to explanation because that’s all there is to reality itself. There 
needn’t be production or interaction, in other words, for there to be determination or 
the “fixing” of certain facts relative to others. In other words, the ontic structural 
realist is committed to a view of determination (which you may call “causal” but 
which often seems inappropriate) which is not necessarily tied to temporal order or 
the “generation” of change from an interaction at a particular region of spacetime. 
This is the crucial difference, finally. Since OSR rejects the view that systems may 
always decompose into part-whole relationships (the mereological view), and on 
account of OSR’s view that what an ‘individual’ is is fixed by context and not by its 
“inner constitution” or “intrinsic properties”, change does not depend on matter-in-
motion, and a fundamental description of the universe is not one of the temporal 
evolution of systems (the dynamical “Hamiltonian” view often adopted in physics). 
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Explanation, as I have argued elsewhere
58
 in the context of QM, needn’t be so 
limited. 
 The retreat in the foundations of physics community from entity-based or 
more generally causal explanation is often accompanied by the push for what has 
been called “structural explanation” (Hughes 1989), grounded in (following, 
somewhat, Janssen 2008) the kinematical perspective. There is an entire tradition that 
embraces a deeply kinematic spirit of interpreting quantum theory, going back to 
Heisenberg’s famous “Umdeutung” of 1925 (and possibly earlier, with Minkowski’s 
famous 1908 geometrical formulation of Einstein’s 1905 theory of special relativity). 
We find more recent incarnations of this spirit in the “algebraic” and “logical” 
interpretations of QM, notably in the schools of interpretation advocated variously by 
Gudder, Bub (1974), and Stairs (1984). Indeed, this is the spirit which motivates 




 I suggest that a metaphysics of structure may underwrite such a tendency to 
go “kinematic”, or propositional rather than “physical”, and that in so doing we 
thereby move away from “ontic” explanation in the causal mechanical sense, to an 
“ontic” explanation in a thoroughly structural realist sense. And this, furthermore, can 
be understood as a species of “structural explanation”, now grounded in a 
metaphysics of structure. Thus, we might gain “understanding” in the sense in which 
Salmon had in mind, but without the need to tie such an understanding to entities 
                                               
58 For example is Stuckey, Silberstein and Cifone (2008b)—see appendices. 
59 Which is really a propositional-kinematic reconstruction of Bohm’s theory, now taken to be an 
instance of a “modal” theory 
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and/or causal mechanisms. This reinterpretation of the “ontic” form of explanation 
also allows those who embrace a kinematic perspective in QM, for example, and who 
also favor a structural model of explanation to be realist. Given that realism is no 
longer taken to be one of an entity sort, we might unproblematically invoke 
“measurement” in our interpretation of quantum theory, so long as it is clear that this 
concept serves merely a functional role in the context of a structural explanation. In 
particular, we may introduce the concept of measurement if it reflects the more 
fundamental (structural) idea that quantum theory introduces, to borrow from Bub 
(1974), abstract structural constraints that events are held to satisfy. Bub clearly 
intends this when he understood (in 2004) quantum mechanics to be “about 
information”. He characterized the theory of quantum mechanics in terms of 
information-theoretic constraints, and in so doing, measurement enters into the 
interpretation. Even though the concept of ‘measurement’ might play a fundamental 
role in the context of information theory itself, Bub is certainly allowed to give such a 
notion a structural gloss in the following algorithmic and operational way: 
Take ‘measurement’ to be simply the correlation between one 
physical system and its possible physical states (called “the 
measured”), and another physical system and its possible states (called 
“the measurement apparatus”). 
Let the physical states of each respective physical system constitute an 
event space (perhaps, the space of possible “yes/no” measurement 
questions that can be “asked”) – that is, formally represent the two 
physical systems in propositional terms, if you like. Next, show that 
this system is isomorphic to an “information system” in Shannon’s 
sense. 
Apply three information theoretic constraints to this system (no bit 
commitment; no superluminal signaling and no cloning). It can now be 




 Notice, ‘measurement’ simply is a short-hand term for a correlation between one 
physical system and another. The principles can be understood as purely kinematical 
restrictions on the state-space adumbrated above, which entails characteristically 
quantum correlations. The constraints are structural or, in particular, are kinematic. 
Two problems now remain: the measurement problem (obviously) and how to explain 
distant EPR-Bell correlations. 
 I look at Bub’s basic proposal (in his 2004, 2005 papers) in a bit more detail 
in the next chapter, before moving on to Huw Price’s attempt to win back Einstein 
Local Realism. We can understand Price’s proposal to be one that essentially tries to 
reinstate a clear causal explanation for quantum mechanical phenomena, that may 
possibly satisfy a causal-mechanist like Wesley Salmon. I argue that Price’s proposal 
fails, and that some more radical picture of explanation is called for—that QM is 
telling us that causal interactions in space and time are simply not enough for an 
adequate explanation of the physical world
60
. 
                                               
60 The full argument has been articulated in Silberstein, Cifone and Stuckey (2008b), where we also 
propose that structural views such as our “Relational Blockworld” interpretation of QM fare better than 
mechanical, backwardly-causal views such as BCQM. I refer the reader to our (2008b) and (2008a) 
papers in the Addendum, where we  fully elaborate on Relational Blockworld (which adopts the 
perspective of relational, ontic structural realism as a methodological program in accordance with the 




Chapter 3: Information Theory as a Non-causal-mechanical 





1. Introduction. The recent work on the foundations of quantum mechanics in the 
light of information theory suggests a change in physics that many in the foundations 
of physics community are attempting to articulate. This change, I want to suggest, 
represents a challenge – but one that has been only vaguely articulated. The work of 
Bub (2004) and Clifton, Bub and Halvorson
61
 (2003) suggests one way of 
formulating the challenge. Theirs, I believe, is a direct challenge to the received view 
in physics, the causal-mechanical view. 
 The information theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics, I hope to 
show, constitutes a species of what I have been calling “ontic” structuralism, the view 
that the most fundamental explanatory tools open to the scientist need not be causal 
mechanisms in, e.g., Salmon’s sense, nor does the explanation need to rely on the 
postulation of fundamental constituents in the sense, e.g., of the kinetic theory of 
gases (what Einstein called a “constructive” theory). And insofar as our attitude to 
this (quantum) information theory is that it is “true” (in the conjectural, tentative 
sense we spoke about in the first chapter), we say that it provides the true structure of 
nature, as far as the theory allows (in this case, the structure has to do with an 
information theoretic construal of signaling in space and time—a feature of nature to 
which special relativity, though with different mathematical laws, corresponds). I 
have used the term “non-causal mechanical” to illustrate that even if one does not 
                                               
61 Hereafter, CBH. 
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adopt the perspective of ontic structuralism explicated in this dissertation, my point 
still stands: that there is no a priori reason why only causal-mechanical (with a 
metaphysics of entities in causal interaction) explanations are valid, and that the 
information theoretic interpretation may indeed be considered a species of realism—
just not a realism of entities. It is not a huge leap to see that the form of this non-
entity realism is just what I have called “ontic structuralism”, by another name. 
 Clifton et. al. (2003) have suggested a way to characterize quantum theory in 
terms of three information-theoretic principles. Bub has furthermore claimed, in his 
“Why The Quantum?”,  that this can resolve long-standing conceptual worries about 
quantum mechanics; in particular, he argues that the measurement problem becomes a 
tractable and less mysterious problem vis a vis information theory. There are two 
potential worries that Bub’s project faces: (1) the lack of agreement on the meaning 
of ‘information’ – and especially, the meaning of “information in the physical sense”, 
as Bub wants to think of it. Unless it is given some clear meaning, the assertion that 
“information is physical” is obscure. (2) Other information theorists have made 
claims that quantum information theory (QIT) provides clarity and solution to the 
foundations of quantum mechanics. However, most simply rehearse either a kind of 
antirealism or instrumentalism, in that they invoke an epistemic view of the quantum 
mechanical state
62
. Does Bub’s position threaten to reduce to a similar rehearsal of 
either antirealism or instrumentalism with respect to physics in general, and quantum 
mechanics in particular? I will argue that Bub need not be committed to antirealism or 
instrumentalism. In fact, I want to suggest a way in which Bub’s position could be 
                                               
62 See e.g.: Fuchs 2001b, 2002b; Fuchs and Peres 2000 and Duvenhage 2002. 
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construed realistically. Where this position falls short, as we’ll see, is in not providing 
an account of what the world is like, if physics is not about the stuff we have taken 
for granted: particles, fields, waves, and so on. He has simply left an ontological void 
in the wake of the information-theoretic characterization of quantum mechanics. 
I have, consequently, two primary objectives, which motivate another, secondary 
(although by no means unimportant), objective: 
Objective 1: “Fuchs’ dilemma”, as Hagar (2003) puts it, is: “either he is a realist, but 
has not solved the measurement problem (which is fatal for his project) or he is not”. 
Bub claims that the measurement problem is solved, if you do not construe it as a 
“definiteness” problem. Bub also skirts the issue of realism. Many quantum 
information theorists seem to take either an instrumentalist or antirealist line 
regarding QM. Does Bub’s position amount to more of the same? If Bub, though, is 
an antirealist or instrumentalist, then his position becomes uninteresting – 
antirealism/instrumentalist does all of the interpretive work. The extent to which 
Fuchs’ position collapses, for example, is the sense in which he takes an epistemic 
view of the quantum state, which Hagar argues is an inconsistent view (following 
Hemmo
63
). Does Bub’s position face the same specter of realism? I will argue that it 
does not, allowing that quantum mechanics is not about the behavior of classical 
waves, particles, and so on. This is not to imply antirealism or instrumentalism 
though! It is at least a denial of the causal-mechanical view, presupposed in virtually 
all disputes over classical and quantum mechanics. But the denial of the causal-
mechanical view is consistent with the truth of realism. This distinction, between the 
                                               
63 See fn. 28, p. 14 in Hagar 2003 (manuscript) for citations. 
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issue of realism on the one hand, and the issue of the causal-mechanical view on the 
other, is paramount: they are really logically distinct issues
64
.  
Objective 2: Looking to the current philosophical literature on quantum information, 
there is much confusion as to how to understand ‘information’. I will try to clear up 
this confusion. It is a confusion over whether information should be thought of as an 
entity or as a property; many want to argue that it is a property. However, 
interestingly, Bub wants to say it is an entity – indeed “a new kind of entity”. I will 
clearly distinguish the entity vs. property issue, and will distinguish several senses of 
information qua property that help resolve the issue of whether classical information 
is a “new kind” of information as Josza (1998) wants to suggest.  
Objective 3: I would like to formulate unambiguously the challenge to physics 
suggested by Bub and CBH, by extending Bub’s discussion and by invoking the 
distinction developed as my first objective which shows that realism is only of 
orthogonal concern for Bub. Bub’s proposal – if taken to be the denial of the causal-
mechanical view of physics – sheds light on the old Einstein-Bohr debate, which in 
turn suggests a way of articulating exactly what the puzzle is regarding the change to 
quantum mechanics. Bub’s work, and the view suggested in Clifton, Bub and 
Halvorson (2003), represents a switch from the long-standing causal-mechanical view 
of physics to something else that is decidedly non-causal-mechanical. This, I suggest, 
was the fundamental problem from the very inception of the debate over classical and 
                                               
64 Not everyone would argue that realism and the causal-mechanical view are logically distinct. For 
example, van Fraassen (1989) argues that “epistemic realism” should be understood as involving a 
commitment to the causal-mechanical view (p. 97-9). Thus, since the common cause principle is 
violated by quantum mechanics, and that this principle is necessary for a causal-mechanical account of 
the word, QM prima facie implies a kind of anti-realism. I simply deny this: it is consistent to be a 
realist about QM and think that QM is true of a non-causal-mechanical world. See my section 3 below. 
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quantum mechanics: can physics be causal-mechanical after quantum mechanics? 
Bohr’s fundamental motivation, it seems, was to be anti-mechanistic; realism is a 
somewhat orthogonal issue for him. So, to the extent that the dispute is over 
Einstein’s realism vs. Bohr’s antirealism, the dispute is confused. The understanding 
of Bohr as anti-mechanical differs from the traditional interpretation ascribed to him 
as advocating some form of antirealism (the denial of the thesis that science is about 
the existence of mind-independent entities)
65
. We shall see if this is plausible. 
 After briefly discussing the CBH result, and after outlining (again, briefly) 
Bub’s project of fleshing out the philosophical implications of the CBH 
characterization theorem, I will satisfy my objectives in turn: section 3 will be 
devoted to the first, section 4 to the second and last objectives. 
 
2. The Project: “CBH Theorem” And The Explanation of Quantum Mechanics. 
Recently, as recent as the early 1980s, quantum mechanics gained a fresh perspective 
from information theory. The fundamental motivation for this view is a powerful 
foundational methodology: the search for deeper and “higher” level principles at 
work in Nature that quantum mechanics obeys. As Nielsen (2001) points out in a talk 
given at the University of Queensland in Australia: physicists, in possession of the 
powerful predictive engine of quantum mechanics, have used it without really 
                                               
65 At least some thinkers have undertaken a comprehensive task of re-understanding Bohr as not so 
much of an antirealist, but as advocating a very subtle and sophisticated notion of measurement 
interaction that is necessarily contextual (for example, Howard – both in private and in some of his 
lectures – has been suggesting this). It is consistent to think both that measurement results and the 
resulting descriptions of objects/events in the world are contextual and that physics is “really about” 
the mind-independent existence of things. Simply because physical descriptions are necessarily 
contextually constrained does not imply antirealism (understood as the denial of the thesis that physics 
is “really about” the mind-independent reality of entities). 
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understanding it; the rules are used without knowing “why the quantum”
66
 – i.e., 
without knowing the principles of the Universe in virtue of which it is quantum 
mechanical. He writes: 
We’ve known the basic rules of quantum mechanics for quite some time, yet we have 
a quite limited understanding of those rules and the higher-level principles they 
imply. (2) 
 
In the spirit of the quote by Nielsen above, CBH propose to “raise” three seemingly 
innocuous principles to the status of laws of nature (CBH 2003, p. 1562). They see 
this move as similar to Einstein’s when he proposed to postulate both the principle of 
relativity and the light principle that allowed the derivation of a more fundamental 
physics: Special Relativity (hereafter, SR)
67
. Presumably, these three laws would, in a 
certain sense, explain quantum mechanics, just as the two postulates of SR in a sense, 
explain it (i.e., explain the extended life of elementary particles showering into earth-
bound labs whose life otherwise, in stationary frames, is rather brief, etc.).  
The sense of explanation, roughly, would be one of explanation by derivation: 
quantum mechanics is explained by the information theoretic laws of nature because 
quantum mechanics can be derived from these laws (as the CBH paper purports to 
demonstrate). This would, putatively, satisfy Nielsen’s “quest”: 
[Quantum information theory] is … the quest to obtain a set of higher 
level principles and heuristics about quantum mechanics analogous to 
those which a master chess player uses when playing chess. (2001, 2) 
                                               
66 Originally, Wheeler’s question. 




The hope with authors like Clifton, Bub and Halvorson, is that quantum mechanics –  
seen through the theoretical guise of information theory and dressed in C*-algebras –  
will reveal those deeper, higher-level principles at work in Nature. And the hope also 
is that when we are in possession of such higher-level principles, which dictate the 
(information-theoretic) structure of Nature, we will be able to resolve certain long-





3. Implications of the CBH Theorem: Quantum Mechanics Is Not About Quantum 
Objects. Some of the philosophical weight of the CBH work is elaborated in a recent 
piece by Jeffrey Bub (2004) entitled, appropriately enough, “Why The Quantum?”. 
His paper is devoted to arguing for three theses. I quote them verbatim: 
• Thesis 1: A quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the 
possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a 
theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles. 
• Thesis 2: Given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical 
theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of the measuring 
instruments that reveal these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to 
a quantum theory. 
• [Thesis 3:] Assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact 
satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that 
                                               
68 See Bub (2004) for example—esp. pp. 261 ff. 
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includes an account of measurement interactions can be acceptable, and 
the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level then becomes the 
representation and manipulation of information (p. 1) 
Thesis 1 is an implication Bub wants to draw from the CBH characterization theorem 
itself.  The idea is this. By taking a restricted subclass of noncommutative C*-
algebras – the abstract algebraic structure of quantum mechanical observables and 
states – at face-value, so to speak, one does not try to interpret their Hilbert space 
representation (guaranteed to exist) as a phase-space representation with respect to 
which the states of QM are interpreted as representing a complete catalogue of 
properties and the observables are interpreted as representing properties like position 
and momentum. One is left to treat quantum mechanics, then, as really about the 
“possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about 
the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles” (ibid., 242).  The suggestion is that 
the source of the conceptual problems with quantum mechanics stems from 
attempting to see its Hilbert space representation as a kind of quantum analogue of a 
phase-space representation of classical mechanics, in which the behavior of non-
classical waves or particles is described. Representing all physical theories in terms of 
C*-algebras allows this point to be made very precisely. Part of the importance of 
CBH’s work is to make this point clear. 
 The conjunction of Thesis 2 and 3 is the heart of Bub’s paper. Thesis 2 is the 
claim that, supposing a certain set of information-theoretic constraints (principles)
69
 
                                               
69 They are: no superluminal information transfer, no broadcasting (related to the “no cloning” result in 
quantum information) and no bit commitment. 
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are true of a class of C*-algebras is equivalent to quantum mechanics is true (i.e., 
these information theoretic constraints logically imply that the C*-algebra is quantum 
mechanical), then since there exist entangled states: (a) the (C*-algebraic) theory 
cannot unambiguously be extended to the measuring instruments and (b) any causal 
mechanical theory will have excess empirical content over a quantum theory. 
 Thesis 3 is the most radical. As I see it, the most plausible interpretation of 
this thesis is that Bub is suggesting that we think of physics (and quantum theory in 
particular) not causal-mechanically, but non-causal-mechanically
70
. If QM is not 
fundamentally about the behavior of (non-classical) particles, waves, etc., (thesis 1) 
and if we take seriously the claim that information is an “entity” which is “physical”, 
as Bub proposes, then the most plausible interpretation of this is that there are no 
“causal mechanisms” with which to “construct” an ontology – i.e., physics is to be 
construed non-causal-mechanically
71
. If quantum mechanics is a truly fundamental 
theory, fundamental to physics, then if QM cannot support a causal-mechanical view 
of the world, physics (ultimately) cannot. 
3.1 No Mechanical Theories From Information-theoretically Constrained C*-
algebras. The most general way to think of physics is this: initially, we make 
                                               
70 I am not fully articulating the exact kind of non-causal-mechanical view being suggested— it is 
really irrelevant here (though it should be considered a species of ontic structuralism as articulated in 
this dissertation). Bub is simply implying a critique of the causal-mechanical view and hasn’t yet 
provided a positive ontological account in non-causal-mechanical terms. 
71 Originally, Bub tried arguing that there did not exist a mechanical theory underlying QM, which is 
obviously too strong (private communication). He tried launching this argument by making clear the 
distinction between principle and constructive theories, arguing that QM is best seen as an example of 
the former. I now think that the real work such a distinction could do is provide a way of eschewing 
talk of causal mechanisms. If a theory is a class of principles, then prima facie it is neutral regarding 
any underwriting ontology. This provides more freedom to think of other ontologies that are non-




measurements with certain instruments that yield some result or other with a certain 
frequency. We take the “observables” to represent changes in a physical system; the 
measuring instruments record such changes. We take “states” to represent probability 
distributions over measurement outcomes. The most abstract language for this kind of 
physics is a C*-algebra, where we consider very general kinds of observables 
operating on very general kinds of states. The C*-algebra, in the sense sketched 
above, is treated instrumentally at the outset. Now, we might want to replace this 
theory of states and observables with a theory of evolving dynamical quantities. That 
is, we might want a phase-space representation of the C*-algebraic structure. Why? 
Because we might like to think that physical systems “really” must be characterized 
by those properties we think of as being “real”, “fundamental”, or “constitutive of the 
system”  etc. We may think that properties like position and momentum are such 
quantities that are most important about a physical system, in terms of which other 
quantities can be defined. So, we want to know how such a system evolves as a 
function of these – we want a phase-space representation. Now, according to two 
basic representation theorems, if the algebra is commutative, then we are guaranteed 
the existence of not only a Hilbert space representation, but also a phase space 
representation of that algebra
72
. This is good news for classical mechanics, since its 
algebra is commutative. Thus, we’re guaranteed a phase-space representation. 
Furthermore, we’re guaranteed to be able to describe the instruments themselves as 
being “composed” of physical systems with these dynamical properties – independent 
of the states of the systems being measured. We have a complete description of the 
physical world. 
                                               
72 See Bub (2004a) for technical details, esp. pp. 10ff. 
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 Can this be done for quantum mechanics? Bub wants to argue that it cannot be 
done, if one restricts their consideration to empirically well motivated interpretations 
or rival theories to QM. Now, from the CBH theorem itself, “a theory satisfies the 
information theoretic constraints if and only if it is empirically equivalent to a 
quantum theory” (Bub 2004, 257). So the trick becomes to either show that some 
rival interpretation is actually empirically inequivalent to a quantum theory, or else 
show that the extra structure in some empirically equivalent quantum theory lacks 
evidential support. There are, in general, two cases that must be dealt with: (1) so-
called modal or “no collapse” hidden-variables theories (of which Bohmian 
mechanics is the prototypical example
73
), or (2) collapse theories (like the GRW 
theory). 
 The extra mechanical structures underlying the statistics in Bohm’s theory are 
particle trajectories in configuration space with accompanying “guiding waves” 
(quantum mechanical wave functions). If the initial distribution of the particles, from 
which we might derive their trajectories (along with a wave function), is the so-called 
“Born distribution”, then the resulting quantum statistics is equivalent to any quantum 
theory, and so won’t violate any of the information theoretic constraints, via the CBH 
theorem (Bub 2004, pp. 257-8). But, 
If the information-theoretic constraints apply at the phenomenal level then, according 
to Bohmian mechanics, the universe must be in the equilibrium state, and in that case 
there can be no evidence for Bohmian mechanics that goes beyond the empirical 
                                               
73 All modal interpretation are equivalent in the sense that they all specify the dynamics of some 
definite observable. For Bohm, it is position (see Bub 2004a, 14). As well, Bell argues that the many 
worlds interpretation is equivalent to Bohmian mechanics modulo particle trajectories (Ibid.). 
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content of a quantum theory (i.e., the statistics of quantum superpositions and 
entangled states). Since it follows from the CBH theorem that a similar analysis will 
apply to any ‘no collapse’ hidden variable theory or modal interpretation, there can, 
in principle, be no empirical grounds for choosing among these theories, or between 
any one of these and  quantum theory (Ibid., 258). 
 With a collapse account, like GRW, Bub points out that it violates one of the 
information-theoretic principles: the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit 
commitment: 
“Since the GRW noise [read: hidden degrees of freedom] is 
uncontrollable in principle, there will be entangled states associated 
with this larger Hilbert space that cannot be prepared, and so cannot be 
exploited for steering [Schrödinger’s way of talking about nonlocal 
changes to quantum measurement statistics]… This suggests that 
unconditionally secure bit commitment would, in principle, be possible 
[by accessing these hidden degrees of freedom]. (ibid., 256) 
To count against the truth of Bub’s claim, any counterexample must at least satisfy 
the conditions of the theorem (both the information-theoretic constraints and the 
kinematical essence of QM). GRW does not, and hence does not count against Bub. 
 Where does this leave us? If we cannot specify any empirically supported 
underlying mechanical structure (that is, some phase-space representation underlying 
the statistical structure of the observable algebra) or if any attempt at recovering 
“definiteness” results in violating one or more information theoretic constraint or if 
we end up with an empirically inequivalent theory, and we want to take quantum 
theory seriously (as a truly fundamental theory), then we should believe that “our 
measurement instruments ultimately  remain black boxes” which implies that we treat 
quantum mechanics as about the statistical outputs of information sources. The 
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fundamental entity is not particles, waves and so on – it is information; that is all. The 
problem with QM is really an historical contingency: we developed classical 
mechanics first out of the 17
th
 century, where it was very popular to see the world 
causal-mechanically
74
. Consequently, physics sought to find a representation of these 
causal mechanisms, and so any mathematical representation of nature ultimately was 
judged over its ability to find expression as a complete catalogue of properties of 
these causal-mechanical particles – a phase space representation. 
 It might be thought that Bub’s basic position is nothing other than a kind of 
antirealism or instrumentalism regarding QM – nothing other than a statistical 
interpretation with the aim at being metaphysically agnostic. Indeed, one might be 
tempted to this view because many other quantum information theorists seem to be 
arguing for an epistemic view of the quantum mechanical state and some form of 
instrumentalist or antirealism. If so, then Bub’s position is uninteresting, since 
instrumentalism or antirealism would be doing all of the interpretive work. If our 
theories are merely “instrumental” then there is no bother over ontological worries; if 
one denies that our theories are about a mind-independent reality, then there can be 
no worries over that reality as far as our theories go.  
 But to take such a view of the CBH project and Bub’s subsequent 
foundational work with it, would be to miss the essential point: quantum mechanics is 
about the behavior of information, not classical particles, waves, etc. This does not 
                                               




entail either instrumentalism or antirealism (or realism for that matter). Realism is 
actually consistent with CBH’s project and Bub’s position, as I will now argue. 
 
4. Realism Is Not The Real Issue: Blocking Instrumentalism and Antirealism From 
CBH. It is unfair to believe that CBH and Bub’s elaboration of its foundational 
significance might be just instrumentalism (or antirealism) in disguise. Quantum 
mechanics need not imply a dispute over realism and antirealism
75
. It can simply 
imply a dispute over whether we can maintain a causal-mechanical view of physics or 
not; that is, whether we can hold fast to the somewhat misnamed “criteria of reality” 
Einstein adamantly propounded: locality and separability
76
. These two criteria are at 
least necessary conditions on a causal-mechanical view, if not the very definition of 
it
77
. The well-confirmed violation of Bell’s Inequalities establish that separability and 
locality cannot be true of a quantum world
78
. Thus, QM since it violates these 
inequalities, implies the falsity of the causal-mechanical view. This suggests that we 
view the change from classical to quantum mechanic as the shift from the causal-
mechanical view to a non-causal-mechanical view. 
                                               
75 I wish to understand realism and antirealism following Devitt (2002): realism is, on the “existence 
dimension” of it, a claim that “most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific 
theories exist mind-independently”. Anti-realism is the denial of this claim. This way of construing 
realism is neutral to any underwriting ontology: existence could be predicated to causal-mechanisms 
or non-causal-mechanisms (Platonic Forms, Aristotelian essences, and the like). 
76 See Bub 2005, p. 543ff. 
77 Van Fraassen (1989) argues for a similar point (see esp. pp. 99ff). Although van Fraassen takes a 
denial of the a causal mechanical view to be a denial of “epistemic” realism, I find that realism and the 
causal-mechanical view are distinct, as I argued in the Introduction of this paper, and as I argue in the 
present section. 
78 Technically, the violation of Bell’s Inequalities imply the falsity of the common cause principle, 




 We can then see that there are two orthogonal problems with respect to QM: 
realism vs. antirealism/instrumentalism on the one hand, and the causal-mechanical 
view vs. a non-causal-mechanical view on the other. The issue of realism can only 
make sense with respect to some background ontological scheme, such as the causal-
mechanical view, where it is clear what kinds of things we can be realists about or 
what our theories are about (i.e., what sort of mind-independent reality there is). For 
example, it is one thing to be a realist about a causal-mechanical world (of particles, 
waves, fields, etc.); it is quite another to be a realist about a non-causal-mechanical 
world (say, a world of Aristotelian essences – abstract, formal properties not 
reducible to Democritean atoms –  or, of Platonic Forms). Indeed, I might be a realist 
about information – but not think that it reduces to the classical ontology of the 
causal-mechanical world-view (as Bub claims of information)! If some interpretation 
of QM does not buy into the background ontological scheme of the causal-mechanical 
world-view, then it is unfair to charge it with antirealism or even instrumentalist 
unless such a charge is made relative to that background. 
 I believe that it is the fairest interpretation of the CBH result, and Bub’s 
subsequent elaboration of this result, to see it non-causal-mechanically. This reading 
is fair in that it does not see their work as being doomed to anti-realism or 
instrumentalism right from the start. It allows them room to be realists, but realists not 
about the furniture of a classical world. It allows them to be realists about a 
nonclassical world of information, which mustn’t reduce to the classical ontology 
(although one may try to argue that it does). I am not arguing that they must be 
realists; my argument is that there is logical space for them to be. In this way, then, it 
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would be entirely unfair to charge their project as being antirealist or instrumentalist 
from the get-go. 
 This way of interpreting the project distinguishes it from other information-
theoretic projects which are overtly instrumentalist
79
 or only awkwardly realist
80
. 
Thus, CBH and Bub’s own foundational project based on it, are not necessarily 
antirealist or instrumentalist. Denying particles, waves and the like is not denying 
realism; it is just changing ontology. The burden then becomes articulating that 
ontology precisely. 
 
5. The Real Worry: Information as Property or Entity? In the current literature on the 
subject, there seems to be much confusion over the question of how to understand 
‘information’. Some think that quantum information “does not exist”, in that it is 
nothing more than Shannon Information (Duwell 2003); others think that it is a new 





 claims that “[i]nformation is not a disembodied 
abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical representation” and hence he wants to 
draw the implication that information is physical; likewise for Steane
83
. Timpson 
(2000) argues against this view; he thinks that the claim ‘information is physical’ is 
                                               
79 See Duvenhage (2003)  for an approach to quantum information which is instrumentalist. 
80 Fuchs claims to have a realist project; however as Hagar argues quite convincingly, if one adopts an 
epistemic view of the quantum mechanical state, then it is almost impossible to be realist about QM. 
81 See Duwell (2003), pp. 479-80. 
82 Quoted in Timpson (2000). 
83 Op. cit. 
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false. So, for Timpson, information is not physical. Information is not to be thought of 
as an entity at all
84
. Bub flatly denies this. 
 This confusion is made worse since most authors want to invoke information 
in either an antirealistic or instrumentalist context; few have attempted to see 
information realistically
85
. Fuchs (2002b) takes the quantum mechanical state to 
“[represent] a collection of subjective degrees of belief …” (p. 5) and to be “solely an 
expression of subjective information – the information one has about a quantum 
system” (p. 7). Fuchs’ project an “epistemic view”, “can be rendered consistent,” 
Hagar writes, “only at the price of denying even the weakest form of realism” alluded 
to by Fuchs (Hagar 2003, p. 763). Duvenhage sees the quantum state in a way similar 
to Fuchs: it is “a mathematical object which for each possible outcome of each 
measurement that can be performed on the system, provides the observer with the 
probability of obtaining that outcome when performing that measurement” (2002, 4) 
– implying a kind of instrumentalist attitude toward QM and an epistemic view of the 
quantum mechanical state
86
. Duvenhage regards information as being “about a 
physical system” that “is a set of probabilities [an observer] assigns to the outcomes 
of all measurements which he can perform on the system” (p.2). The mathematical 
object that expresses this for him, then, is the quantum mechanical state. 
 How can we make sense of all of this confusion? Specifically, can Bub defend 
the claim that information is a new kind of entity? I think Bub can, if we take him to 
                                               
84 Timpson 2000, p. 16 
85 The work of the Horodeckis seem to want to go realist, or at least physical, with information. See 
esp. their (2003) “Quantum Information Isomorphism: Beyond The Dilemma of Scylla of Ontology 
and Charybdis of Instrumentalism” for an interesting suggestion in this regard. 
86 On the potential inconsistency of realism and the epistemic view, see Hagar (2003). 
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be effectively denying the causal-mechanical view. If we take Bub non-causal-
mechanically, then many of the worries generated will go away.  
 In general, there are two possible ways to see information: either as a property 
of something (like a physical communications system in Shannon’s sense) or as an 
entity in its own right. For each sense, there are further issues that arise. 
5.1 Information as Property: Functional vs. Essential. If one wants to understand 
information as a property, then there are two possible interpretations, either as (i) a 
functional property or (ii) as an essential property. For example, ‘being a computer’ 
or ‘being a Turning machine’ is a functional property: to be one of these things is to 
satisfy certain abstractly specified conditions (“roles”), which can be “realized” with 
many kinds of entities (computers can be made out of wood, water and pipes or 
silicon). Functional properties do not pick out natural kinds in the world. In contrast, 
‘being a piece of gold’ is not a functional property: to be gold is to have a certain 
fixed sub-atomic configuration.  It is, therefore, an “essential property” in this sense. 
An essential property is a property that if a thing did not posses it, it would not be that 
thing – it would cease to exist a the thing it is. 
 If information is nothing but a functional property, then ‘having information’ 
means ‘instantiating certain abstract conditions’; for example, we can take those 
conditions as none other than the Shannon communication system itself
87
. The only 
sense in which information is physical is the sense in which it gets “realized” in 
physical systems like a Shannon communication system. But then it seems that the 
                                               
87 See Shannon 1948,  p. 2. 
93 
 
only difference between quantum information and classical is a difference in the kind 
of physical stuff in which the information is realized: quantum information is that 
which is realized in quantum mechanical stuff, and classical in classical stuff.  
 However, there seems to be some disagreement in the literature as to whether 
this analysis is right. Is quantum information nothing but the quantum analogue to 
classical information (a la Shannon), or is quantum information a new kind of 
information? Duwell (2003) argues that “quantum information does not exist” in the 
sense that it is nothing more than classical Shannon information multiply realized 
over different physical entities (some quantum, some classical)
88
. Thus, Duwell is 
claiming that (Shannon) information is a functional property, realized with various 
entities (characterized with their own essential properties). As such, Shannon 
information is “sufficient” for quantum information. 
 Jozsa (1998) argues that quantum information is a new kind of information in 
the sense that there are certain properties of quantum information (namely, 
entanglement) which distinguish it from classical information. Duwell wants to take 
issue with Josza: quantum information does not exist. However, there seems to be 
confusion here. 
 But saying that quantum information is a “new kind” need not immediately 
commit one to the insufficiency of Shannon Information for quantum information, if 
Shannon information is functionally construed. Of the class of things defined 
                                               
88 But, if quantum mechanics is truly a fundamental theory, then in which sense is there anything 
“really” classical? Either (i) QM is complete, and classicality is an appearance, or else (ii) QM is not 
complete, and some things can be really classical. If (i), then there is really no classical information; if 
(ii) then there can be. 
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functionally as ‘information’, we may further specify two sub-classes, quantum and 
classical. Josza has something to say about this: quantum information is “new” in the 
sense that to be quantum information is not only to satisfy the functional property 
‘information’, but also to possess an essential property that makes something 
quantum: entanglement. The possibility of ‘being entangled’ is an essential property 
for something’s being ‘quantum’. 
 Thus, it is consistent to say that Shannon information is sufficient for quantum 
information and to say that quantum information is different from classical (because 
of the possession of a further essential property) – unless you identify Shannon 
information with classical information. But if you think that Shannon information is 
basically a functional property, then there is not motivation for such an identification. 
5.2 Information as Entity? Consider the following central philosophical remark 
towards the end of “Why The Quantum”: 
So a consequence of rejecting Bohm-type hidden-variable theories or 
other ‘no-collapse’ theories is that we recognize information as a new 
sort of physical entity, not reducible to the motion of particles or 
fields. An entangled state should be thought of as a nonclassical 
communication channel that we have discovered to exist in our 
quantum universe, i.e., as a new sort of nonclassical ‘wire’. We can 
use these communication channels to do things that would be 
impossible otherwise, e.g., to teleport states …. A quantum theory is 
then about the properties of these communication channels, and about 
the representation and manipulation of states as sources of information 
in the physical sense” (2004, p. 262). 
 The picture of the world Bub endorses is one in which information counts as 
physical entity, but the ‘how’, though, isn’t explained. Bub does not specify what an 
entity is such that information counts as one; furthermore, it’s not clear how this 
entity relates to other characteristically ‘physical’ entities like particles or waves—or 
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if Bub is rejecting the whole idea that the world is fundamentally composed of 
particles and fields. Indeed, it’s not clear what Bub means by ‘physical’, because, as 
we’ve seen, one standard response to his view is that all it amounts to is a particularly 
egregious form of hypostasis—treating an abstract concept as a physical object or 
‘entity’, if you will. The least that Bub seems to be saying is that not all physical 
entities are sums of, or at any rate dependent upon, the standard panoply of ontology 
which includes particles and/or waves. But, it is reasonable to request of Bub’s 
position that it outline why this isn’t hypostasis. In other words: insofar as there is a 
prior and reasonable distinction to be made between ‘abstract’ vs. ‘physical’ (i.e., 
concrete, non-abstract and physical) entities, and insofar as ‘information’ is plausibly 
construed as an instance of the former (this is Timpson’s, and to some extent Hagar’s, 
contribution to the discussion), then unless some thesis is advanced to address this 
distinction itself, there is good reason to suspect that Bub has committed the fallacy 
of hypostatization. 
 But, let us take notice of the fact that this charge of “hypostatization” really 
depends upon a particular prior way of dividing physical from non-physical—of 
making the distinction between concrete vs. abstract, that is. In fact, when we think 
about what is meant by ‘physical’, the usual response is: composed of non-mental 
stuff, stuff like chemicals and compounds, which ultimately are composed of 
elementary particles/fields and their intrinsic properties (or we way become a little 
more sophisticated and say that ‘physical’ and even ‘physical entities’ are nothing 
more than bundles of properties). Everything else, you may say, in some sense 
depends on that. One way of articulating this dependency is to invoke a relation like 
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“supervenience”: all facts “supervene” on the physical facts, where the content of the 
concept ‘physical’ is supplied by fundamental physics (particles/fields, waves, and 
their intrinsic properties, which are things like charge, spin, mass, etc.). The view 
seems to be that unless entity X depends upon some set of physical facts Y, then X is 
abstract. It is characteristic of abstract entities that they are autonomous and 
independent of minds, societies and beliefs and physical stuff. Mathematics can be 
thought of as the study of abstracta: numbers, the concept of infinity, and sets are 
abstract in the sense that they themselves do not depend on there being any physical 
facts all and certainly do not depend on minds, beliefs and societies (so goes the 
view). 
 Bub, though, can easily reply to the charge that he’s committed the fallacy of 
hypostatization by treating information as a physical entity. He can simply say “so 
what? Even if information is an ‘abstract’ entity according to your distinction, the 
claim on the table is that when the world is construed in quantum information 
theoretic terms, so long as it’s clear, operationally speaking, what an ‘information 
theoretic system’ amounts to, and in particular what a ‘communications system’ is or 
could possibly be ‘made of’, then what I have done is provided the principles that 
govern such abstracta! As long as information theoretic systems are construed 
functionally—just like the concept of a hammer or a computer may be understood 
functionally—then just about any collection of things, under the right conditions and 
with the right structure, may count as an information theoretic system, and so be 
under the purview of the principles of quantum information theory as has been 
characterized (CBH 2003). This is just like saying that when I’ve got the right system 
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of wood, pulleys and so on in place such that I may compute a function, I’ve got a 
computer and therefore certain mathematical truths will apply (i.e., Church-Turing 
thesis, principles of computation, combinatorial mathematics, etc.). If anything, I am 
saying something that has been noted for generations now: mechanical systems are 
describable by vector calculus; information theoretical systems are describable by 
information theory—and with the right configuration, even a mechanical system may 
be considered an information theoretical one, though perhaps the latter just doesn’t 
reduce to the former. Now, if anything is wrong here, it’s with your narrow construal 
of ‘physical’ or ‘concrete’ in terms of particles/fields or waves. All that I am telling 
you is that ‘information’ does not reduce to, or is not a compositional sum of, those 
entities, and that the laws of quantum mechanics are ‘about’ the possibilities of 
information transfer, communication, etc. Now, just like a the idea of a ‘computer’ 
must be realized by ‘physical’ objects, it is still true that the laws of computation are 
such as to be true of just about any sort of computer. Indeed, this is the hallmark of an 
objective science—by definition. Indeed, what I am really saying is that ‘entity’ is 
much more general concept that the classical picture allows for. Why should my 
characterization of the world have to fit the mold of the classical picture of the world, 
where all that we’re supposed to be describing is the behavior of particles/fields or 
waves? That would be a way of begging the question against my point of view. 
Abstracta may differ from concreta, but surely both it seems a stretch to say that 
because an entity is abstract, then there can be no scientific laws about it, or that the 
universe may, in limited was, be conceived of as an instance of an abstract concept 
(like that of a computer), as functional the concept turns out to be, in the end”. And 
98 
 
indeed, making this argument—that Bub’s position amounts to a non-causal 
mechanical view and that this implies—has been the purport of this chapter. 
 As I see it, Bub is really re-asserting Quine’s dictum, albeit one freed of the 
idea that particles/fields or waves are the only acceptable ‘physical entities’: get your 
ontology from fundamental physics—even if that requires generating a more abstract 
and less “stuffy” sort of ontology than that characteristic of the classical view we 
find, for example, in Newton. Indeed, certain abstracta, like the abstract, functional 
concept of ‘computer’, find many instances, and these instances obey suitably 
abstract laws (that of logic and computation, let us say). To say that every computer is 
realized by some conglomeration of physical stuff (non-abstracta) is not to say that 
the laws are untrue and fail to refer. Maybe we just don’t think that such kind of 
theories—those that refer to abstracta—don’t count as fundamental physical theories. 
Surely, though, Bub’s opponent owes him an explanation as to why his information 
theoretic characterization of quantum theory cannot count as a fundamental theory of 
the universe. In other words, Bub’s opponent owes him a story as to what counts as a 
“fundamental theory”—an argument that has not be made. And this question—what 
counts as a fundamental theory—does not seem to admit of a perfectly general 
answer. Indeed, as I’ll explain at the end of this dissertation, this question is open, as 
open as any theory is open to empirical investigation. So, unless Bub’s opponent just 
stamps their feet and insists that all interpretations of theory or fundamental theories 
all require an ontology of particles/fields or waves by which one may construct (or 




 But, the opponent might persist, what I am really requiring is that unless your 
ontology is such as to allow for a description of all fundamental physical processes 
(at least those that are the purview of quantum theory—and we must include here the 
process of measurement itself) in terms of the behavior of this fundamental ontology 
plus the dynamical laws that coordinate the behavior of that fundamental ontology, 
then this ontology, and this interpretation in general, is completely inadequate. So, 
our opponent claims that we cannot build a picture of the basic processes of nature 
out of the quantum information theoretic account, nor can we, in particular, resolve 
the measurement problem. 
 How could the interpretation do this, if there is no appeal to entities like 
particles/field or waves—entities which are such as to allow for spatiotemporal 
locatedness, and are such as to move. Those sorts of entities are, we may say, concrete 
in the sense that they have (in principle) definite and determinate spatiotemporal 
features. Abstracta—functional ‘objects’ like computers or ‘informational systems’—
do not themselves have spatiotemporal locations, but their concrete exemplars most 
certainly do. Information qua entity (let us say even qua abstract entity) does not have 
a “location”, spatiotemporally speaking, in the same way that particles or waves have 
spatiotemporal location. That which is a concrete physical realization of (quantum) 
information will always have a spatiotemporal location—and so the quantum 
mechanical problems of recovering definiteness and determinateness, that is of 
recovering an apparently “classical” world from the quantum one—will only arise 
whenever we attempt to tell a story of the quantum world in terms of an ontology of 
particles/fields or waves. And only here does a measurement problem arise. 
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5.3 An analysis of ‘measurement’. Recently, Bub has addressed precisely the issue 
discussed above in more detail, and has developed a more nuanced approach to the 
question being raised here, which is just what is being required of a quantum theory 
so that a solution to the measurement problem may be given? In particular, what is a 
measurement, anyway? Bub claims (personal communication): 
The new empirical discovery underlying quantum mechanics that 
clashes with the causal-mechanical view of classical physics (as 
extended by Einstein’s relativity theories) is that there exist 
information sources that cannot be cloned. Putting it differently: there 
is no universal information-cloning machine… [i]f you could clone the 
information source, then you would have [in a twin-slit experiment, for 
example] a classical distribution at the back of the slits and not the 
interference distribution. So, the essential step in the break with 
classical physics is noncommutativity or the Uncertainty Principle. 
[…] If you have information sources that cannot be cloned, i.e., if 
there is no universal information-cloning machine, then there can be 
no such thing as measurement in the sense that we usually think about 
measurement is a causal-mechanical theory. 
 
So, according to this view, the “no universal cloning machine” theorem, which can in 
information-theoretic terms be proven of quantum theory, implies that “there can be 
no such thing as measurement” in the usual sense, which is that there is (ideally) a 
perfect correlation between the states of the measurement apparatus and the states of 
the system being measured—i.e., the measurement apparatus effectively clones or 
copies the physical states of the measured system. Insofar as there exist no universal 
cloning machines, then no such measurements exist according to Bub’s information 
theoretic interpretation of quantum theory. 
To put it simply [he writes]: ‘no universal information-cloning 
machine’ means ‘no measurements’ (in the usual sense). So we have to 
take our measuring instruments—ultimately—simply as classical 
information sources, i.e., a ‘black boxes’ no susceptible to a dynamical 
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analysis. That is, in any measurement situation, there must always be 
some ultimate measuring instrument that is not analyzed any further 
dynamically and is just functioning as a classical source of 
information, i.e., it produces some classical probability distribution of 
events. …[Y]ou can always push a dynamical analysis of the 
instrument further (there’s no absolute stopping point…), but that just 
pushes things one step back to some other ‘ultimate measuring 
instrument’. This is a conclusion of the analysis prompted by the 
discovery that some information sources cannot be cloned (and 
empirical discovery elevated to a principle underlying quantum 
mechanics as a new theory of information…); measuring instruments 
much (ultimately) function as ‘black boxes’ or classical information 
sources. 
 This is a strong thesis. It implies that any causal-mechanical story of measurement 
requires that there be cloning, which is disallowed. Thus, there is a dilemma: either 
there is no measurement problem, or universal cloning is possible. Bub’s position 
entails, therefore, that there is no measurement problem. Furthermore, Bub claims 
that this interpretation—which is essentially arguing for a particular analysis of the 
meaning of ‘measurement’—is analogous to what Einstein provided with his special 
theory of relativity, which is an analysis of the meaning of ‘simultaneity’. Bub 
explains: 
So, quantum mechanics is not a theory of waves and particles of a new 
sort but a theory of information and how it relates to classical 
information. From this point of view, there is no measurement 
problem: the problem arises if you persist in thinking about quantum 
mechanics in the old way. The analysis … resolves a foundational 
problem in a similar sense to the way the puzzle about light is resolved 
by Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity. For Lorentz, the fact that the 
velocity of light is constant was something to be explained, e.g., by 
‘constructive’ assumptions about electrodynamical interactions in the 
ether that are responsible for the contraction of moving rods. For 
Einstein, there is nothing to be explained here (in the sense of 
providing a mechanism for some puzzling behavior): the puzzle is 
resolved by the analysis of simultaneity (i.e., there is no puzzle). 
Similarly, GRW theorists postulate a constructive ‘collapse’ 
mechanism to explain how you get a classical probability distribution 
is a measurement interaction. But there is nothing to be explained here 
from the point of view of the information-theoretic interpretation: the 
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analysis linking the behavior of measuring instruments to the 
impossibility of a universal cloning machine resolves the puzzle (i.e., 
there is no puzzle). 
So, Bub now proposes as one fundamental principle the principle that there is no 
universal cloning machine; this is a principle that “governs” (if you will) the 
“behavior” of information transfer. 
 It is not entirely clear why Bub’s proposal is not as “physical” as Einstein’s. 
Both begin with, in effect, an analysis of measurement: for Bub, the analysis concerns 
the basic structure of measurement which involves a correlation between the states of 
the measured system and the (internal) states of the measurement apparatus; for 
Einstein, it also involved measurement, but one having to do with a more 
fundamental consideration of simultaneity—what it means to say that two events 
‘happen at the same time’ (which notion is involved in every measurement of length, 
which is a fundamental feature of any physical system). Bub calls such kinds of 
theory “constitutive”, involving, as they do, a consideration of what constitutes a 
proper measurement, or better, what is excluded from the concept of measurement: in 
QM (according to Bub), it is cloning that is prohibited (one you formulate quantum 
theory information theoretically); in relativity, it is absolute simultaneity that is 
prohibited (that is, there is no universal standard of spatiotemporal measurement that 
stands outside of every physical process, including that of measurement
89
). Both 
                                               
89 This is exactly what the conjunction of the two principles of special relativity lead to: all 
determinations of space and time are fixed by the speed of electromagnetic processes, is a constant and 
independent of the motion of its source. In effect, this means that only one length is absolute: x= ct, 
which is the amount of ‘space’, if you will, described by a beam of light. But this ‘absolute length’ is 
essentially dependent upon a particular process in nature, and so does not leave space and time 
independent of every natural process, which in turn implies an absolute notion of simultaneity (this is 
Newton). Einstein simply realized that this notion of simultaneity was at the heart of Lorentz’s attempt 
to account for the laws of electromagnetism, in conjunction with the null result of the famous 
Michelson-Morley experiment. Dropping the idea that spatial and temporal facts are in principle 
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theories, in their turn, imply something about the proper form of theories in its 
domain: in relativity, the proper form is determined by Lorentz invariance; in Bub’s 
formulation of QM, the proper form of theories is that is manifest a non-commutative 
state-space geometry—not merely apparently, but really. That is, according to Bub, 
any reconstruction of quantum theory that adds another (hidden) variable to the 
theory will be analogous to introducing an ether hypothesis whose purpose is to 
smuggle in an absolute notion of simultaneity. In other words, Bub’s position is that 
any “solution to the measurement problem” will be such as to re-introduce a notion of 
measurement that is inappropriate for quantum theory (in essence, the old notion of 
measurement was such that, in the language of information theory, cloning was 
possible in principle). 
 The point with all of this is that Einstein’s theory is as “physical” as Bub’s 
proposed re-interpretation of the quantum theory in information theoretic terms. 
Insofar as the notions of velocity and space and time have clear operational meaning 
in relativistic mechanics, Einstein’s theory is physically meaningful and can find 
concrete physical instances; mutatis mutandis for Bub’s information theoretic 
reinterpretation: as long as we can conceptualize any physical system as an 
informational system with ‘physical’ components, then Bub’s is a ‘physical’ theory, 
at least as much as Einstein’s. Bub’s view implies, however, is that there is no 
absolute deconstruction of the process of measurement which is not itself going to 
obey the non-commutativity of the quantum theory. That is, there is no absolute 
                                                                                                                                      
independent of every natural process (including measurement) led Einstein to the special theory: we 
have evidence, in effect, that at least one velocity is independent from its source (electromagnetic 
velocities), and thus we may hang our temporal and spatial determinations around this fact, rather than 




measurement—no “universal cloning machine”—and so every measurement 
apparatus must remain, essentially, a ‘black box’, an incompletely analyzed 
correlation-generating information source. 
 
6. A species of ontic structuralism. Bub’s latest view amounts to a species of ontic 
structuralism. Another way of understanding the basic thesis of the ontic structuralist 
is that there is no absolute, non-structural decomposition of the physical world—all 
entities (individuals) are metaphysically derivative from structure, and there is (in 
principle) no end to this structural analysis. In other words, there is no “complete” 
account of the physical world that bottoms out in terms of non-structural 
“fundamental constituents”. The causal-mechanical view is a metaphysical view that 
precisely demands what the structuralist regards as illegitimate, for it regards 
everything as determined by the interactions of fundamental constituent parts which 
have their own, independent, self-contained nature. 
 In the case of Bub’s information theoretic interpretation of quantum theory, 
what is disallowed is a construction of all fundamental processes in terms of 
fundamental constituents; some elements of the picture must remain unanalyzed. If 
we did allow such a view, then according to Bub’s interpretation, we will run afoul of 
the principle of “no universal cloning machine” in the case where we apply this 
causal-mechanical doctrine to the processes of measurement itself. The question is, 
then, what sort of a world are we left with if, according to QIT, the fundamental 
“entity” is information, and there can be no absolute decomposition of the world 
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along causal-mechanical lines? The most plausible interpretation here is that Bub’s 
QIT describes the true structure of the world in terms of informational systems, which 
may be “composed” of just about anything, given the right configuration and under 
the right circumstances. In other words, inasmuch as we may physically construct 
systems that are the functional equivalents of quantum computational structures 
(effectively building the quantum analogue of classical communications systems that, 
e.g., Shannon first described), we may build a kind of quantum computer which 
instantiates the right sort of computational structures that will, in turn, obey Bub’s 
principles—and the claim is that every quantum mechanical system may be 
conceptualized and treated in this manner. We may even go a bit further here, and 
invoke the possibility that there may be no limit on how “large” systems may be that 
display quantum mechanical effects (something that, e.g., Sir Anthony Leggett has 
written on). Indeed, there may be radical length-scale invariance here: if the 
conjecture of Leggett’s is right
90
, then just about any collection of objects at any level 
of scale may manifest quantum mechanical behavior, so long as one can suspend the 
effects of what has been called “environmental decoherence” (ED for short). The 
sense in which we arrive at an ontic structuralist view of the physical world is seen 
when you realize that what Bub is really saying is that given the complete generality 
                                               
90 Relatively macroscopic objects such as benzene molecules have been shown to exhibit quantum 
interference effects, for example. So, these systems counts as quantum mechanical systems if any do—
irrespective of size. Only quantum coherence counts. The conjecture of Leggett’s is: why, in principle, 
should we expect quantum mechanical effects to drop off on the order of the length-scale of viruses, 
bacteria, lipids, chemical compounds, etc.? Supposing that ED can be appropriately and effectively 
controlled, thus inducing a coherent quantum state, there seems to be no in principle length-scale limit 
to what systems will exhibit quantum mechanical effects—possibly whole planets or solar systems. It 
follows that, for example, a quantum information system may be constructed with the appropriately 
ED-controlled, macroscopic elements. So, just as a computer can be constructed out of wood, water 
and pulleys (as Searle famously pointed out in the context of philosophy of mind) for which the laws of 
computation apply, likewise for a “quantum computer” (an instance of an informational system) made 
out of ED-controlled bits of physical stuff. 
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of the laws of quantum information theory, what is being described is not the motion 
of non-classical particles or waves, but the modal structure of informational 
systems—what can and cannot be done (the “possibilities and impossibilities of 
information transfer”) in the world, quite irrespective of “what it’s made of” (this, 
finally, is what we’re to be ‘realist’ about, should we choose to invoke that 
terminology). Bub’s QIT is insensitive to “what the world is made of”; it only cares to 
provide the structure of what there is, come whatever details you like to fill in for the 
material stuff. And this, finally, is what relativity provides: a description of what can 




Chapter 4: Quantum Mechanics from the “Archimedean” 




1. Introduction. The purpose of this essay is to explicate Huw Price’s “Backwards 
Causation Quantum Mechanics” (1996, 2001) with the goal of revealing the deeper 
philosophical implications regarding explanation and the status of (dynamical) laws 
in a universe where this interpretation is true. The metaphysical and epistemic 
perspective Price adopts for this view is what he calls the “Archimedean” perspective 
– the perspective of a timeless observer. We will pursue the question: can this 
“timeless” perspective be reconciled with Price’s insistence on the explanatory role of 
backwards causal dynamical influences? 
 After bringing out the nature of explanation and the status of dynamical laws 
in a universe where not only is BCQM true, but where we adopt a timeless 
interpretation of it in such a world, we will ask a further question regarding the 
plausibility of invoking “backwards” causal influences to explain phenomena in this 
universe. This analysis will suggest several philosophical problems or potential 
objections to Price’s view. The most serious potential objection is that these 
backwards causal influences threaten an explanatory regress (perhaps to the big-
bang), hence rendering explanation empty (even allowing that “Einstein local 
realism” is consistent with BCQM). Finally, we will argue for an interpretation of 
Price’s view where “causation” is a compromise between the dynamical and non-
dynamical perspectives Price vacillates between. Thus causal talk, albeit 
“perspectival”, reconciles both the dynamical and non-dynamical points of view 
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adopted by Price. Here, we will explore what the right attitude ought to be with 
respect to dynamical laws from the Archimedean point of view. In particular, we will 
explore the possibility of moving beyond a dependence on dynamical laws for 
“explanation” – where the Archimedean does not just describe, but can discover non-




2. EPR: As simple as ‘B causes A’? Bell took for granted – as physicists tend to – that 
the future cannot determine the past in the sense that the initial state of some physical 
system is statistically independent of the events in its future light-cone. Price, 
considering this to be an unjustified assumption in the Bell proof, constructs a model 
of epr phenomena without assuming that the past does not depend in some important 
sense on the future, at least when it comes to microphysical systems (of, say, 
electrons, photons, etc.). Consider the basic epr configuration, in schematic 
spacetime-diagram form [figure 1].  
                                               
91 Arguably, this is what we have been doing all along with the “principle” methodological strategy 
which Einstein – one’s of its champions – ironically derided as a method of “desperation”. In the ideal 

















It might be that the quantum state prepared at the source is actually dependent on its 
future measurement interactions. Bell (1993) seemed to think that this would amount 
to a possible world which was 
even more mind-boggling than one in which causal chains go faster 
than light. Apparently separate parts of the world would be deeply and 
conspiratorially entangled, and our apparent free will would be 
entangled with them. (p. 154) 
This possibility can be ruled out by stipulating the “independence assumption (Price 
2001, 199): 
Independence Assumption (IA): The values of the hidden variables 
λ1,λ2 are independent of the measurement settings Set1, Set2 
This means that we can imagine the future measurement settings varying such that the 
probability distribution ρ(λ) does not change. If, contrary to IA, we do allow this 
probability distribution to depend on the measurement settings, then a very simple 
explanation of the Stern-Gerlach distribution pattern in an EPR-Bohm set-up [figure 
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2] is possible: the particles “know” which way the apparatus is going to be oriented, 





















If we want to embed this story in spacetime, it looks like we have to posit backwards 
causation as the physical mechanism responsible for the failure of IA, as Maudlin 
(1994) notes: 
Since the settings of the measurement devices can be performed in the 
absolute future of the creation of the electrons, and since the settings 
can be determined independently of the process which creates the 
electrons (e.g., the setting could be determined by a computer program 
running a complex algorithm), any theory which denies [the 
independence assumption] must posit backwards causation …. (285) 
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The denial of IA opens up the possibility of something like a “common-cause” 
explanation of EPR-Bohm, albeit in reverse: information about SG settings is sent 
along the backwards light-cone of each sg apparatus M1,M2 where this common 
information coincides at the source of the particle pair so that each particle can 
“possess” the information about its future. It is not in virtue of only a past common 
causal intersection that explains the future correlations: it is the past common causal 
intersection (the singlet state prepared at the source) plus the common information 
about the particles’ future measurement interaction that explains EPR. We can call 
this model of EPR, formulated around the explicit denial of IA, “backwards 
causation” quantum mechanics or BCQM, following Callender (1998, 153). 
 According to BCQM the determination, and hence explanation, of the 
behavior of epr particles is made on the basis of their future interactions, as well as 
their past. With this kind of symmetric determination, in one fell swoop not only is 
the peculiar lack of a continuous spread of particle positions explained quite simply 
(Bell 1987, 142), but also explained is the outcome correlation between M1 and M2 
(separated by a spacelike interval): information about the future lands backwards in 
time at the source of particles. Since quantum theory itself does not provide this 
necessary information when describing the initial EPR singlet-state, the theory is an 
incomplete theory. When completed, the new quantum theory will have a completely 
“local” and “realistic” interpretation in Einstein’s sense, although now somewhat 
restricted.. This is a crucial point. 
 Consider figure 3. The quantum state |ψ> is “highly potential”: it encodes 
information about what would happen to the state under certain experimental 
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conditions. We can represent this as a set of conditional probabilities for the outcomes 
of possible yes/no measurements (Price 2001, 204): { … P(Qi|Fi) … } is the 




























As in figure 3, the quantum state from this point of view encodes information about 
its possible future: it provides information about the likelihood of a particular 
outcome when subjected to certain experimental conditions. Modulo any interpretive 
moves at this point, we take each likelihood to be a (non-overlapping) possible world, 
where only one world is selected at the time of measurement – the actual future.  
 Suppose, however, that the universe is something like a “block” universe, in 
which the past, present and future are equally real. Suppose that there is what Price 
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would call an “Archimedean” observer who can “survey the future as well as the 
past” (ibid.). From this observer’s point of view, there is only one actual future. For 
this observer, the picture of quantum theory sketched above is massively redundant: 
most of the information in |ψ> is information about futures which never come to be – 
|ψ> is “noisy”. 
 From this perspective, formulating a quantum theory in Archimedean terms 
would “cut out the noise” in standard quantum theory. Supplementing the theory with 
a hidden variable, as Price proposes, which provides information about the actual 
future would severely limit the standard theory. An “A-complete” (for 
“Archimedean”) theory wouldn’t be as “potential” as the standard theory: |ψ+λ> will 
not reproduce all possible futures encoded in |ψ> alone. As Price himself notes: 
… a hv model of this kind trades off some potentiality in return for a 
gain in A-Completeness. The values of the hidden variables … would 
not be predictive, in the fully counterfactual way that ψ is. To be 
precise, they lose predictivity with respect to the class of possible 
futures which they themselves exclude” (2001, 205). 
The upshot of this loss of “predictivity” is supposed to be what almost every natural 
philosopher worrying about quantum theory was convinced is not a viable possibility: 
beating Bell with a local model of quantum correlations, in short the return of 
Einstein’s “local realism”. But what is perhaps an even more laudable achievement, 
BCQM corrects a long-standing, though not-oft appreciated, problem in the 
conceptual foundations of physics: the asymmetry of explanatory dependence (that 
the future of physical systems depends on the past and not the other way around
92
) is 
not reconcilable with the time-symmetry of fundamental dynamical laws, including 
                                               
92 The principle of “µ-Innocence” is an instance of asymmetric dependence in that this principle states 
that interacting particles exhibit correlations only after, and not before, they have interacted. 
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Schrödinger’s. This asymmetric dependence lacks justification (be it observational or 
conceptual), when considering that the fundamental physical laws governing the 
micro-physical world are quite indifferent to “time’s arrow” and that obviously 
macroscopic “arrows”, like that of thermodynamic processes, are certainly not 
evidence upon which to infer a microscopic asymmetry. Perhaps because of the 
unpalatable “conspiracy”, as Bell put it, that such a symmetrically dependent world 
would require, it is taken for granted that the future is determined by the past in a way 
in which the past is not. Bell’s Theorem consequently inherits what for Price is a 
long-standing unjustified assumption about which way the arrow of determination 
points. 
 But name-calling is never an adequate response to a conceptual possibility, no 
matter how hard to grasp or counter-intuitive it might be. There is no “conspiracy” for 
Price
93
. By taking an “Archimedean” view of physics, which embraces something 
like the “blockworld” view of spacetime (the reality of all spacetime events), Price 
has really assumed that whatever the universe is going to be like, it is already there, 
“at once” and nothing “new” comes into being. All interactions, changes of state, 
choices made, outcomes realized, experiments performed, exist timelessly. Whatever 
patterns there ever were, are or will be, are “there”. That is, from the point of view of 
an Archimedean observer – perhaps something akin to Laplace’s or Newton’s 
omniscient God
94
 – all of the past, present and future are within view. Bound up in 
the fabric of this frozen spacetime are what observers from a particular perspective 
                                               
93 I am taking a somewhat heterodox position here; many natural philosophers tend to adopt the 
“conspiracy” interpretation of those theories which drop the λ-independence assumption. See Lewis 
(2005) for a clear analysis. 
94 See for example Newton’s De Gravitatione. 
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call “EPR correlations” (predicted by a certain physical theory). There are other 
patterns, to be sure. But the patterns consist in nothing more than a comparison of 
three observational facts (recognized by observers within the block): facts about the 
preparation of a physical system, facts about the measurement devices into which 
these systems will go for experimentation, and the outcomes of the experiment itself. 
A problem arises when one takes a physical theory of how the world is supposed to 
work (i.e., quantum theory), makes predictions for this experimental set-up and then 
reasons about what the physical system could possess at the time of preparation to 
give rise to the correlation in their subsequent outcomes. Price asks how beings, from 
a perspective within the fabric of the blockworld, can determine the outcomes from 
the Archimedean perspective. There is, however, no “conspiracy”. It is simply that the 
explanatory task is a good bit different: supposing that the future is real before the 
particles emerge, and that the particles “have” this information, can they exhibit the 
correlations after interacting with the measurement device? The answer of course is 
yes – quite easily. 
 But let us consider how the explanation goes for Price’s Archimedean 
observer, and ask whether one can do better from this timeless perspective. 
 
3. Dynamical Laws and Explanation from the ‘Archemedian’ perspective. Dynamical 
laws are “pushy” to borrow Carl Hoefer’s term: 
They make things happen in certain ways, and by having this power, 
their existence lets us explain why things happen in certain ways. 
Laws, we might say, are implicitly thought of as the cause of 
everything that happens (2003). 
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But their “pushiness” derives from the fact that they pick out, from a larger class of 
possibilities, either a single possibility (for strictly deterministic laws) or a reduced 
class of possibilities. This is the empirical content of a law: it tells us how the 
physical world definitely, or at least probably, is at a later time. However, dynamical 
laws aren’t so pushy in a blockworld. 
 In a blockworld, we imagine that from an Archimedean perspective
95
, all 
events are “real”. Whatever the universe is going to be like, it timelessly “is”. (You 
might even imagine that it has “unfurled” in some sense, although the active voice is 
somewhat odd when it is supposed to be describing a timeless reality). So, whatever 
is going to happen in the universe “does” and we are left with but one possible world 
– the actual one. In this sense, blockworld implies the “fixity of facts”, what we can 
call “logical determinism”. 
 Immediately, in such a world, dynamical laws are not so pushy. Rather, they 
are better seen as a generalization of facts that are already fixed – a summary of what 
the actual blockworld is like. Recall, furthermore, that for Price one looses a measure 
of “predictivity” – in the sense that merely one possible future is fixed from the initial 
state of a physical system (see figure 3). But the initial state of a system, for Price and 
the Archimedean, is not determined from the present to the future; rather, is 
determined from the future to the past. Thus, a “counterfactual” account of laws in a 
universe like this (an Archimedean or block-universe) cannot obtain because, given 
the failure of predictivity in Price’s sense, physical systems are precisely not 
                                               
95 Recall that Price dedicates several pages of his 1996 monograph to the blockworld view of 
spacetime, where he endorses it explicitly (see pp. 12ff). Such a view re-emerges in Price’s later work 
when he asks us to imagine an Archimedean observer who can survey the past and the future when 
thinking about QM (2001, 204). 
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compatible with counterfactual statements about their present state-of-affairs
96
. Even 
if we index counterfactuals to statements about the whole universe, and try to defend 
a counterfactual account of laws accordingly, it is hard to reconcile Price 
Archimedean-ism with counterfactuals. A more plausible interpretation of laws for 
Price is the regularity-theorist’s account (laws are merely regularities of the 
phenomena). According to this view, dynamical laws are cooked-up to match the 
block of already real events for our Archimedean observer. On this view, the 
dynamical laws are determined by the actual block of fixed events, but the block is 
not cooked-up (or entailed by) the laws.  Dynamical laws don’t push! They 
characterize the block of events (is if by a spacetime geometry one simply means a 
characteristic metrical structure between the events, then these laws-qua-regularities 
thereby characterize the geometry as well). 
 Furthermore, supposing that only one actual world is ever the case (which 
follows immediately from logical determinism, come whatever dynamical laws one 
might dream up to fit the blockworld), probability and chance are purely epistemic 
notions. The sense in which things could be otherwise should be interpreted 
epistemically, if logical determinism is true. By adopting an Archimedean point of 
view, the future is what it is, and likewise the past and present. There is no (non-
                                               
96 Unless, of course, one indexes counterfactuals to statements about the entire universe. But in this 
case, these classes of counterfactuals are seemingly not empirical matters – not matters of fact. The 
truth of counterfactuals in these classes will depend on the nature of the initial and final conditions that 
gave rise to this particular universe. But that will be decided by our best theories discoverable in that 
universe. Unless there is a fact of the matter about what the initial and final boundary conditions are, 
and how to evolve those conditions to get the actual world, and unless there is a fact of the matter 
about what other initial and final conditions could have obtained, it is not clear that a counterfactual 
statement indexed to the entire state of the universe is factual. On Price’s view, it does not seem to 
make sense to speak about counterfactuals indexed to the entire universe given his Archimedean view. 
So, it is implausible to defend a counterfactual account of laws, but more plausible to be a regularity-
theorist about laws. 
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epistemic) “chance” for the world to really be otherwise. The world is “chancy” 
simply because no Archimedean observer is physically possible; if an Archimedean 
observer is physically possible – that is, if something like Newton’s omniscient God 
were possible – then it would simply perceive, all at once, what was going to be true 
whenever and wherever. However, given that Price embraces Einstein local realism, 
and since he presumably would embrace the relativity of simultaneity (otherwise 
there would be little physical motivation for the blockworld view), it is hard to 
reconcile Newton’s omniscient God or the analogous “Archimedean observer” with 
relativistic spacetime structure. For Price, Newton’s God could not plausibly exist in 
a relativistic spacetime. 
 If what is really explanatorily important in a dynamical law, plus the relevant 
boundary conditions, is how selects, from a set of possible outcomes, the actual one 
corresponding to the actual world, then dynamical laws are not importantly 
explanatory. A dynamical law does not “select” any possible world. Recall Price’s 
loss of predictivity for quantum mechanical systems: the present is compatible with 
just one outcome (the actual one that obtains at the measurement event) of the set of 
outcomes consistent with the initial quantum state. Remember that in an Archimedean 
universe (the blockworld) it is the block of events that determines the dynamical laws 
in the sense that the laws are generalizations over the “already real” events in 
spacetime. The events are ontologically prior to the laws: the laws just summarize 
facts about the block. In this sense, dynamics do not explain, they simply repeat back 
to us a generalization over the actual facts about the block. Dynamics, hence, are not 
the “reason” why things happen to be the way they are – things just are. 
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 Plausibly, then, Price would adopt the negation of the thesis defended by 
Brown (2005), who argues at length that the right dynamical laws of the fundamental 
constitutive ontology of the world (presumably, “matter” of some kind) determines 
the geometry (i.e., the block), and the geometry merely codifies the behavior of that 
moving stuff (whose movement is governed by the dynamical laws). Therefore, 
dynamical laws “push” for Brown, whereas they are merely impotent regularities for 
the Archimedean observer – “frozen patterns” to use somewhat suggestive language. 
The Archimedean is therefore free to take a merely epistemic interpretation of 
dynamical laws – they are ways to discover facts about the frozen block – without 
having to (a) defend an ontological view of them or (b) without having to accord 
them a fundamentally explanatory role (as Brown would, for example) in science 
(though, relative to a non-Archimedean observer within the block of frozen events, 
they might serve the purpose of explanation qua successful prediction for practical 
purposes: from predicting where a spaceship will land in spacetime, to where and 
when a click in a photon-counter will appear under certain conditions). 
 All of this is reasonable from the Archimedean perspective, from the 
(admittedly physically impossible, though conceivable) point of view of God 
perceiving the entire blockworld. Given what we have now learned regarding the 
ontological, epistemic and explanatory status of dynamical laws in a blockworld (in 
particular, their inability to provide deep explanations for events in spacetime), how 




4. Critique of BCQM: epr, Explanation and Archimedean physics. The philosophical 
worries about EPR are generated by a prediction about how measurement outcomes 
would be correlated in separate regions of spacetime, a prediction made on the basis 
of the details of quantum theory. By applying the theory to the case of measuring the 
“spin” of a particle, which operationally turns out to be the behavior of a given 
particle (often of zero total electric charge) under the influence of an inhomogeneous 
magnetic field, and by considering a certain kind of prepared state and its subsequent 
behavior when subjected to various field strengths, one compiles a record of 
outcomes from which a peculiar correlation between the spin states is noted. The 
important point is that according to the theory, by writing down an appropriate wave-
function for this system of two particles, and by solving the Schrödinger equation, 
one obtains that while the results of measurement on either particle are equally 
probable, they will on average exhibit anticorrelation in their measured spin states 
(Bohm 1951, 617-618). In this case the dynamics (albeit statistically, with the 
orthodox, text-book theory or deterministically as with Bohm’s theory) fixes what 
one will see in the lab. After performing many runs of the experiment under identical 
or nearly identical conditions, if the measurement results adequately agree with the 
theoretical predictions, we are satisfied with the dynamical law and ascribe it an 
important explanatory status: the dynamical laws “push” the world around to exhibit 
particular states. The dynamics are the reason why the world is the way it turns out to 
be. Part of the explanation of EPR inevitably will turn on the dynamics
97
 that fixes 
this state’s evolution (in Hilbert space), and the subsequent measurements of this state 
(in spacetime). 
                                               
97 Either linear Schrödinger dynamics of QM or collapse dynamics. 
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 Since from the point of view of an Archimedean observer, all facts are fixed 
(logical determinism is true), dynamical laws are most-plausibly interpreted 
generalizations over the physical facts of the blockworld and do not determine events; 
dynamics simply describes certain features of the block, relative to certain limiting 
conditions. Furthermore, and this is important for BCQM, since for the Archimedean 
observer there is no objective chance that the world might turn out to be other than 
what it actually is, the dynamics is not “predictive”, in a broad sense (i.e., the initial 
state of a quantum system is compatible merely with the actual post-measurement 
state of the system, and no other). If a necessary condition for predictivity of laws is 
that there really be alternative ways the world could have been (i.e, that other possible 
states compatible with the initial state could have obtained for that initial state), then 
in a blockworld where all facts are fixed, laws are not predictive. To repeat: the laws 
simply return what the Archimedean observer already knows
98
, which is how the 
“universe unfolds” (or, more properly, how it “always is”). 
 For Price’s Archimedean observer, the specific details of quantum theory are 
quite irrelevant. Absolutely any correlations imaginable can be met if, in this 
blockworld, the future determines the past (and the past the future, to complete the 
symmetry
99
). If what was empirically interesting about quantum theory is the 
particular kind of correlations predicted on the basis of its dynamical laws, then our 
Archimedean observer is rather uninterested to call these correlations anything more 
                                               
98 Knowledge here is also fixed since the entirety of what there is, is fixed. Notice logical determinism 
in a blockworld even implicates the “epistemic-ontic” distinction often assumed in debates about 
physical theories and their relationship to the empirical world. But this intriguing suggestion must be 
placed aside for now. 
99 The “two-vector” formalism of Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz or “ABL” (1964), reconstructs 
standard QM in a way in which full symmetric dependence is worked into the quantum state itself. 
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than those natural to his blockworld—they are completely uninteresting for him. 
Allowing that the particles know their future (or, more generously, that the future 
influences the past), then the particles are behaving just as they should be; given other 
details about the physical world, particles will behave accordingly. And so on. Since 
we are only concerned about explaining the correlations between measurement 
records of this device, given the fact that the initial particles have the information 
about the future settings of the measurement devices prior to entering the 
measurement devices, the details of the microphysics are not all that important. The 
rather new explanatory task, given that we know how the EPR correlations can be 
exhibited in a blockworld, is to find a way of physically modeling such influences. 
The new task seems to be simply to show that quantum theory can accommodate the 
backwards influences in a reasonable, physical way.  
 With BCQM we are not explaining why things happen in certain ways; rather, 
we are explaining how a theory can be reconstructed on the basis of how the world 
actually is from an Archimedean point of view. It is, therefore, not right to view 
Price’s interpretation of quantum mechanics as an “interpretation” at all: it is simply 
an attempt to show how quantum theory can be modified to produce models of the 
temporally-reversed influences sending relevant information about the future to epr 
singlet states. To use Callender’s locution, BCQM is an “interpretation schema” 
(Callender 1998, 154). More specifically, it is an interpretation schema for a type of 
hidden variables reconstruction of qm, where the only function of the hidden 
variables is to show that if the values of the variables depended on the future 
measurement settings, then epr correlations can be explained. Since the settings of 
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these measuring devices can be varied by an altogether physically distinct device like 
a computer carrying out a complex algorithm (Bell 1993, 154), one must postulate 
backwards causation (Maudlin 1996, 285) as a physical mechanism for the 
dependency. 
Price is making three important, though conceptually distinct, moves with BCQM:  
(i) quantum theory reconstructed from the point of view of no 
perspective at all (the Archimedean/blockworld perspective) 
(ii) dependence of the past on the future (determination proceeds 
future-to-past) 
(iii) postulation of backwards causation 
 
Presumably, the conjunction of (ii) and (iii) implies (i). However, one might be 
cautious here. If we take (ii), the dependence of the past on the future, to be simply 
the reverse bias of “µ-Innocence” (which Price desperately wants to strike from the 
conceptual foundations of physics), then (ii) is unjustified if the past-to-future 
direction of determination is
100
! 
4.1 The Arrow of Determination. In Archimedean physics, the arrow of determination 
should be bi-directional: the past and the future depend on each other, 
                                               
100 Indeed, Maudlin calls the denial of the independence assumption an “ineliminable asymmetric 
dependency of absolutely earlier states on absolutely later events” (ibid.) – though he does not intend 
this to be a critique of the possibility per se. This asymmetric dependency might become suspicious in 
the context of “Archimedean physics” – whose purport, according to Price, is to alleviate the 





. So (ii) is best modified to conform with a strict symmetry 
requirement for dependency (at least in the microworld). Bi-directional dependency, 
however, might threaten to be too problematic from an Archimedean point of view. In 
what does this “dependency” consist? If an Archimedean observer surveys at will the 
past and the future in a blockworld, then since the past is as “real” as the future, and 
nothing “comes into being” which isn’t already in this observer’s sight, the sense in 
which the past “depends on” the future is rather trivial: the past must be what it is 
because the future is already real! To put the point more clearly: since logical 
determinism is true, then the future and past are in a fixed relation precisely 
“because” all counterfactual claims are strictly speaking false. The falsity of all 
counterfactual claims, given the fixity of actual facts in the blockworld, picks out the 
actual blockworld uniquely. It follows as a matter of pure logic that if the past 
“determines” the future then the future “determines” the past. No physics is needed 
for this dependency.  
 Some thinkers who have grappled with the problem of the asymmetric 
dependency in qm have attempted to ameliorate this problem by invoking a dubious 
bi-directional dependency. The so-called ABL reconstruction (Aharonov, et al. 1964) 
of qm is precisely one which incorporates such bi-directional dependence into the 
formalism of the theory itself. For ABL, the quantum state, given some initial 
condition, is evolved forward in time; as well, the state that results after measurement 
is evolved backwards in time, now tagged with its final boundary condition. A state 
                                               
101 Or at the very least, if one is worried about the unjustifiable bias given to the past-future arrow of 
determination in physics, then a future-past arrow invoked in explaining EPR for example would be just 
as unjustifiable. Conclusion: for a given state at a given time, that state should be determined by at 
least some event(s) in its future lightcone and some event(s) in its past lightcone. 
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“in the middle” that is compatible with the initial and final conditions (of 
measurement) is constructed—the so-called pre- and post-selected state. The 
predictions of the single-vector formalism without this backwards-evolved 
information are interpreted as “error” or as “noise”. This picture of QM leaves us 
with a classical picture not unlike Price’s, where the deviations from the classical 
picture are simply interpreted as redundancies, due to lack of information about the 
future of the system undergoing dynamical evolution. For ABL, before a 
measurement is made we lack information about the quantum state which, upon 
making a measurement, is updated and we now interpret the quantum state in light of 
this new information. So by the lights of ABL’s reconstructed theory, we are simply 
learning how to update our information about systems—QM is just an “error theory” 
of information, whereas the world itself is perfectly classical. The Archimedean view 
is certainly not suggested by this reconstruction of QM (although it’s compatible with 
it). What is worse, if we want to interpret ABL from an Archimedean point of view, 
then not only is bi-directional dependency no obvious physical dependency (given 
what was said supra), we are also left with nothing more than an epistemic 
interpretation of the quantum state. The burden now is to explain what is particularly 
“quantum mechanical” about the world. 
4.2 Backwards Causation. The postulation of backwards causation  explains the 
dependency of the past on the future: information is sent backwards in time to the 
singlet state [see figure 2], which in turn exerts an influence on the initial state; the 
past therefore depends on the future. Furthermore, backwards causation (qua real 
physical influence) avoids the necessity of invoking influences between two 
126 
 
spacetime regions exerted at spacelike separation to explain EPR, influences which 
potentially conflict with Relativity. From the Archimedean perspective, though, why 
postulate any causation if (a) all facts are fixed (b) dynamical laws just repeat true 
generalizations of the fixed events (c) chance is ultimately epistemic (d) the arrow of 
determination and the arrow of time are “perspectival”? If there is any causation for 
the Archimedean observer, it will be relegated to the domain of perspective, and more 
usefully seen as a convenient fiction with which one can relate experiences within the 
block to the physics of the Archimedean perspective? Indeed, causation – or perhaps 
more perspicuously, the arrow of causation – is merely perspectival: “causal 
asymmetry isn’t really in the world at all, but the appearance that it is is a product of 
our own standpoint” to use Price’s words (1996, 155). But if the arrow of causation is 
perspectival, then causation is too (whatever you might think it turns out to be). If 
causation is deeply perspectival, then even to call causation “backwards” is 
something of a misnomer, for there is no physical fact of the matter as to which way 
time’s arrow points, at least for the microphysical world. Time’s arrow, on which one 
can hang the directionality of causation, isn’t “in” the blockworld, but just a matter of 
one’s (contingent!) perspective within it. So for the Archimedean observer, causation 
is strictly speaking superfluous. The concept of causation does not do anything more 
than provide a perspectival description of the way things seem to be, which is in 
“movement” from past to future. Archimedean physics, presumably, can get by 
without “backwards causation” or any “causation”. 
 The best way to understand “causation” in Price’s account of quantum theory 
and epr correlations is that “backwards causation” is a conceptually necessary device 
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with which to relate two seemingly incompatible perspectives: the perspectival-less 
Archimedean and the ineliminably perspectival. Backwards causation quantum 
mechanics, then, is something of a compromise between explanations of the physical 
world from the ultimate, mind-independent, observer-independent, and “detached-
observer” point of view versus explanations that rely on facts about information 
gatherers and observers tied to a particular part of space and time, with particular 
observations and experiences within the blockworld. 
 The latter view is taken from the perspective of an observer “within” the 
blockworld, who experiences ordinary things like change, a “flow” of time, etc. From 
this point of view, the future is unknown, and the past is all but a historical treatise. 
From this point of view, the world seems like it could be many possible ways, and 
from this point of view one can think that dynamical laws are really “pushy” 
explainers. The physics from this point of view is dynamical, and “perspectival”. 
From the Archimedean point of view, physics consists in description of the actual 
world, and relative to certain perspectival constraints, certain dynamical laws and 
theories built around them will be true (i.e., true for observers within the block). So, if 
I stipulate certain experimental configurations, divide that configuration into 
“preparation state” and “measurement apparatus” and resolve that into “singlet state” 
and “measurement settings”, etc. I get a prediction about the behavior of these items. 
Now I ask, in a dynamical way, what “pushes” the preparation state of particles to 
behave the way they do in the measurement apparatus? Clearly, many options are 
available, but given the blockworld hypothesis and the interpretation of this situation 
from the Archimedean perspective, all the events of this measurement situation are 
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equally real, and so the dynamics of the particles don’t “push” anything around. So, 
what determines the particles to behave as they do in the magnets? In a sense, BCQM 
says that it’s simply the very fact that the particles will interact with the magnet that is 
the “reason why” the particles exhibit correlations. But this is trivial, it is simply the 
repetition of the mere fact that there are such-and-such patterns in the block. One can 
characterize these facts in terms of “causation” but, as we have said, this adds nothing 
to the explanation itself, as there really is not explanation per se but the description of 
the Archimedean point of view from the dynamical, perspectival point of view. 
4.3 Explanatory regress to the Big Bang? If we keep pushing BCQM for more 
encompassing explanations of physical facts, it threatens to reduce to even more 
trivial explanations. We have argued that, relative to the EPR experimental 
configuration itself, the causal influences are explanatorily superfluous – indeed so 
are the dynamical laws used to generate the predicted correlations – from the 
Archimedean perspective. But we have taken for granted this experimental 
configuration, and have not asked for a BCQM-type explanation for any of its sub-
systems. Particularly, we might ask about the explanation for the singlet-state itself. 
What explains the entanglement at the source of the photons. According to BCQM 
the correlations that define a singlet/EPR-state are explained by the particular settings 
of the measurement apparatus out to which the particles move in the future. The 
arrow of determination goes from future to past, though from our experiential 
perspective it looks like things “move” from the past/present to the future. Let us 
grant this for the moment and ask how a singlet state is actually prepared in the lab.  
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 Singlet-states can be prepared with a single-source of particles (say, a 
sufficiently heated bit of metal where electrons are exchanging energy and emitting 
photons in the process), though this is not necessitated by quantum theory itself
102
. 
The usual understanding is that at some point, two independent quantum systems, 
represented by their own unique wave-functions, “combine” or “interact” so that their 
combined spin components, for example, become correlated even though their 
individual spin might be random or non-random (Bohm 1951, 400-1). It follows from 
BCQM that the explanation for the interaction of these systems – that they interact at 
all, and become correlated – must derive from the fact that each system “possesses” 
this information already, before the process that leads to their correlation. So, the 
“source” state is both an explanans, and an explanandum: it itself is explained by an 
influence from the future measurement-interaction, and the source explains the fact 
that independent quantum systems are to be correlated. And of course, this logic must 
proceed all the way down along each and every quantum system’s worldtube, down 
to the very creation of the systems themselves – presumably at the big-bang. But this 
would explain only the particular epr event in question. Since this particular system 
will presumably interact with many systems over the course of its entire history, all 
information relevant to its future course must end in the big-bang. In fact, not-unlike a 
Leibnizian monad, this system must contain within it all information about the entire 
universe, at least in principle. For, given that this system S1 interacts with another 
system S2, information about both must be equally shared everywhere along their 
respective worldtubes, converging on the big-bang – and so on. And if the universe 
                                               
102 See Hardy (1992), where he exploits “interaction-free” measurements to generate EPR states, where 
the particles exhibiting EPR correlations have never interacted and so share no common source. 
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happens to be one for which there is a “big-crunch” on the other end, then absolutely 
every system will possess information about every other system, since they all share a 
common point of convergence in the future. And, add to this the fact that the notion 
of “system” itself is somewhat of a loose term (especially if one interprets quantum 
states, with Rovelli (1996), relationally
103
), then explanation must in some very deep 
sense be relative to how one divides the universe into system-subsystem, so that this 
Leibnizian interconnectedness does not render the explanatory project quite literally 
empty.  
 Again, this dynamical perspective, if taken to its logical extreme, seems to 
collapse under its own weight: the demand for backwards causal influences 
necessitates that information about the entire universe be (at least potentially) had by 
each system. Moreover, as one sub-divides systems into more fundamental 
component systems, more and more explanatory relations will emerge. Of course, 
such information is presumably available to the Archimedean observer, but it seems 
absurd to postulate an “influence” which, when interpreted realistically, makes each 
system (at least, each micro-system of the universe) potentially omniscient in itself. 
Surely, Archimedean physics can do better, and can do without “causal influences”. 
 
5. Conclusion: Moving Beyond the Dynamical Perspective. The lesson, ironically, 
that we have learned from the Archimedean observer is that in a blockworld, 
explanation is perspectival. Ultimately, explanation collapses to description from the 
                                               
103 Since Price offers us merely an “interpretation schema” we are presumably free to consider some 
possible ways to interpret the specific details of quantum theory itself, like its state, dynamics, etc., 
according to some other interpretive systems. 
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Archimedean point of view. From this perspective, there are no real influences – 
influences are an appearance within the blockworld. And to the extent that physics 
tries to derive law-like generalizations of the appearances, traditional physics (the 
perspectival, dynamical physics of the ordinary kind) is right on the money. As 
Arthur Fine (1989) says regarding the search for influences and the “dynamical 
tradition”: 
The search for ‘influences’ or for common causes in an enterprise 
external to the quantum theory. It is a project that stands on the outside 
and asks whether we can supplement the theory in such a way as to 
satisfy certain a priori demands on explanatory adequacy. Among 
these demands is that stable correlations require explaining, that there 
must be some detailed account for how they are built up, or sustained, 
over time and space. In the face of this demand, the tangled 
correlations of the quantum theory can seem anomalous, even 
mysterious. But this demand represents an explanatory ideal rooted 
outside the quantum theory, one learned and taught in the context of a 
different kind of physical thinking. It is like the ideal that was passed 
on in the dynamical tradition from Aristotle to Newton, that motion as 
such requires explanation (p. 192). 
 
And so in this dynamical tradition, the motion is attributed to some kind of causal 
influence impelling the matter forward (perhaps the dynamical law is a description of 
the real influence?). But again, from the blockworld perspective, motion too is merely 
an appearance and an explanation of it in terms of an “influence” will be to “explain” 
one perspectival aspect of reality with another – one appearance explains the other. In 
the blockworld, all physical facts are fixed – none being “responsible for” another in 
a dynamical, causal sense. 
 Fine’s point should be emphasized, but restricted to the context of our present 
investigation. The search for influences is a project external to quantum theory. But 
the kind of project it is will be constrained by certain metaphysical hypotheses about 
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the physical world and the nature of physics from the deepest metaphysical point of 
view in that world. Understood in the context of Archimedean physics, the search for 
influences amounts to modifying qm to suit our intuitions and experiences of the 
apparent forward-directed-ness of reality. BCQM represents something of a 
compromise between, on the one hand, explanations couched in terms of embedded 
experiences of the physical world, and on the other hand the demands of physics from 
a non-dynamical, perspective-less point of view. We have been arguing, however, 
that the final step in this Archimedean progression should be to break free of the need 
to invoke causes altogether, and re-conceptualize the experiments altogether – to 
explain the world from the ultimate Archimedean perspective. 
 Let us be specific on what counts as the Archimedean view
104
: 
(1) Dynamical laws do not determine events (they aren’t “pushy”), but are 
generalizations of observation of physical phenomena. Dynamical laws 
are merely phenomenological. 
(2) Explanation at the fundamental level is description; at the less-
fundamental level, explanation is pragmatic and relative to a particular 
context/goal 
                                               
104 Perhaps this is the proper stance regarding truly fundamental theories: at least ontologically and 
epistemically, one ought to be neutral regarding the exact details of the dynamics of the matter in 
motion (theoretical pluralism should be maintained at that level of explanation), while embracing a 
realism of the structure of the principles of physical theories comprehended from the Archimedean 
point of view. This kind of view might reconcile a “Lorentzian” pedagogy with an Einsteinean one that 
seeks more and more abstract principles of nature (and less and less dynamical details). But the thesis 
defended here is that Price’s view is one where there is a tension between dynamical attempts at 
explanation from within the Archimedean view, versus non-dynamical descriptions attainable come 
whatever dynamical details known to non-Archimedean observers (like us!). 
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(3) The “perspective-less” fundamental level of description should be 
consistent with the “perspectival” less-fundamental levels of 
explanation/description 
(4) The descriptive apparatus used at the fundamental level should determine 
the set of possible perspectival less-fundamental descriptions. This means 
that the physics at the fundamental level should determine the physics of 
the perspectives, so to speak. 
(5) The ontology of individual stuff (particles, fields, waves, wave-functions, 
etc.) and dynamical laws of that stuff do not determine “what happens”. 
All events are equally real, timelessly exist, and don’t “come into being”. 
 
If we take Archimedean physics seriously, and we think that there is something true 
of the world captured by quantum theory (yet we are not willing to interpret the 
theory as being “incomplete” in Einstein’s sense, as Price does), then one would 
expect to find quantum mechanical experiments that outstrip dynamical perspectives 
such as BCQM. Such experiments will make plain the uneasy compromise between 
the dynamical, perspectival view and the non-dynamical, non-perspectival view. We 
would interpret these experiments as not calling out for more exotic dynamical and 
perspectival explanatory stories, but for a deeper Archimedean point of view which 
encompasses all of these dynamical stories. This perspectival-less fundamental point 
of view should be one for which one can provide an explanation of the less-
fundamental perspectival stories themselves! The job of the Archimedean physicist is 
not only to model nature but also to tell us how nature could appear to be dynamical, 
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and she does this, for example, by explaining how quantum theory can be so bizarre 
when one demands from it a dynamical model of the behavior of the phenomena it 
predicts. The Archimedean physicist is also a natural philosopher. 
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Chapter 5:  Summary, Objections and Replies. 
I’d like to conclude this dissertation with a summary of the thesis defended here and a 
consideration of some major objections, and their replies, to structural realism itself 
(we will be careful, of course, to distinguish between the epistemic versus the ontic 
versions of structural realism and adjust the focus of the objections accordingly). This 
summary will give us an opportunity to understand the extent to which the objections 
in the literature impinge on the thesis of ontological structural realism central to this 
dissertation. We need to keep this summary in mind as we work through potential 
objections. 
 
1. Summary of Ontological Structural Realism as defended in the present 
dissertation. The view, and implications of it, that I’ve set forth in this dissertation 
may be summarized as follows. I shall lay out the summary piece by piece, for easy 
of reference. 
Ontological Structural Realism (OSR) and Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) are 
compatible. Rather, the two positions are mutually supporting. The thesis of the 
contextuality of individuals is crucial here: relative to a certain fixed background, 
whenever we examine the structure of an atom, we find what we can think of as 
‘individual objects’. But, from the point of view of a deeper analysis—that of the 
theory of relativity of from quantum field theory—the notion of an individual breaks 
down. Nonetheless, the concept is useful, relatively so. In other words, we are 
inquiring into “more than structure”, but this must be understood as: physics 
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postulates certain primitive individuals (like an “elementary particle”), and over time, 
learns of deeper structure; thus, the individual must be understood as having a 
relatively limited and dependent status that changes over time. So the claim that we 
know “only structure”—the claim that Demopoulos and Freidman, following 
Newman (1928), charge Russell with defending (see section 2 below)—is indeed 
trivial, but only if you take a static view of the knowledge derived from physics. 
Recall that part of the motivation of the structural realist was to also account for 
theory change in such a way as to capture what was/is successful about a theory, and 
which survives the change. It is structure, with the individuals presupposed at each 
temporal slice of the history of science changing such that they can be reinterpreted in 
light of a deeper and wider scope of scientific knowledge. Ontological structural 
realism and epistemic structural realism are natural companions with this view of 
theory-change in sight. 
The claims that OSR rejects: (a) “things-in-themselves”; (b) ‘natures’; (c) substances 
with “intrinsic” properties (d) self-subsistent individuals (that is, individuals whose 
‘individuality’ is grounded in a metaphysical essence or essential property like 
“haeccity” or “primitive this-ness”. All of (a)—(d) are conceptually and 
metaphysically unnecessary to account for what we know about the world according 
to our best sciences, especially fundamental physics. In other words, OSR is at the 
same time a “naturalized metaphysics” (see Ladyman et al. for an extended polemic 
on naturalizing metaphysics). Note that our naturalized metaphysics is in the spirit of 
Quine, who famously said that “philosophy of science is philosophy enough”, but 
importantly different regarding the form that the metaphysics from science takes. It is 
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anti-Humean, and is importantly different from the recent alternative to Humeanism 
defended by Tim Maudlin (2007). 
OSR and reductionism, holism. We always have to be careful with the issue of 
reductionism, as Silberstein (2002) points out in detail, since questions of 
compatibility with it will turn on what one means by ‘reductionism’. OSR is not 
compatible with ontological reductionism, or even mereological reductionism. OSR 
is compatible with a notion of “holism”, but this will really depend on what the 
meaning of that term is. Since most versions of holism are centered around 
considerations of the system/whole-subsystem/part question in fundamental physics, 
and are in particular motivated by the issue of non-separability and entanglement of 
quantum theory, OSR will entail holism with respect to quantum theory (that the 
properties of wholes are not in general exhausted by the intrinsic properties of their 
parts), but there is an important conceptual difference. Holism is usually devised to 
handle specific violations of (common-sense) part-whole relationships, and is also 
used to demonstrate the bankruptcy of Humean supervenience. OSR builds from such 
empirical cases used to develop the concept of holism to a more general metaphysical 
view: that individuals are contextual, and that relational structure is prior to objects or 
entities (qua individuals). OSR, in other words, attempts to handle more than just 
non-separability and entanglement; it attempts to account for the concept of the 
“field” in relativity and QFT (i.e., that there can be no “rigid bodies”), the frame-
dependence of many seemingly “intrinsic” properties of “objects” like mass and 
electric charge, the relativistic equivalence of mass-energy, the phenomenon of 
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plasmas, quantum liquids, etc. We may therefore see OSR as the more general of the 
views. 
OSR and fundamentalism. OSR rejects many fundamentalisms: levels and laws 
fundamentalism being the two most obvious. The former says that the universe is 
(metaphysically) arranged in a hierarchy of levels, according (roughly) to size/scale, 
from the subatomic to the atomic, molecular, etc. and that physics provides the most 
fundamental level from which all other levels might be derived or in any case upon 
which all higher levels ontologically depend (we may weaken this by saying “upon 
which all higher levels supervene, where supervenience is a kind of logical 
dependency relation between the levels). The latter holds that the universe unfolds or 
is produced from laws of nature; that the universe evolves as a consequence of some 
fundamental physical law(s), from one state to the next, given the initial conditions 
present at its initial stage of evolution (the view of Maudlin). Laws are on this view, 
therefore, ontologically primitive. Levels fundamentalism is a thesis of the Humean 
and it advocates for a synchronic determination between the levels, whereas laws 
fundamentalism is a thesis of the non-Humean (in Maudlin’s formulation of the 
position) and advocates for a diachronic determination between successive states of 
the universe-at-a-time (the question of the synchronic relations between levels, 
presumably, is open: one could adopt a kind of ontological emergence—a decidedly 
anti-Humean position—on this score, while maintaining laws fundamentalism). OSR 
rejects levels fundamentalism: it is an open question as to whether or not 
“fundamental theories” may be derived from “higher levels” of scale. Some (e.g. 
Robert Laughlin) have argued, for example, that general relativity may be derivable 
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from condensed matter theory—a theory that does not seem to be fundamental to 
general relativity because the latter entails as solutions to its differential equations the 
former (i.e., matter fields may be considered as solutions to the Einstein Field 
Equations
105
). The empirical relationships between different levels of scale is entirely 
open to investigation and of no ontological significance according to OSR. It is hard 
to see that OSR is compatible with laws fundamentalism: laws are descriptions of 
structure and as such their ontological status is parasitic on that structure; it is not 
clear that is makes sense to speak of the universe’s “unfolding” according to OSR. 
Mathematical vs. physical structure. OSR is not committed to there being an 
ontologically significant distinction between mathematical as opposed to physical 
structure. Notice that from the fact that the distinction has been rejected as carrying 
ontological weight, it would be wrong to thereby charge OSR with either reifying 
mathematics or with eliminating it in favor of physical ‘natures’ etc. That would be to 
beg the question against OSR. It is important to point out that we do not have a prior 
notion of mathematics to work with, just as we do not have a prior notion of “physical 
nature”. The definition (as opposed to the use) of such concepts is dependent upon 
philosophical creativity, and the naturalized metaphysics adopted here simply 
                                               
105 See for example Robert Laughlin (2005): A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the 
Bottom Down. This case is quite interesting because the claim on the table is that the laws governing 
condensed matter—laws which describe the behavior of quantum mechanical phenomena like 
Einstein-Bose condensates and quasi-particles (non-elementary “particles” that are non-individuals and 
are theorized to have fractionalized elementary charges), and effects such as super-fluidity—entail the 
laws of general relativity (i.e., a theory of gravitation). This seems to flip the ontological order on its 
head; though, arguably, with the advent of general relativity, it is not at all clear (ontologically 
speaking) whether it is gravity that describes matter, or matter that described gravity—the spacetime 
structure and the matter fields are in the case equivalent according to GTR. But, it is certainly not true 
that GTR implies matter fields which, e.g., obey Einstein-Bose statistics—a characteristically quantum 
mechanical fact. That is, GTR has yet to be consistently related to quantum field theory, and the basic 
purport here is to do just that (thus, it constitutes in effect a kind of “quantum theory of gravity”, albeit 
from the perspective of a theory of the nature and behavior of matter). 
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advocates that all metaphysical concepts be subject to, and dependent upon, actual 
scientific/empirical analysis. The concepts of common sense, of course, are another 
matter. We might relegate the entirety of “ordinary language philosophy” (i.e., most 
of philosophy in the Anglo-American community) to this category, the category of 
analytical precision with respect to the ordinary use of concepts. This has its own 
domain of applicability, and as we filter our commonsense notions through our 
empirical traditions, we discover the extent to which those concepts are useful and the 
extent to which they require revision or expansion. As science has demonstrated, 
though, most of our commonsense notions must be given up from the point of view of 
science, especially fundamental physics
106
. The question as to what mathematical 
structures “are” is, according to OSR, simply a species of the question as to what 
structure there is in the world at all. That is, mathematical structures are “physical 
structures” insofar as they become part of the language of empirical inquiry 
(fundamental physics and the special sciences). Whether or not the structures “exist” 
or are “referred to” is another matter. OSR says we simply don’t know whether “they 
exist”. Furthermore, asks OSR, why does there have to be a referent of a concept? 
Isn’t it enough that we may learn to use it, and write down a system that explicates 
the mathematics so that another person may in turn learn it, commit it to memory in 
                                               
106 Notice the assumption here is that ‘ordinary’ means ‘ordinary’. Ordinary means, roughly, “not 
philosophically analyzed”. It is not sufficient, for example, to defend the concept of ‘ordinary 
objecthood’ with a notion of ‘primitive-thisness’ etc. The idea of the analytical metaphysician in this 
case is that we must find a philosophical ground that provides support for the concept, and invent 
philosophical concepts for this purpose (another example would be the case of “fictional objects”). 
This leads to un-natural metaphysics insofar as no part of the analysis rests on empirical premises. The 
whole process is devoted to the establishment of ordinary use in philosophical analysis. I wholly reject 
this, and OSR is not committed to this sort of philosophical dialectic (cf. Ladyman et al.’s “primacy of 
physics constraint” and their “principle of naturalistic closure”). 
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part, and then use it, and so on
107
. Perhaps some concepts—some mathematical 
structures—simply do not refer, and whether or not they do is something that is an 
open empirical question (taking “reference” to be “corresponds to the structure of 
nature”). 
“The” Structure? OSR is not committed to the existence of there being a real 
“totality” or whole “composed of” structure. This would constitute what Russell 
called an “illegitimate totality”. OSR says that there is relational structure “all the 
way through”, but this does not bottom-out or top-off. 
2. Main objections and replies. There are a host of closely related objections to 
structural realism that I’d like to consider now. They are centered around a couple of 
main issues. One issue is whether or not there is a tenable distinction between 
‘structure’ and ‘non-structure’ (the latter itself open to numerous possibilities: entity, 
nature, object, substance, property, individual, etc.). In other words, exactly what 
distinction, if any, is required to make metaphysical sense of structural realism and is 
                                               
107 The underlying thesis here requires a distinction between two sorts of mathematics: there is the 
mathematics that is, or has been, incorporated into a science or other empirical practice (it might even 
constitute most of the practice, as with theoretical physics), and there is the mathematics that is part of 
a living practice for no end but the doing of mathematic itself (with contemplative and non-
contemplative aspects), the mathematics of which is not necessarily associated with the former, 
empirically oriented kind. Thus, my thesis here is that mathematics learned and used and contemplated 
is neither “in the head” or purely abstract, nor “in the world” or purely concrete. It is, in effect, a 
“distributed system” of learning, both individual and social, and memory, both individual, community 
and cultural. But when we speak of the mathematics of the sciences or physics, and say that it captures 
the structure of (some aspect of) nature, we do not mean not the living practice sort of mathematics. 
We now refer to mathematical structures which have been found to be applicable to the natural world. 
And this discovery is akin to the discovery that the map you have been using and contemplating 
actually allows you to get around in your immediate surroundings and possibly beyond. Now, both 
sorts of mathematics may themselves be open to a structural description: in the former case the 
structure will not be purely limited to the domain of physics, etc. The structure of relationships 
between the contemplative activity, the community of mathematics users and teachers, the books your 
read, etc. all provide a structure at another level of description that is simply more general than, and at 
any rate not narrow enough, relative to the mathematical structures employed in science. To suggest 
that structural realism must provide a substantial distinction between mathematical structures and those 
that are employed in physics seems to be to asking the structuralist to commit a category error. 
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it tenable? Another main issue (related to the one above) has to do with representation 
of structure (to which the structural realist wants to be metaphysically committed), in 
particular with the question of whether we should take theories to be linguistic 
constructions or not, and how a theory can be understood to reflect the (real) structure 
of nature as opposed to (and this harkens back to the first issue) the often historically 
contingent entities, properties, etc. referred to in past (and present) scientific theories. 
Indeed, the deeper question for structural realism is whether we are committed to 
anything beyond the purely mathematical and structural relationships of a theory; and 
if so, what? In other words, does structural realism threaten to collapse into either a 
version of strict empiricism or a kind of Platonism? My hypothesis is that properly 
understood, the structural realist might want to commit to both horns of the 
dilemma—properly understood. We shall see. 
Reply to the Newman-Demopoulos-Freidman problem. One reply open to the 
structural realist against the “Ramsey-sentences” problem, raised by Demopoulos and 
Freidman (1985), which follows Newman (1928), is to deny the assumption that 
allows the Ramsey tactic to apply in the first place: namely, that theories are 
linguistic constructions, where the formal, logical relations between the theoretical 
terms of a theory are taken to be the only knowable reality. As Demopoulos and 
Freidman rightly pointed out, this is quite trivial, since on this view all that we can 
know is a collection of relations up to isomorphism, telling us very little. They write, 
citing Newman: 
The difficulty is with the claim that only structure is known. On this 
view “the world consists of objects, forming an aggregate whose 
structure with regard to a certain relation R is known, say [it has 
structure] W; but of . . . R nothing is known . . . but its existence; . . . 
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all we can say is there is a relation R such that the structure of the 
external world with reference to R is W” (Newman 1928, p. 144). But 
“any collection of things can be organized so as to have the structure 
W, provided there are the right number of them”…. Thus, on this 
view, only cardinality questions are open to discovery! (Demopoulos 
and Friedman, p. 627) 
 
Surely this is empirically bankrupt, and at any rate not how science proceeds. This 
seems to put the cart before the horses. 
 As McArthur (2006) points out in his survey of some recent debates over 
structural realism, Ladyman (1998) has replied that this objection only applies to the 
epistemic structural realist, whose position is that “nothing can be known of 
unobservables other than the structural relations that they engage in as expressed in a 
theory’s Ramsey sentence” (McArthur 2006, 217). As for the ontic structural realist 
(which McArthur dubs the “metaphysical” structural realist), things are the other way 
around: structure is metaphysically primitive, rather than objects and their 
relations
108
. It is not that only structure is known; (relational) structure is what is 
                                               
108 For the epistemic structural realist, the objects and their relations are taken to be the needed, though 
unobserved, “substratum” or “things in themselves” of which we only have structural knowledge. 
There is clearly tension in this view, as Kant in effect pointed out long ago: according to this view, our 
knowledge depends on this substratum, yet we cannot “directly” access it; we only have knowledge of 
structure among the things in themselves. Importantly for the ontological structural realist, there is not 
much to the “observable”/“unobservable” distinction, for as our capabilities in both perception and 
theorizing are extended—that is, as our thought becomes increasingly mediated and therefore 
supplemented by technologies of various kinds, both external to thought (telescopes, computers, 
particles accelerators) and internal to it (logic and mathematics)—such a boundary becomes 
increasingly arbitrary and altogether irrelevant. To put the point in another way: both the apparatus of 
technology in the sense of devices we create and then interact with in the external world, and the 
apparatus of what we might call “mental” technology or technology of thought as we have though 
mathematics and logic, provide us ways of extending what we can “see”, i.e., understand. We may, 
indeed, take this process of extending knowledge with these various technological supplements as 
another kind of real relationship, an epistemic one, into which human beings enter when knowing the 
physical world. But it is wrong to judge from the fact that we must depend on certain relations for our 
knowledge that our knowledge is therefore of structure only, rather than “things in themselves” for this 
is not quite accurate to the way knowledge actually proceeds (I here reject the primacy of a “rational 
reconstruction” of knowledge from science, or of a sharp distinction between “context of justification” 
and “context of discovery”). What we call “thing in itself” is merely our ignorance of a deeper level of 
structure to nature in some domain of empirical inquiry, relative to what structure is already known. 
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being described by theories. We may then isolate features of the structure described 
by a theory and in turn derive a notion of object, etc. but such entities are derivative 
from a prior ontology of structure. Hence, rather than beginning with the logic of 
predicate calculus or more generally with set theory, one ought to choose a 
representational scheme that takes ‘relation’ as a primitive (unanalyzed concept), out 
of which one might construct the notion of ‘object’ and ‘relation between object’ as 
derivative concepts
109
. This would, if successful, allow the ontic structural realist to 
express, formally, the commitment to ontologically primitive structure (where the 
structure is taken to be “relational structure”, following Ladyman et al. 2007). 
Ladyman (1998) proposed to adopt, consequently, a “no-statement” view of theories 
where theories are taken to be collections of models and not linguistic entities (i.e., 
sets of sentences, which would be clearly representable with the predicate calculus, 
                                                                                                                                      
That is, knowledge is always proceeding to more and deeper and even more abstract levels of 
structural knowledge, so that the postulation of a “thing in itself” is always unnecessary. It is a fiction 
which may be unproblematically given up. What distinguishes structures from one another is their use 
and effective correspondence between representational structure and non-representational structure 
(i.e., “nature”, of which the representational structures are but one part, i.e., in the mind of the theorist, 
or in the paper-and-pencil description, or in the models of a computer program). 
109 There is a longer historical and philosophical argument to be made here that the rise of modern 
abstract algebra (of which group theory is a species) represents a move towards precisely the view that 
‘relation’ is primitive, on the basis of which you may construct an algebraic structure that represents 
certain mathematical concepts (“rotation”, etc.) which, on this algebraic basis, may be considered as 
conceptually independent of the particular details of what “realizes” or “instantiates” that structure 
(coordinate systems, various sets of numbers, etc.). Indeed, the symbolic character of abstract algebra 
has this feature to it: the symbols may represent may different mathematical “objects”,  yet nonetheless 
the algebra captures a more general—i.e., invariant—feature of those objects which is a certain abstract 
structure. In order to demonstrate that such objects (upon which relations are thought to depend) are 
mathematically unnecessary for the conceptualization of algebraic structures, we might try to provide a 
foundation for abstract algebra where the objects themselves are given in relational or structural terms. 
There is a mathematical tradition, “graph theory”, that does this already (though not necessarily in the 
context of abstract algebra), and there are so-called “pointless” topologies, and so on. The point, so to 
speak, is that ‘object’, on which ‘relation’ is conceptually dependent, needn’t be taken, mathematically 
speaking, as a primitive. Notice that the claim here, again, is not that “objects or the relata standing in a 
relation” do not exist; rather, the claim is that the objects or relata are derivative from a more 
fundamental concept, that of ‘relation’, which is taken to be itself conceptually primitive. As such, the 
thesis is decidedly not incoherent; it merely rests on a subtle claim of “logical priority”, the tenability 
of which claim depends on whether or not there always exists a relational analysis  of ‘object’ or 
‘relata’. There does not seem to be any a priori reason to doubt this, logically or mathematically. 
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on the basis of which the Ramsey-sentence tactic is based). This model, non-linguistic 
view of theories, proposes Ladyman, could be cast with group theory, for which one 
could find a variety of linguistic representations. The question, however, is whether 
or not this twin move—taking structure to be ontologically primitive and adopting a 
representational scheme where ‘relation’ is conceptually and logically prior to 
‘object’ and relata—would also obviate the Ramsey-sentence problem. I think there is 
more to their objection than the formal question it raises, which is: can we restate 
structural realism in such a way as to not be reliant upon a logic or formalism where 
relata are basic, and relations derivative? This requires a reconsideration of the 
objections raised by Demopoulos and Friedman. 
 It seems to me that the deeper problem posed by Demopoulos and Friedman is 
that it is possible to have two or more structurally identical collections of things, 
where in each set the things are arranged differently (say, spatiotemporally), and 
where those different arrangements of the things might make all the difference! Or, 
perhaps worse, I can have two sequences of the same thing which have the same 
structure but which are still different from each other. Consider, for example, a 
perfectly spherically symmetric ball travelling a spacetime path from point A to point 
B to point C. Now consider the same object in a time-reversed sequence: point C to 
point B to point A. Suppose that there are no other objects in the vicinity of the 
moving object, and that by points A, B, C I refer to equally spherically symmetric 
objects that serve as markers for the spacetime path (i.e., by ‘path’ I mean the 
sequential intersection of the object with other objects at A, B, C). Taking, for the 





, these two cases—time-ordered sequence #1 consisting of 
{A,B,C} and time-ordered sequence #2 consisting of {C,B,A}—are different states of 
the world (going from Earth to Mars, or going from Mars to Earth), yet they are 
structurally identical. Physics does not explicitly put in this directionality, yet it is a 
plausible  feature of our world, if not of my experience of it. So, one might add, 
perhaps as Maudlin would, the extra ingredient of an arrow of time, in which case we 
can easily break the structural identity. So, the bare theoretical structure does not tell 
us enough about the world; there seems to be more to it. The theoretical structure 
allows me, certainly, to represent the world (the trajectory of a moving object), but 
the theoretical structure itself leaves out something, i.e., the movement of the object 
through space and time, from one point to another. 
 Firstly, the problem of the arrow of time is not particular to structural realism; 
it is an issue faced by anyone who contemplates the significance of physics and the 
laws of nature. Ladyman and the structural realist might reply to this specific charge 
by simply pointing out that if, as in the case above, an aspect of the world (or our 
experience) is left out of a theory, then that is a problem with the theory and not with 
structural realism per se. In other words, if it’s not part of a theoretical description in 
the first place, then it’s obviously not going to appear in a structural interpretation of 
it. Furthermore, the claim of the structural realist here is simply that should a feature 
of reality be captured (or be representable) in some theory, and should that theory be 
understood in terms of a collections of models (i.e., non-linguistically), then it is 
possible to provide a structural realist interpretation of the theory. That this is always 
                                               
110 This is, for example, Maudlin’s thesis, defended at length in his 2008. 
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possible is another matter (we might provide a bit of logical analysis here for this 
question), one which does not need to be resolved here. One other important aspect of 
this objection is the distinction between what a theory represents versus what there is 
about the world independent of our theoretical representations of it. 
Objection: the distinction between the mathematical representation of structure and 
that which is being represented reduces to the ‘structure’ vs. ‘nature’ distinction. The 
ontological structural realist says that structure is ontologically prior to objects or the 
relata standing in any relation, and that this is what a theory faithfully captures. But 
then what is the distinction between the mathematical representation and that which is 
represented? I think that this objection has no force to it. The distinction can be 
rephrased so as to alleviate the worry that it collapses to, or otherwise relies on, the 
untenable distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘nature’. We may state the distinction 
simply as that between a mathematical representation of structure and the structure 
that is not representational at all—i.e., the structure of nature “itself”. As French and 
Ladyman point out, “to describe something using mathematics does not imply that it 
is itself mathematical (2003b, 75 as cited in McArthur 2006, 218). This does not, as 
McArthur contends, threaten to run amok of Psillos’ objection that structural realism 
is committed to an untenable distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘nature’ i.e., to the 
“distinct but inexpressible in-itself” (McArthur, ibid.). The problem is simply that we 
want to know, so to speak, “where” the mathematical structure is and “where” the 
structure of nature is. The answer to these questions is simple, and allows us to 
unproblematically distinguish between “nature” or “physical structure” as opposed to 
“purely mathematical”: the mathematical structure is simply “in” my paper-and-
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pencil markings, or “in” a computer program, or “in” the acts of generating a 
theoretical model. Such things are certainly part of the “physical structure of the 
world”, but they are just sub-structures within a larger physical structure which 
correspond to an aspect of that larger physical structure. But there is no substantial 
ontological distinction here between the “paper-and-pencil” structures (or the 
mathematical concepts in my head) and the “physical” structures to which these 
structures correspond. The point is that I may say that a map corresponds to the 
physical world, but the map does not have to represent me as well; I can always 
generate a larger structure of relationships which then also represents me in relation 
to the structure of the map, and so on. But surely there is no deep metaphysical 
problem because the map does not itself contain a reference to its user. So, 
mathematical structures—graphs, pencil markings, computer readouts, etc., are 
simply substructures within a larger structure (“the world”), the relation between the 
substructure and some whole of which it is a part I may always characterize in 
structural terms. 
“Constructive Empiricism” and Structural Realism: a challenge? Van Fraassen 
(2006, 2008) has argued extensively that, if we re-construe structural realism along 
the lines of constructive empiricism, we arrive at a position van Fraassen calls 
“empiricist structuralism” (van Fraassen 2006, p. 299ff) and on his view the 
metaphysical bite goes away. He summaries his view as follows: 
Science represents the empirical phenomena solely as embeddable in 
certain abstract structures (theoretical models), and those abstract 
structures are describable only up to structural isomorphism. […] 
There is warrant for the assertion of an accumulation of empirical 
knowledge through theory change precisely if it can be demonstrated 
for phenomena counted among the empirical successes of earlier 
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science that, if they are embeddable in the new models then they are 
‘approximately’ embeddable in the old models. (p. 305) 
Clearly, van Fraassen wants to satisfy the “no miracles” intuition and speak to the 
“pessimistic meta-induction” in a manner consistent with constructive empiricism. 
Empiricist structuralism is a position that purports to account for the success of 
science and for aspects of theory change that the structural realist is concerned with, 
without being committed to a metaphysics of theoretical entities or being committed 
to (ontological) structure. No metaphysics! Science is “about” empirical 
phenomena—that which is observed. Van Fraassen continues: 
This empiricist re-construal is scant comfort to the scientific realist, of 
course. It also sets aside as unimportant the conceptual puzzles about 
how to distinguish structure from content or quality, which beset so-
called structural realism. But it provides a balanced view of scientific 
theory change, taking some of the mystery out of scientific 
revolutions. All it takes, to achieve this more balanced view, is to 
dispel the lazy illusion that we could do this by means of the simple 
expedient of either reifying the models or regarding them as 
delineating the objective structure of a hidden qualitative content. 
(ibid.) 
 
It is important to point out that van Fraassen’s view simultaneously avoids both 
epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism: science is only about the 
representation of empirical phenomena; it is where knowledge of empirically 
adequate theoretical knowledge is gradually accumulated through the centuries, 
which knowledge is grounded solely in acts of human observation and intellectual 
ingenuity. Metaphysics, insofar as it steps beyond the horizon of empirical adequacy, 
is unneeded to adequately account for the success of science. This success is to be 
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measured in proportion to how adequately theories save the phenomena. Arguing 
against the very motivation of Worrall, van Fraasen writes: 
The empirical success of the older theories were partial successes of a 
very distinct sort: their representations of nature, the models they made 
available for representation of the observed phenomena, were partially 
accurate. These successes consisted in their fitting the data, the 
deliverances of experimental and observational experience. There was 
something they got right: the structure, at some level of approximation, 
of those phenomena. Here the word ‘structure’ is used to point 
specifically to a certain character, defined by certain measureable 
parameters both old and new theory use to describe those successes. … 
Just look at those empirical phenomena! (ibid., p. 304) 
From science, we need no more and can do with no less. Such a view provides no 
metaphysical foundations for science. Warns van Fraassen, we must “prevent 
ourselves from sinking into [a] metaphysical morass that swallows all seekers for the 
true foundations of being”, i.e., metaphysics (ibid., p. 303). 
A (polemical) reply to van Fraassen: the aims of metaphysics and the goal of 
philosophy. It is part of van Fraassen’s thesis that, prior to any conception of science, 
we must distinguish between the phenomena that a theory attempts to describe, and 
the abstract representational apparatus of theories. Philosophy, at this stage, may help 
us to sharpen this question, but need not supply a “theory” (an a priori account) to 
settle the matter. More importantly for van Frasseen: science is only in the business of 
adequately accounting for the phenomena, that is, providing us with relatively 
accurate model-representations of “experimental and observational experience”. That 
a model is successful does not imply the existence of unobservable theoretical entities. 
That Maxwell’s theory provided an accurate description of electric and magnetic 
phenomena does not imply the existence of some ontological “thing” that “underlies” 
the phenomena. Rather, Maxwell’s equations provide us with a means of finding 
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models that represent/describe very well what is detectable and observable, and may 
even allow us to locate other, as-yet unknown, instances of the same phenomena. 
Postulating something else—a field—reifies the models science provides. 
Alternatively, we may say that the equations describe the form or structure of 
something, an unknown entity (van Fraassen 2006, p. 279). 
 Notice, though, that the thesis defended throughout this dissertation, and the 
thesis of Ladyman et al. provides yet another alternative that is neither reification nor 
the “form” or structure of “some unknown entity”. In particular, the thesis defended 
here asserts that individuals are contextual in the sense that their existence at any 
moment is causally and non-causally dependent upon conditions whose absence 
implies the absence of the individual. If entities are individuals, then entities are 
contextual as well. Additionally, insofar as science and fundamental physics implies 
the contextuality of individuals, there are no good grounds to defend the thesis that 
individuality is grounded in anything other than relational structure. That is, entities 
are ontologically secondary to relational structure in the sense that the former are 
derivative from (or ontologically dependent upon) the latter. ‘Structure’ here refers to 
the larger modal context in which we locate individuals, and by ‘modal context’ I 
mean a structure of inter-dependencies (both causal in the standard sense and non-
causal). By ontic structural realism I mean that ‘structure is all there is’ in the sense 
that individuals within a structure are themselves just more structure, and that “it’s 
structure all the way down”. There is no thing or substance that is structure precisely 
because of the (i) contextuality of individuals and (ii) there is no “lower-most” or 
“upper-most” level of structure. That is, structure is not a “totality” (such a notion 
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would be illegitimate), it has no substance itself, and it is open-ended. In fact, we 
should not even use the term “it” to designate “it”—there’s not “it”! Science reveals 
to  us a widening scope of empirical interrelationships; some fields of science are 
isolated to a particular level of scale (quantum field theory and particle physics), 
while others may study and describe interlevel relationships (between the quantum 
and general relativistic scale-levels of the universe, for example). Structural realism is 
a metaphysics but not one of the substance or form-of-we-know-not-what varieties. 
As defended here, it is not committed to a kind of Kantian enclosure within 
phenomena; it is not of the much-maligned “epistemic” sort. The version of structural 
realism defended in this dissertation needs, therefore, to be labeled something else, as 
something outside the standard metaphysics/epistemology categories, associated as 
they are with the boogeyman of “realism” vs. “nominalism”—precisely the views 
“constructive empiricism” is cooked up to avoid. 
 I would like to concede much to van Fraassen’s “empiricist structuralism” in 
fact. Most of what he defends is friendly to the ontological structural realist, in my 
view. The  difference—perhaps what is the most significant difference, and what puts 
the thesis somewhat off the present map—is that I do not conceive of the project of 
“metaphysics” in the way that van Fraassen does. I, rather, adopt the view of William 
James (1911): 
In its original acceptation, meaning the completest knowledge of the 
universe, philosophy must include the results of all the sciences, and 
cannot be contrasted with the latter. It simply aims at making of 
science what Herbert Spencer calls a “system of completely unified 
knowledge”. In the more modern sense, of something contrasted with 
the sciences, philosophy means “metaphysics”. The older sense is the 
more worthy sense, and as the results of the sciences get more 
available for co-ordination, and the conditions for finding truth in 
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different kinds of questions get more methodically defined, we may 
hope that the term will revert to its original meaning. Science, 
metaphysics, and religion may then again form a single body of 
wisdom, and lend each other mutual support. 
At present this hope is far from its fulfillment (from Some Problems of 
Philosophy). 
In light of James’ view, we should dub the view of metaphysics adopted in this 
dissertation as “coordinative metaphysics”, as opposed to “ordinary language” 
metaphysics or “substance metaphysics”, and as opposed to “constructive 
empiricism”, positivism and metaphysical agnosticism. This, finally, is the fourth 
tradition of philosophy. It is a sound attempt to escape being committed to “the true 
story”, for structure is not “the truth” about “being” or reality. Reality and being are 
the inputs to such a view, not the doctrinal outputs. Structural realism is a method, 
not so much a doctrine. It is a proposal—much like we may take the Cartesian 
Coordinate System—for how to organize our empirical discoveries into a coherent 
whole. It is a view that attempts to unify not through a substance or through a 
conceptual analysis, but through the investigation of the empirical relationships that 
might exist irrespective of scale, ontological preferences or hierarchies, and so on. It 
is not concerned with “truth”, but, as with van Fraassen’s constructive empiricist, 
empirical adequacy in light of a coordinative view of the relationship between all 
empirical facts, at once. 
 Science, indeed, need not be committed to any theoretical entities because it 
reaveals to us a gradually widening scope of structural relationships. We understand 
“thing” from two points of view: from the point of view of all of science and 
empirical knowledge (and the commonsense concept here is woefully inadequate, and 
our coordinative metaphysics requires an appropriately wide and revised conception, 
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without the introduction of metaphysical entities, etc.—an Occam’s Razor certainly 
applies here). It attempts a “panoptic” view of all the sciences, a coordinative sight. 
But it is an attempt to first rid philosophy (or science) of prejudice, of taking a 
particular view as to the “true” structure or nature or make-up of reality. It is an 
attempt to clear the way for whatever empirical connections there might be in the 
world, irrespective of our philosophical doctrines: behaviorism, materialism, 
physicalism, substance-dualism, and so on. All such positions are, indeed, fruitless 
and built upon philosophical castles in the sky. We might, wonders the structuralist, 
discover all sorts of strange things about our universe. But all of these things, insofar 
as we can observe and study them, will be describable, and will count as part of the 
same world. One fabric with many interrelated strands, each sub-strand of which is 
yet another interrelated pattern of strands … and so on forever. Science should 
proceed without limit and without bias. It is open, and ought not be weighed down by 
philosophical doctrines that have dogged many a philosopher and tradition of the past 
(scholasticism, the Kantian tradition, the Hegelian tradition, positivism, etc.). 
Presently, mathematics offers the most precise representational apparatus man has yet 
devised, but there is no reason to think that mathematical representations are the only 
powerful and meaningful empirical tools man might use; nonetheless, technological 
augmentations of humanity’s empirical inquiry are likely here to stay and will likely 
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The Relational Blockworld (RBW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics (NRQM) is introduced. Accordingly, the spacetime of NRQM is a 
relational, non-separable blockworld whereby spatial distance is only defined 
between interacting trans-temporal objects. RBW is shown to provide a novel 
statistical interpretation of the wavefunction that deflates the measurement problem, 
as well as a geometric account of quantum entanglement and non-separability that 
satisfies locality per special relativity and is free of interpretative mystery. We present 
RBW’s acausal and adynamical resolution of the so-called “quantum liar paradox,” 
an experimental set-up alleged to be problematic for a spacetime conception of 
reality, and conclude by speculating on RBW’s implications for quantum gravity. 
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  Many philosophers and physicists expect to find new physics lurking in the 
answer to van Fraassen’s
(1)
 foundational question par excellence: “how could the 
world possibly be the way quantum theory says it is?” In fact, Smolin
(2)
 believes that 
what “we are all missing” in the search for quantum gravity “involves two things: the 
foundations of quantum mechanics and the nature of time.” We share this sentiment 
and are therefore motivated to “understand” non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
(NRQM). As we will show, our interpretation has strong implications for the practice 
and unification of physics, and we will speculate formally on these consequences.  
 Since there are several well-known conceptual and formal tensions between 
relativity and quantum mechanics which bear on the project of unifying general 
relativity (GR) and quantum field theory (QFT), we feel that a necessary condition for 




This contradiction is so strongly felt that it has even been doubted whether 
what goes on in an atom can be described within the scheme of space and 
time. From a philosophical standpoint, I should consider a conclusive decision 
in this sense as equivalent to a complete surrender. For we cannot really avoid 
our thinking in terms of space and time, and what we cannot comprehend 




Some physicists, among them myself, cannot believe that we must abandon, 
actually and forever, the idea of direct representation of physical reality in 
space and time. 
As Howard notes in the following passage, one of the central debates between the 
founding fathers of quantum mechanics was over the conflict between the spacetime 
picture and the quantum picture of reality and how they may be reconciled
(5)
:  
The second striking feature of Pauli’s last-quoted paragraph is that it points 
backward to what was by 1935 an old debate over the nonseparable manner in 
which quantum mechanics describes interacting systems. The fact that this 
was the central issue in the pre-1935 debate over the adequacy of the quantum 
theory disappeared from the collective memory of the physics community 
after EPR….Einstein had been trying in every which way to convince his 
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colleagues that this was sufficient reason to abandon the quantum path…But it 
was not just Einstein who worried about quantum nonseparability in the years 
before 1935. It was at the forefront of the thinking of Bohr and Schrödinger. 
 
In today’s terminology we would say that the spacetime picture of relativity adheres 
to the following principles
(6)
: 
Separability principle: any two systems A and B, regardless of the history of 
their interactions, separated by a non-null spatiotemporal interval have their 
own independent real states such that the joint state is completely determined 
by the independent states. 
Locality principle: any two space-like separated systems A and B are such that 
the separate real state of A let us say, cannot be influenced by events in the 
neighborhood of B. 
It is now generally believed that Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations, i.e., 
correlated space-like separated experimental outcomes which violate Bell’s 
inequality, force us to abandon either the separability or locality principle. 
As Howard notes, Einstein thought that both these principles, but especially 
the latter, were transcendental grounds for the very possibility of science. Einstein’s 
spatiotemporal realism is summarized in his own words
(7)
: 
Is there not an experiential reality that one encounters directly and that is also, 
indirectly, the source of that which science designates as real? Moreover, are 
the realists and, with them, all natural scientists not right if they allow 
themselves to be led by the startling possibility of ordering all experience in a 
(spatio-temporal-causal) conceptual system to postulate something real that 
exists independently of their own thought and being?  




Schrödinger’s introduction of entangled n-particle wave functions written not 
in 3-space but in 3n-dimensional configuration space offends against space-
time description because it denies the mutual independence of spatially 
separated systems that is a fundamental feature of a space-time description. 
And we might add that realism about configuration space also destroys Einstein’s 
vision of spacetime as the be-all and end-all of reality as exemplified by M4.  
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 All of this raises an interesting question about just how much of the spacetime 
picture can be retained given quantum mechanics. As we will show, the Relational 
Blockworld
(9)
 interpretation of NRQM points to a far more intimate and unifying 
connection between spacetime and the quantum than most have appreciated. Many 
will assume that such a geometric interpretation is impossible because quantum 
wavefunctions live in Hilbert space and contain much more information than can be 
represented in a classical space of three dimensions. As Peter Lewis says
(10)
, “the 
inescapable conclusion for the wavefunction realist seems to be that the world has 3N 
dimensions; and the immediate problem this raises is explaining how this conclusion 
is consistent with our experience of a three-dimensional world.” On the contrary, the 
existence of the non-commutativity of quantum mechanics is deeply related to the 
structure of spacetime itself, without having to invoke the geometry of Hilbert space. 
Specifically, as will be demonstrated in section 2, the non-commutativity of NRQM’s 
position and momentum operators is a consequence of the relativity of simultaneity. 
Since, as will also be demonstrated in section 2, the NRQM density operator can be 
obtained from the spacetime symmetries of the experimental configuration, we justify 
a Relational Blockworld (RBW) interpretation of NRQM. 
1.1 Caveats. It is important not to be misled at this early stage by our claim about the 
spacetime symmetries of the experimental configuration. We are not advocating a 
brute spatiotemporal relationalism between sources and detectors, themselves 
conceived as classical and substantial trans-temporal, macroscopic objects. Rather, 
it’s “relations all the way down” to echo Mermin. The spacetime symmetries 
methodology of NRQM is just the beginning of our account wherein “it is all related” 
because “it is all relations.” That is, on our view any given relatum (such as a source 
or detector) always turns out to be a relational structure itself upon further analysis.
 
The formal characterization of relations will change accordingly as we move toward 
the more fundamental relations underlying RBW (as introduced in section 2), but at 
the level of experimental set-ups in NRQM, spacetime symmetries are the most 
appropriate characterization of relations (as illustrated in section 4). In short, 
relationalism does not end with macroscopic objects but applies to their ultimate 
“constituents” as well.   
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The reader is warned that RBW is counterintuitive in many respects. Of 
course there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics that have highly 
counterintuitive features, but RBW possesses its own unique twists on several such 
features. Primarily, these counter-intuitive aspects arise from: (1) our claim that 
relations are fundamental to relata and (2) our particular variation of the blockworld.  
1.2 Relations Fundamental to Relata. Assuming relations are fundamental to relata is 
not  
unique to RBW. For example Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum  
mechanics
(11)
 holds that a system’s states or the values of its physical quantities as 
standardly conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or 
measuring instrument. As well, on Rovelli’s relational account, the appearance of 
determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to 
the interaction of the system and observer. Rovelli is rejecting absolutely determinate 
relata. Rovelli’s relational interpretation of NRQM is inspired by Einstein’s theory of 
special relativity in two respects. First, he makes the following analogy with special 
relativity: relational quantum mechanics relativizes states and physical quantities to 
observers the way special relativity relativizes simultaneity to observers. Second, 
Einstein does not merely provide an interpretation of the Lorentz formalism, but he 
derives the formalism on the basis of some simple physical principles, namely the 
relativity principle and the light postulate
(12)
. 
Another closely related example is Mermin’s Ithaca interpretation
(13)
 which 
tries to “understand quantum mechanics in terms of statistical correlations without 
there being any determinate correlata that the statistical correlations characterize
(14)
.” 
According to Mermin, physics, e.g., quantum mechanics, is about correlations and 
only correlations; “it’s correlations all the way down.” It is not about correlations 
between determinate physical records nor is it about correlations between determinate 
physical properties. Rather, physics is about correlations without correlata. On 
Mermin’s view, correlations have physical reality and that which they correlate does 
not. Mermin claims that the physical reality of a system consists of the (internal) 
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correlations among its subsystems and its (external) correlations with other systems, 
viewed together with itself as subsystems of a larger system. Mermin also claims 
inspiration from special relativity. 
RBW shares with the relational and Ithaca interpretations a rejection of the 
notion of absolute states and properties. RBW also shares inspiration from relativity 
but as we shall see, RBW provides a much deeper and more unifying relationship 
between quantum mechanics and special relativity than the relational or Ithaca 
interpretations. In addition, both formally and conceptually, the characterization of 
relationalism in RBW is quite different than either of these views.  
First, in terms of specific formalism, RBW employs spacetime symmetries 
and relations fundamental to those symmetries best characterized as a mathematical 
co-construction of things, space and time (explained in section 2). Second, the rubric 
characterizing relationalism is ontological structural realism
(15)
 (OSR), which rejects 
the idea that reality is ultimately composed of things, i.e., self-subsisting entities, 
individuals or trans-temporal objects
(16)
 with intrinsic properties and “primitive 
thisness,” haecceity, etc. According to OSR the world has an objective modal 
structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the 
intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. In Einstein’s terminology, given OSR, 
particles do not have their own “being thus.” The objective modal structure of the 
world and the abstract structural relations so characterized are fundamental features 
of reality relative to entities such as particles, atoms, etc. This is not anti-realism 
about objects or relata, but a denial of their fundamentality. Rather, relations are 
primary while the things are derivative, thus rejecting “building block” atomism or 
Lego-philosophy. Relata inherit their individuality and identity from the structure of 
relations. According to RBW, entities/objects and even the dynamical laws allegedly 
“governing things” are secondary to relational structure.  
While the standard conception of structure is either set theoretic or logical, 
OSR holds that graph theory provides a better formal model for the nature of reality 
because relations are fundamental to nodes therein
(17)
. Many people have argued that 
giving primacy to relations and abstracting relata from them is somehow incoherent. 
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However, graph theory shows us that such objections are prejudiced by atomistic 
thinking and ordinary language. In fact, per Leitgeb and Ladyman
(18)
 the identity and 
diversity of individuals in a structure are primitive features of the structure as a whole 
in graph theory. Thus, we employ a spatiotemporal graph to provide a heuristic 
characterization of RBW in section 2. 
What this implies for the quantum domain is that one must be cautious in 
using everyday classical metaphysics of individuality. For example, it is quite 
common for physicists to say things like, “I can see a glowing atom in the Pauli trap.” 
RBW a la OSR does not deny such a claim so long as it is not meant to imply any 
“being thus” on the part of the atom, a metaphysical interpretation not entailed by the 
facts. Certainly, it is difficult to think about structure without “hypostatizing” 
individuals or relata as the bearers of structure, but it does not follow that relata are 
truly ontologically fundamental. 
None of this is really new as OSR-type views have a long and distinguished 
history in foundational physics
(19)
 and group theoretic accounts
(20)
 of objects have a 
long history in the development of quantum mechanics. The group-theoretic 
conception of the ‘constitution’ of objects as sets of invariants under symmetry 











. When it comes to fundamental physics, objects 
are very often identified via group-theoretic structure, e.g., quantum field theory. So, 
while counterintuitive, the notion of relations being fundamental to relata is not 
without precedence.  
1.3 The Blockworld. The second counterintuitive feature of RBW is the use of a 
blockworld (BW) in the explanation and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Thus, 





There is no dynamics within space-time itself: nothing ever moves 
therein; nothing happens; nothing changes. In particular, one does not 
think of particles as moving through space-time, or as following along 
their world-lines. Rather, particles are just in space-time, once and for all, 
and the world-line represents, all at once, the complete life history of the 
particle.   
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When Geroch says that “there is no dynamics within space-time itself,” he is not 
denying that the mosaic of the blockworld possesses patterns that can be 
described with dynamical laws. Nor is he denying the predictive and explanatory 
value of such laws. Rather, given the reality of all events in a blockworld, 
dynamics are not “event factories” that bring heretofore non-existent events 
(such as measurement outcomes) into being. Dynamical laws are not brute 
unexplained explainers that “produce” events. Geroch is advocating for what 
philosophers call Humeanism about laws. Namely, the claim is that dynamical 
laws are descriptions of regularities and not the brute explanation for such 
regularities. His point is that in a blockworld, Humeanism about laws is an 
obvious position to take because everything is just “there” from a “God’s eye” 
(Archimedean) point of view. That is, all events past, present and future are 
equally “real” in a blockworld. 
Others have suggested that we ought to take the fact of BW seriously when 
doing physics and modeling reality. For example, Huw Price
(27)
 calls it the 
“Archimedean view from nowhen” and it has motivated him to take seriously the idea 
of a time-symmetric quantum mechanics and so-called backwards causation in 
quantum mechanics (BCQM). As he says about his book defending BCQM
(28)
, “the 
aim of the book is to explore the consequences of the block universe view in physics 
and philosophy.” Price is attempting to construct a local hidden-variables 
interpretation of NRQM that explains quantum non-locality with purely time-like 
dynamics or backwards causation. According to Price, BCQM provides an 
explanation of the Bell correlations
(29)
 “which shows that they are not really non-local 
at all, in that they depend on purely local interactions between particles and 
measuring devices concerned. They seem non-local only if we overlook the present 
relevance of future interactions.” 
The key explanatory move that Price makes is to have information travel 
backwards along the light-cones of the two EPR particles, converging at the source of 
the entangled state. Presumably, this is the point in spacetime where the entangled 
state is “prepared.” The picture we must think of is this: the future measurement 
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interaction in separate wings of an EPR apparatus is the cause of the (earlier) 
entangled state, so the “point at which they separate” is the “effect” of a causal chain 
“originating” with the measurement interaction. This is to put the point directly in 
terms of backwards causation. The arrow of causation does not point from one 
spacelike separated wing of the apparatus to the other, across space, but rather it 
points backwards in time to the point at which the particles separated. Other 








The connection between BCQM or time-symmetric accounts of the quantum 
and the BW is straightforward: in a BW the state preparations and measurement 
outcomes are equally real, i.e., already “there.” Thus, since a dynamic interpretation 
of the BW picture is superfluous, one might as well claim the measurement outcomes 
“effect the state preparations” rather than the converse. Of course it may seem trivial 
to explain the outcomes of quantum experiments (or anything else) using the BW. 
After all, one could answer any question in this vein by saying something like “it’s all 
just there in the BW, end of story.” In order to avoid trivializing the BW explanation, 





 and the two-vector formalism
(35)
. Do these beautiful 
and clever devices really avoid the charge of triviality? Such explanations are no less 
dynamical than standard quantum mechanics, which is puzzling given that the 
original blockworld motivation for such accounts lacks absolute change and 
becoming. As far we know, only Cramer speaks to this worry. Cramer notes that the 
backwards-causal elements of his theory are “only a pedagogical convention,” and 
that in fact “the process is atemporal
(36)
.” Indeed, it seems to us that all such 
dynamical or causal devices in a BW should be viewed fundamentally as book 
keeping. BCQM and the like, even having acknowledged the potential explanatory 
importance of BW, have not gone far enough in their atemporal, acausal and 
adynamical thinking. Whereas such accounts are willing to think backwardly, 
temporally speaking, it is still essentially dynamical, temporal thinking.  
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We rather believe the key to rendering a BW explanation nontrivial is to 
provide an algorithm for the relevant BW construction. Thus, the answer to “Why did 
X follow Y and Z?” is not merely, “Because X is already ‘there’ in the future of Y 
and Z per the BW,” but as we will illustrate, “Because this must be the spatiotemporal 
relationship of X, Y and Z in the BW per the self-consistent definition of the entities 
involved in X, Y and Z.” If one chooses to read dynamical stories from a BW picture, 
they may where feasible. However, BW descriptions are not limited to the depiction 
of dynamical/causal phenomena, so they are not constrained to dynamical/causal 
storytelling. In the following passage Dainton
(37)
 paints a suggestive picture of what it 
means to take the BW perspective seriously both ontologically and explanatorily: 
Imagine that I am a God-like being who has decided to design and then create 
a logically consistent universe with laws of nature similar to those that obtain 
in our universe…Since the universe will be of the block-variety I will have to 
create it as a whole: the beginning, middle and end will come into being 
together…Well, assume that our universe is a static block, even if it never 
‘came into being’, it nonetheless exists (timelessly) as a coherent whole, 
containing a globally consistent spread of events. At the weakest level, 
“consistency” here simply means that the laws of logic are obeyed, but in the 
case of universes like our own, where there are universe-wide laws of nature, 
the consistency constraint is stronger: everything that happens is in accord 
with the laws of nature. In saying that the consistency is “global” I mean that 
the different parts of the universe all have to fit smoothly together, rather like 
the pieces of a well-made mosaic or jigsaw puzzle.  
Does reality contain phenomena which strongly suggest an acausal BW algorithm? 
According to RBW, the deepest explanation of EPR-Bell correlations is such an 
algorithm. NRQM a la RBW provides an acausal BW algorithm in its prediction of 
Bell inequality violations and these violations have been observed. So it appears that 
reality does harbor acausal BW phenomena and NRQM a la RBW is one algorithm 
for depicting the self-consistent placement of such phenomena in a blockworld, as 
will be illustrated via the quantum liar experiment in section 4.  
We support this claim in section 2 by first reviewing a result in which the non-
commutativity of NRQM’s position and momentum operators is a consequence of the 
relativity of simultaneity, and as is well known the latter implies a blockworld barring 
some neo-Lorentzian adornment, re-interpretation or the like
(38)
. The second result 
reviewed in section 2 shows the density operator of an experimental configuration is 
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obtained from the “past, present and future” of the entire spatiotemporal configuration 
a la the spacetime symmetries of the experimental set-up: from the initiation of the 
experiment to its outcomes (as is clear, for example, in the path-integral formalism). 
The blockworld as implied by the spacetime picture does real explanatory and 
unifying work in RBW. Thus RBW helps to unify the quantum and spacetime 
formally, conceptually and metaphysically in ways that neither other relational 
accounts nor BW-motivated accounts have to date. For all these reasons we claim that 
RBW constitutes a geometric, acausal and adynamical account of NRQM and 
spacetime that is fundamental to dynamical explanations. As Dainton says
(39)
: 
If this strikes us as odd it is because we are unused to thinking of the universe 
as a vast spatiotemporal mosaic, but if the universe is a vast spatiotemporal 
mosaic, then, given the reality of the future, the future determines the past as 
much as the past determines the future. The constraints that later events place 
on earlier ones are not always causal [or dynamical or in any way time-like]. It 
is more typically a matter of coordination: the future events exist in the same 
universe as the earlier events, in a coherent, smooth-fitting, law-abiding 
whole.    
1.4 Non-separability of Spacetime Regions and Quantum States. The blockworld of 
RBW is precisely in keeping with Geroch’s “all at once” notion of spacetime and 
Dainton’s “vast spatiotemporal mosaic,” but it is important to note that it is a non-
separable BW while that of relativity theory is separable. That is to say, the metric 
field of relativity theory takes on values at each point of the differentiable spacetime 
manifold, even in regions where the stress-energy tensor is zero, as if “things” are 
distinct from the concepts of space and time. Per RBW, the concepts of space, time 
and trans-temporal objects can only be defined self-consistently so each is 
meaningless in the absence of the others. In section 2, we suggest a method to 
formalize this idea, deriving a spatial distance defined only between interacting trans-
temporal objects. Accordingly, there need not be an ‘exchange’ particle or wave 
moving ‘through space’ between the worldlines of trans-temporal objects to 
dynamically mediate their interaction and establish their spatial separation. As a 
consequence, we understand that an NRQM detection event (subset of the detector) 
results from a particular, rarefied subset of the relations defining sources, detectors, 
beam splitters, mirrors, etc. in an “all at once” fashion. In this picture, there are no 
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“screened off” particles moving in a wave-like fashion through separable elements of 
the experimental arrangement to cause detection events, but rather such detection 
events are evidence that the experimental equipment itself is non-separable
111
. While 
non-separable, RBW upholds locality in the sense that there is no action at a distance, 
no instantaneous dynamical or causal connection between space-like separated 
events. And, there are no space-like worldlines in RBW. Thus, we have the non-
separability of dynamical entities, e.g., sources and detectors, while the entities 
themselves respect locality. In this sense, we agree with Howard
(40)
 that NRQM is 
best understood as violating “separability” (i.e., independence) rather than “locality” 
(i.e., no action at a distance, no super-luminal signaling), and we take to heart Pauli’s 
admonition that
(41)
 “in providing a systematic foundation for quantum mechanics, one 
should start more from the composition and separation of systems than has until now 
(with Dirac, e.g.) been the case.” 
One might perceive a certain tension in the combination of relationalism and 
the BW perspective. After all, nothing seems more absolute than the BW viewed as a 
whole, hence the Archimedean metaphor. One can just imagine Newton’s God gazing 
upon the timeless, static 4-dimensional BW mosaic (her sensorium) from her perch in 
the fifth (or higher) dimension; what could be more absolute? But relationalism is a 
rejection of the absolute and the very idea of a God’s eye perspective. In any case, 
one must never forget that while RBW is a blockworld in the sense that all events are 
equally real, it is a relational blockworld so there is no meaning to a God’s eye 
perspective, i.e., any beings observing the BW must be a part of it. Short of 
occupying all the perspectives “at once,” there is nothing that corresponds to such a 
privileged view.  
1.5 Paper Overview. We offer a graphical model for this non-separable, relational 
blockworld in section 2. In support of our heuristic model, we introduce the 
formalism of RBW by outlining results due to Kaiser, Anandan, Bohr, Ulfbeck, and 
Mottelson, and speculating on a spatiotemporally discrete approach underlying 
                                               
111 Since space, time and trans-temporal objects are to be mutually and self-consistently defined (via 
relations), the non-separability of spacetime entails the non-separability of trans-temporal objects and 
vice-versa. RBW does away with any matter/geometry dualism. 
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NRQM and QFT. We propose this spatiotemporally discrete approach both to follow 
up on the consequences of RBW for the practice and unification of physics, and to 
illustrate the RBW ontology. In section 3, we use this relational, non-separable 
blockworld to provide a geometric account of quantum entanglement and non-
separability that is free of conflict with the locality of SR and free of interpretative 
mystery. Therein, we also show how RBW provides a novel statistical interpretation 
of the wavefunction that deflates the measurement problem. To illustrate the nature of 
explanation for NRQM phenomena in a relational blockworld, we use RBW to 
resolve the so-called “quantum liar paradox” in section 4. Speculations on the 
possible implications for quantum gravity and the spacetime structure of GR are 
found in section 5. 
2. THE RELATIONAL BLOCKWORLD 







 who showed independently that the non-commutivity of 
the position and momentum operators in NRQM follows from the non-commutivity of the 
Lorentz boosts and spatial translations in SR, i.e., the relativity of simultaneity. Whereas 
Bohr et al. maintain a dynamical view of NRQM via the Theory of Genuine 
Fortuitousness
112
, we assume the blockworld implication of the relativity of simultaneity so 
that no particular event is more fortuitous than any other. Kaiser writes
(45)
, 
For had we begun with Newtonian spacetime, we would have the 
Galilean group instead of [the restricted Poincaré group]. Since 
Galilean boosts commute with spatial translations (time being 
absolute), the brackets between the corresponding generators vanish, 
hence no canonical commutation relations (CCR)! In the [c  ∞ limit 
of the Poincaré algebra], the CCR are a remnant of relativistic 
invariance where, due to the nonabsolute nature of simultaneity, 
spatial translations do not commute with pure Lorentz 
transformations. [Italics in original].  
Bohr & Ulfbeck also realized that the “Galilean transformation in the weakly 
relativistic regime
(46)
” is needed to construct a position operator for NRQM, and this 
                                               
112 As with RBW, detector clicks are not caused by impinging particles; in fact they’re not caused by 
anything, and NRQM simply provides the distributions of uncaused clicks. Since Bohr et al. do not 
further assume that the detector itself is a collection of fortuitous events, they seem to distinguish 
between a macroscopic, causal world and a microscopic fortuitous world. 
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transformation “includes the departure from simultaneity, which is part of relativistic 
invariance.” Specifically, they note that the commutator between a “weakly 
relativistic” boost and a spatial translation results in “a time displacement,” which is 
crucial to the relativity of simultaneity. Thus they write
(47)
 , 
“For ourselves, an important point that had for long been an obstacle, 
was the realization that the position of a particle, which is a basic 
element of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, requires the link 
between space and time of relativistic invariance.” 
So, the essence of non-relativistic quantum mechanics – its canonical commutation 
relations – is entailed by the relativity of simultaneity.  
To outline Kaiser’s result, we take the limit c → ∞ in the following bracket of 
the Lie algebra of the Poincaré group: 






=      (1) 
where subscripts m and n take values of 1, 2 and 3, T0 is the generator of time 
translations, Tm are the generators of spatial translations, Kn are the boost generators,  
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2  in the limit c → ∞. [M ≡ mI, where m is identified as “mass” by 
choice of ‘scaling factor’ ћ.] So, letting  
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we have 
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Bohr & Ulfbeck point out that in this “weakly relativistic regime” the coordinate 
transformations now look like: 
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which is responsible for time dilation and length contraction. And, these 





 which is responsible for the relativity of simultaneity, i.e., in a Galilean 
transformation time is absolute so T = t. Therefore, the spacetime structure of Kaiser 
et al. (K4) lies between Galilean spacetime (G4) and M4, and we see that the 
Heisenberg commutation relations are not the result of Galilean invariance, where 
spatial translations commute with boosts, but rather they result from the relativity of 
simultaneity per Lorentz invariance. 
The received view has it that Schrödinger’s equation is Galilean invariant, so 
it is generally understood that NRQM resides in G4 and therefore respects absolute 
simultaneity
(48)
. Prima facie the Kaiser et al. result seems incompatible with the 
received view, so to demonstrate that these results are indeed compatible, we now 
show that these results do not effect the Schrödinger dynamics
(49)
. To show this we 
simply operate on |ψ> first with the spatial translation operator then the boost 
operator and compare that outcome to the reverse order of operations. The spatial 
translation (by a) and boost (by v) operators in x are 
xiaT
T eU
−=   and  xivKK eU
−=      (10) 
 
respectively. These yield 
 
ψψ h/iavmIKTTK eUUUU
−=     (11). 
 
Thus, we see that the geometric structure of Eq. 7 introduces a mere phase to |ψ> and 
is therefore without consequence in the computation of expectation values. And in 
fact, this phase is consistent with that under which the Schrödinger equation is shown 
to be Galilean invariant
(50)
. 
 Therefore, we realize that the spacetime structure for NRQM, while not M4 in 
that it lacks time dilation, length contraction and separability, nonetheless contains a 
“footprint of relativity
(51)
,” i.e., the relativity of simultaneity. In light of this result, it 
should be clear that there is no metaphysical tension between SR and NRQM. This 
formal result gives us motivation for believing that NRQM is intimately connected to 
the geometry of spacetime consistent with the relativity of simultaneity and therefore 
we feel justified in couching an interpretation of NRQM in a blockworld, albeit a 
non-separable blockworld in which relations are fundamental to relata.  
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That relations are fundamental to trans-temporal objects, as opposed to the 
converse per a dynamic perspective, can be justified via the work of Bohr, Mottelson 
& Ulfbeck
(52)
 who showed how the quantum density operator can be obtained via the 




The matrix elements of the unitary, irreducible representations of G are a 
complete orthonormal set for the vector space of the regular representation, or 
alternatively, for functions of g ∈ G. 
which gives
(54) 
If a hermitian operator, H, commutes with all the elements, D(g), of a 
representation of the group G, then you can choose the eigenstates of H to 
transform according to irreducible representations of G. If an irreducible 
representation appears only once in the Hilbert space, every state in the 
irreducible representation is an eigenstate of H with the same eigenvalue. 
What we mean by “the symmetry group” is precisely that group G with which 
some observable H commutes (although, these symmetry elements may be identified 
without actually constructing H). Thus, the mean value of our hermitian operator H 
can be calculated using the density matrix obtained wholly by D(g) and <D(g)> for 
all g ∈ G. Observables such as H are simply ‘along for the ride’ so to speak. 
While we do not reproduce Bohr et al.’s derivation of the density matrix, we 










δδδ)()( 1    (12) 
where na is the dimensionality of the irreducible representation, Da, and N is the 
group order, and considering but one particular irreducible representation, D, we 
obtain the starting point (orthogonality relation) found in Bohr et al. (their Eq. 1), 
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where n is the dimension of the irreducible representation. From this, they obtain the 
density matrix as a function of the irreducible representations of the symmetry group 






)()( 1ρ     (14). 
The methodological significance of the Bohr et al. result is that any NRQM 
system may be described with the appropriate spacetime symmetry group. The 
philosophical significance of this proof is more interesting, and one rooted in RBW’s 
ontology of spacetime relationalism. This ontology, as we will argue in the following 
section, easily resolves the conceptual problems of NRQM while conveying an 
underlying unity between SR and NRQM. 
Exactly what it means to say relations are fundamental to relata will be 
illustrated technically for NRQM by the example in section 4 in terms of the 
spacetime symmetries of the experimental configuration, and an even more 
fundamental conception of relationalism will be outlined via the proposed 
spatiotemporally discrete formalism in the remainder of this section, but we pause 
here to introduce the idea heuristically via a graphical representation of a non-
separable blockworld. Figure 1 shows the links of a graph for two (implied) 
worldlines in a relational G4. The vertical links (temporal translations) are generated 
by the Hamiltonian and the horizontal links (spatial translations) are generated by the 
momentum. Since boosts commute with spatial translations, the boosted version looks 
the same, i.e., spatial hypersurfaces are the same for observers in relative motion. 
Therefore, the only way to move along worldline 1 or 2 is via vertical links, i.e., 
horizontal displacement between worldlines cannot result in any temporal 
displacement along the worldlines. This represents the temporal Galilean 
transformation, T = t, consistent with presentism. In a spacetime where boosts don’t 
commute with spatial translations, the temporal coordinate transformation contains a 
translation, e.g., vx/c
2
 in Eq. 8. A relational spacetime of this type is represented 
graphically in Figure 2. In this type of spacetime it is possible to move along 
worldline 1 or 2 temporally by moving between the worldlines using the boosted 
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spatial hypersurfaces, thus the blockworld implication. If spatial distance is only 
defined via the horizontal links between worldlines, then we say the spacetime is non-
separable as explained in section 1.4.  
 In an effort to formalize the idea that spatial separation exists only between 
interacting trans-temporal objects
(56)
, we are exploring a spatiotemporally discrete 
formalism underlying quantum physics with NRQM following in the spatially 
discrete, temporally continuous limit and QFT following in the limit of both spatial 
and temporal continuity (Figure 3). This approach constitutes a unification of physics 
as opposed to a mere discrete approximation thereto, since we are proposing a source 
for the action, which is otherwise fundamental. So, for example, the spatiotemporally 
discrete counterpart to the QFT transition amplitude for interacting sources without 
scattering 

























exp...... 1             (16) 
when V(φ) is quadratic, e.g., harmonic oscillator per standard QFT. Aij is the discrete 
matrix counterpart to the differential operator of Eq. (15) while Jm and Qn are the 




considered a functional, which we may write as J+βα
2
1
, of Qn, which we may 
write as Q  or Q . Regions in Qn space where the action is stationary, i.e., 
invariant/symmetric, contribute most prominently to the transition amplitude
113
. 
Therefore, the functional is constructed so that what one means by trans-temporal 
objects, space and time, per J  and βα  respectively, are self-consistently defined 
                                               
113 Each possible experimental outcome of a given experiment requires its own “all at once” 
description yielding its own transition amplitude. For the case of spatially discrete sources, Z is the 
probability amplitude so it provides a frequency over the possible outcomes via the Born rule. 
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and harbor the desired fundamental symmetries (Figure 3). This is of course similar to 
the modus operandi of theoretical particle physics, the difference being the discrete 
formalism allows for (requires) the explicit construct of trans-temporal objects in 
concert with the spacetime metric whereas the spatiotemporally continuous starting 
point of QFT harbors tacit assumptions/constraints
114
. 


























    (17). 
Since Aij has an inverse, it has a non-zero determinant so it’s composed of N linearly 
independent vectors in its N-dimensional, representational vector space. Thus, any 
vector in this space may be expanded in the set of vectors comprising Aij. 
Specifically, the vector Jm, which will be used to represent ‘sources’ in the 
experimental set-up, can be expanded in the vectors of Aij. In this sense it is clear how 
relations, represented by Aij, can be fundamental to relata, represented by Jm. In the 
















baab ++==∑  



















qqkkqkqqmqmL −−−+= &&  
and the spatially and temporally discrete version of Aij in Eq. (16) would be 
                                               
114
 That one must explicitly construct the trans-temporal objects, space and time of the discrete action 
suggests there may exist a level of formalism fundamental to the action. Toffoli(57) has proposed that a 
mathematical tautology resides at this most fundamental level, e.g., “the boundary of a boundary is 
zero” whence general relativity and electromagnetism(58). Elsewhere, using discrete graph theory, we 
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The process of temporal identification Qn  qi(t) may be encoded in the blocks along 
the diagonal of Aij whereby the spatial division between the qi(t) would then be 





































The discrete formulation illustrates nicely how NRQM tacitly assumes an a priori 
process of trans-temporal identification, Qn  qi(t). Indeed, there is no principle 
which dictates the construct of trans-temporal objects fundamental to the formalism 
of dynamics in general – these objects are “put in by hand.” Thus, RBW suggests the 
need for a fundamental principle which would explicate the trans-temporal identity 
employed tacitly in NRQM, QFT and all dynamical theories. Since our starting point 
does not contain trans-temporal objects, space or time, we have to formalize 
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counterparts to these concepts. Clearly, the process Qn  qi(t) is an organization of 
the set Qn on two levels—there is the split of the set into subsets, one for each 
‘source’, and there is the ordering over each subset. The split represents space (true 
multiplicity from apparent identity), the ordering represents time (apparent identity 
from true multiplicity)
115
 and the result is objecthood (via relations). Again, the three 
concepts are inextricably linked in our formalism, thus our suggestion that they be 
related via a self-consistency criterion  
(Figure 3). 






































































































for Dim(t – t׳) we find 
                                               
115 These definitions of space and time follow from a fundamental principle of standard set theory, 

















































































































having restored ħ, used D12 = D21 and ignored the “self-interaction” terms J1D11J1 and 






















   (19) 
with J1(t) real.  
If we now use this amplitude to analyze the twin-slit experiment, we can 
compare the result to that of Schödinger wave mechanics and infer the non-
separability of spatial distance therein. There are four J’s which must be taken into 
account when computing the amplitude (figure 4), so we will use Eq. (19) to link J1 
with each of J2 and J4, and J3 with each of J2 and J4, i.e., J1 ↔ J2 ↔ J3 and J1 ↔ J4 ↔ 
J3. In doing so, we ignore the contributions from other pairings, i.e., the exact solution 
would contain one integrand with Qn  qi(t), i = 1,2,3,4. Finally, we assume a 
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monochromatic source of the form j1(ω)* = Γ1δ(ω–ωo) with Γ1 a constant, so the 











































ψ   (20) 
where 









    (21) 
with ψ the NRQM amplitude. [Z corresponds to the NRQM propagator which yields 
the functional form of ψ between spatially localized sources, as will be seen below.] 
With the source equidistance from either slit (or, equivalently, with slits replaced by a 
pair of coherent laser-excited atoms) the phase Γ1 d12j2 equals the phase Γ1 d14j4, so 
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for a particle of mass m moving from x1 to x2 in time t. This ‘exchange’ particle has 
no dynamic counterpart in the formalism used to obtain Eq. (22), but rather is 
associated with the oscillatory nature of the spatially discrete ‘source’ (see below). 
According to our view, this propagator is tacitly imbued “by hand” with notions of 
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trans-temporal objects, space and time per its derivation via the free-particle 
Lagrangian. In short, the construct of this propagator bypasses explicit, self-consistent 
construct of trans-temporal objects, space and time thereby ignoring the self-
consistency criterion fundamental to the action. The self-inconsistent, tacit 
assumption of a single particle with two worldlines (a “free-particle propagator” for 
each slit) is precisely what leads to the “mystery” of the twin-slit experiment
116
. This 
is avoided in our formalism because Z does not represent the propagation of a particle 
between ‘sources’, e.g., qi(t) ≠ x(t) as explained supra. Formally, the inconsistent, 










&  where ontologically m 
(which is not the same m that appears in our oscillator potential) is the mass of the 
‘exchange’ particle (i.e., purported dynamical/diachronic entity moving between 
‘sources’ – again, the ontic status of this entity is responsible for the “mystery”) and 
x(t) (which, again, is not equal to qi(t)) is obtained by assuming a particular spatial 
metric (this assumption per se is not responsible for the “mystery”). Its success in 
producing an acceptable amplitude when integrating over all paths x(t) in space 
(‘wrong’ techniques can produce ‘right’ answers), serves to deepen the “mystery” 
because the formalism, which requires interference between different spatial paths, is 
not consistent with its antecedent ontological assumption, i.e., single particle causing 
a single click. There is no such self-inconsistency in our approach, because Z is not a 
“particle propagator” but a ‘mathematical machine’ which measures the degree of 
symmetry contained in the “all at once” configuration of trans-temporal objects, space 
and time represented by A and J, as explained supra. Thus, this NRQM “mystery” 
results from an attempt to tell a dynamical story in an adynamical situation. 
Continuing, we have 
∫ ′′′= xdxxtxUtx )0,()0,;,(),( 22 ψψ  
                                               
116
 Per Feynman, the twin-slit experiment “has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it 
contains the only mystery” (R.P. Feynman, R.B. Leighton & M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on 
Physics,  
Vol. III, Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1965), p. 1-1). 
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and we want the amplitude between sources located at x1 and x2, so 







































p 12= . Assuming the interaction time is large compared to the ‘exchange’ 
particle’s characteristic time so that x12 is large compared to
p
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Assuming the impulse jk is proportional to the momentum transfer p, we have  










         (25) 
relating the spatial separation xim of the trans-temporal objects Ji and Jm to their 
intrinsic (m, k, ωo) and relational (kim) ‘dynamical’ characteristics.  
As we stated in section 1, the metric of Eq. (25) provides spatial distance only 
between interacting (kim ≠ 0) trans-temporal objects, in stark contrast to the metric 
field of relativity theory which takes on values at each point of the differentiable 
spacetime manifold, even in regions where the stress-energy tensor is zero. And, as is 
clear from our presentation, there is no ‘exchange’ particle or wave (of momentum p 
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or otherwise) moving ‘through space’ from the source to the detector to ‘cause’ a 
detection event. Thus, we have a formal counterpart to our heuristic graphical 
illustration whereby there is no concept of spatial distance in spacetime regions where 
the stress-energy tensor vanishes. 
 
 
3. RESOLVING THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF NRQM 
Before we use RBW to address the conceptual problems of NRQM, we pause 
to enumerate the RBW ontology and methodology. 
1. We may view each piece of equipment in an experimental set-up as 
resulting from a large number of spatiotemporally dense relations, so 
low-intensity sources and high-sensitivity detectors must be used to 
probe the rarified realm of NRQM (Figure 3).  
2. A “detector click” or “detector event” is a subset of the detector that 
also results from a large number of spatiotemporally dense relations; 
we infer the existence of a rarified set of relations between the source 
and the detector at the beginning of the click’s worldline.  
3. It is this inferred, rarified set of relations for which we compute the 
transition amplitude.  
4. A transition amplitude must be computed for each of all possible click 
locations (experimental outcomes) and this calculation must include 
(tacitly if not explicitly) all relevant information concerning the 
spacetime relationships (e.g., distances and angles) and property-
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defining relations (e.g., degree of reflectivity) for the experimental 
equipment.  
5. The relative probability of any particular experimental outcome can 
then be determined via the transition amplitude, which is the 
probability amplitude of NRQM for spatially discrete sources. 
 
3.1 The Measurement Problem. According to the account developed here, we offer a 
deflation of the measurement problem with a novel form of a “statistical 
interpretation.” The fundamental difference between our version of this view and the 
usual understanding of it is the following: whereas on the usual view the state 
description refers to an “ensemble” which is an ideal collection of similarly prepared 
quantum particles, “ensemble” according to our view is just an ideal collection of 
spacetime regions Si “prepared” with the same spatiotemporal boundary conditions 
per the experimental configuration itself. The union of the click events in each Si, as i 
→ ∞, produces the characteristic Born distribution. Accordingly, probability in RBW 
is interpreted per relative frequencies.  
On our view, the wavefunction description of a quantum system can be 
interpreted statistically because we now understand that, as far as measurement 
outcomes are concerned, the Born distribution has a basis in the spacetime 
symmetries of the experimental configuration. Each “click,” which some would say 
corresponds to the impingement of a particle onto a measurement device with 
probability computed from the wavefunction, corresponds to spacetime relations in 
the context of the experimental configuration. The measurement problem exploits the 
possibility of extending the wavefunction description from the quantum system to the 
whole measurement apparatus, whereas the “all at once” description according to 
RBW already includes the apparatus via the spacetime symmetries instantiated by the 
entire experimental configuration. The measurement problem is therefore a non-
starter on our view.  
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Since a trans-temporal object (such as a detector) possesses properties (to 
include click distributions) according to a spatiotemporally global set of relations (all 
trans-temporal objects are defined non-separably in “a vast spatiotemporal mosaic”), 
one could think of RBW as a local hidden-variable theory (such as BCQM) whereby 
the relations or symmetries provide the “hidden variables.” One can construct a local 
hidden-variable theory if one is willing to claim that systems which presumably have 
not interacted may nevertheless be correlated. Such correlations appear to require 
some kind of universal conspiracy behind the observed phenomena, hence Peter 
Lewis
(60)
 calls such theories “conspiracy theories.” As he says, “the obvious strategy 
is the one that gives conspiracy theories their name; it involves postulating a vast, 
hidden mechanism whereby systems that apparently have no common past may 
nevertheless have interacted.” Independence is the assumption that the hidden 
variables assigned to the particles are independent of the settings of the measuring 
devices. If Independence is violated, then a local hidden-variable theory (a conspiracy 
theory) can in principle account for the Bell correlations. But how could 
Independence be violated? The common cause principle tells us that every systematic 
correlation between events is due to a cause that they share. As a trivial consequence, 
systems that have not interacted cannot be systematically correlated, and all 
appearances indicate that the particles and the measuring devices in EPR-Bell 
phenomena do not interact before the measurement. Lewis
(61)
 suggests three 
possibilities for violating Independence: 
Hidden-mechanism theories and backwards-causal theories are both strategies 
for constructing a local hidden-variable theory by violating Independence. The 
first of these postulates a mechanism that provides a cause in the past to 
explain the Bell correlations, and the second postulates a cause in the future. 
But there is a third strategy that is worth exploring here, namely that the 
common cause principle is false—that some correlations simply require no 
causal explanation. 
Lewis calls the third strategy of denying the common cause principle “acausal 
conspiracy theories;” RBW can be reasonably characterized in this fashion with the 
spacetime symmetries playing the role of the hidden-variables. However such a 
characterization is also misleading in that we are not supplementing NRQM in any 
standard sense, such as modal interpretations a la Bohm. We are not claiming that 
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quantum mechanics is incomplete but that the spacetime symmetries and K4 provide 
a deeper explanation than NRQM as standardly and dynamically conceived. At least 
at this level, there is no deeper explanation for individual outcomes of quantum 
experiments than that provided by the structure of K4 and the spacetime symmetries 
underlying each experimental configuration
117
. The measurement problem arises 
because of the assumption that the dynamics are the deepest part of the explanatory 
story, the very heart of quantum mechanics, an assumption RBW rejects. In short, 
RBW provides a kinematic (pre-dynamical) solution to the measurement problem.   
3.2 Entanglement and Non-locality. The blockworld description of an experiment 
includes its outcomes, and it is possible that outcomes are correlated via symmetries 
included in the definition of the experiment per the action. Again, the description is 
“all at once” to include outcomes so if these outcomes are correlated per the action, 
which was constructed to represent a specific subset of reality instantiated 
(approximately) by the experiment in question, then there is no reason to expect 
entanglement will respect any kind of common cause principle. As we stated supra, 
causality/dynamism are not essential in the algorithm for constructing a blockworld 
description. Although RBW is fundamentally adynamical (relata from relations “all at 
once,” rather than relata from relata in a causal or dynamical structure), it does not 
harbor non-locality in the odious sense of “spooky action at a distance” as in Bohm 
for example, i.e., there are no space-like worldlines (implied or otherwise) between 
space-like separated, correlated outcomes. Again, this is where RBW suggests a new 
approach to fundamental physics because dynamical entities are modeled 
fundamentally via relations in “a vast spatiotemporal mosaic” instead of via 
“interacting” dynamical constituents a la particle physics
118
. 
Our account provides a clear description, in terms of relations in a 
blockworld, of quantum phenomena that does not suggest the need for a “deeper” 
causal or dynamical explanation. If explanation is simply determination, then our 
                                               
117 Of course, RBW implies a formalism fundamental to NRQM as shown in section 2. This 
implication sets RBW apart from mere interpretations of NRQM. 
118 This means particles physics per QFT is displaced from its fundamental status (Figure 3). The 
current hierarchy has QFT at the bottom (fundamental) leading to NRQM in the limit of (0+1) 
spacetime dimensions and leading to classical physics in the limit of ħ  0. The completion of physics 
per this scheme requires a quantum version of GR, i.e., quantum gravity. 
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view explains the structure of quantum correlations by invoking what can be called 
acausal, adynamical global determination relations. In NRQM, these “all at once” 
determination relations are given by the spacetime symmetries which underlie a 
particular experimental set-up. Not objects governed by dynamical laws, but rather 
acausal relations per the relevant spacetime symmetries do the fundamental 
explanatory work according to RBW. We can invoke the entire spacetime 
configuration of the experiment so as to predict, and explain, the EPR-Bell 
correlations. This then is a geometrical, acausal and adynamical account of 
entanglement.  
In summary, the spacetime symmetries of an NRQM experiment can be used 
to construct its quantum density operator, such a spacetime (K4) is one for which 
simultaneity is relative, and events in the detector region(s) evidence rarified relations 
between spatially discrete sources, which are trans-temporal objects and thus modeled 
as temporally continuous (recall from section 2 that NRQM obtains in the temporally 
continuous, spatially discrete limit of the discrete action). To evidence the 
explanatory power of this interpretation, we use it to resolve a particularly 
challenging conundrum in NRQM. 
 
4. RESOLVING THE QUANTUM LIAR PARADOX 
 We now apply the Bohr et al. method to a particular experimental set-up. In 
two recent articles, Elitzur and Dolev try to establish something like the negation of 
the blockworld view, by arguing for an intrinsic direction of time given by the 
dynamical laws of quantum theory
(62)
. They put forward the strong claim that certain 
experimental set-ups such as the quantum liar experiment (QLE) “entail inconsistent 
histories” that “undermine the notion of a fixed spacetime within which all events 
maintain simple causal relations. Rather, it seems that quantum measurement can 
sometimes ‘rewrite’ a process’s history
(63)
.” In response, they propose a “spacetime 
dynamics theory
(64)
.” Certainly, if something like this is true, then blockworld is 
jeopardized. By applying the geometrical interpretation of quantum mechanics to the 
“quantum liar” case, we will not only show that the blockworld assumption is 
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consistent with such experiments, but that blockworld a la our geometric 
interpretation provides a non-trivial and unique explanation of such experiments.  
 4.1 Mach-Zehnder Interferometer & Interaction-Free Measurements. Since QLE 
employs interaction-free measurement
(65)
 (IFM), we begin with an explication of 
IFM. Our treatment of IFM involves a simple Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI, 
Figure 5;  
BS = beam splitter, M = mirror and D = detector). All photons in this configuration 
are detected at D1 since the path to D2 is ruled out by destructive interference. This 
obtains even if the MZI never contains more than one photon in which case each 
photon “interferes with itself.” If we add a detector D3 along either path (Figures 6a 
and 6b), we can obtain clicks in D2 since the destructive interference between BS2 
and D2 has been destroyed by D3. If we introduce detectors along the upper and 
lower paths between the mirrors and BS2, obviously we do not obtain any detection 
events at D1 or D2.  
To use this MZI for IFM we place an atom with spin X+, say, into one of two 
boxes according to a Z spin measurement, i.e., finding the atom in the Z+ (or Z-) box 
means a Z measurement has produced a Z+ (or Z-) result. The boxes are opaque for 
the atom but transparent for photons in our MZI. Now we place the two boxes in our 
MZI so that the Z+ box resides in the lower arm of the MZI (Figure 7). If we obtain a 
click at D2, we know that the lower arm of the MZI was blocked as in Figure 6a, so 
the atom resides in the Z+ box. However, the photon must have taken the upper path 
in order to reach D2, so we have measured the Z component of the atom’s spin 
without an interaction. Accordingly, the atom is in the Z+ spin state and subsequent 
measurements of X spin will yield X+ with a probability of one-half (whereas, we 
started with a probability of X+ being unity). 
4.2 Quantum Liar Experiment. QLE leads to the “quantum liar paradox” of Elitzur & 
Dolev
(66)
 because it presumably instantiates a situation isomorphic to a liar paradox 
such as the statement: “this sentence has never been written.” As Elitzur & Dolev put 
it, the situation is one in which we have two distinct non-interacting atoms in 
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different wings of the experiment that could only be entangled via the mutual 
interaction of a single photon. However one atom is found to have blocked the 
photon’s path and thus it could not interact with the other atom via the photon and the 
other atom should therefore not be entangled with the atom that blocked the photon’s 
path. But, by violating Bell’s inequality, its “having blocked the photon” was affected 
by the measurement of the other atom, hence the paradox. Our explication of the 
paradox differs slightly in that we describe outcomes via spin measurements 
explicitly.  
We start by exploiting IFM to entangle two atoms in an EPR state, even 





. We simply add another atom prepared as the first in boxes 
Z2+/Z2- and position these boxes so that the Z2- box resides in the upper arm of the 
MZI  
(Figure 8). Of course if the atoms are in the Z1+/Z2- states, we have blocked both 
arms and obtain no clicks in D1 or D2. If the atoms are in Z1-/Z2+ states, we have 
blocked neither arm and we have an analog to Figure 5 with all clicks in D1. We are 
not interested in these situations, but rather the situations of Z1+ or Z2- as evidenced 





−−+++ ZZZZ     (26) 
and subsequent spin measurements with orientation of the Stern-Gerlach magnets in 
ℜ2 as shown in Figure 9 will produce correlated results which violate Bell’s 
inequality precisely as illustrated by Mermin’s apparatus
(69)
. This EPR state can also 
be obtained using distinct sources
(70)
 (Figure 10), so a single source is not necessary 
to entangle the atoms. In either case, subsequent spin measurements on the entangled 
atoms will produce violations of Bell’s inequality.  
                                               
119 The non-interaction of the photons and atoms is even more strongly suggested in an analogous 
experiment, where a super-sensitive bomb is placed in on of the arms of the MZI(68). 
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Suppose we subject the atoms to spin measurements after all D2 clicks and 
check for correlations thereafter. A D2 click means that one (and only one) of the 
boxes in an arm of the MZI is acting as a “silent” detector, which establishes a “fact 
of the matter” as to its Z spin and, therefore, the other atom’s Z spin. In all trials for 
which we chose to measure the Z spin of both atoms this fact is confirmed. But, when 
we amass the results from all trials (to include those in which we measured Γ and/or 
∆ spins) and check for correlations we find that Bell’s inequality is violated, which 
indicates the Z component of spin cannot be inferred as “a matter of unknown fact” in 
trials prior to Γ and/or ∆ measurements. This is not consistent with the apparent 
“matter of fact” that a “silent” detector must have existed in one of the MZI arms in 
order to obtain a D2 click, which entangled the atoms in the first place. To put the 
point more acutely, Elitzur and Dolev
(71)
 conclude their exposition of the paradox 
with the observation that 
The very fact that one atom is positioned in a place that seems to 
preclude its interaction with the other atom leads to its being affected 
by that other atom. This is logically equivalent to the statement: “This 
sentence has never been written.
120
” 
In other words, there must be a fact of the matter concerning the Z spins in order to 
produce a state in which certain measurements imply there was no fact of the matter 
for the Z spins. 
4.3 Geometrical Account of QLE. By limiting any account of QLE to a story about the 
interactions of objects or entities in spacetime (such as the intersection of point-
particle-worldlines, or an everywhere-continuous process connecting two or more 
worldlines), it is on the face of it difficult to account for “interaction-free” 
measurements (since, naively, a necessary condition for an “interaction” is the 
“intersection of two or more worldlines”). Since the IFM in this experiment 
“generated” the entanglement, we can invoke the entire spacetime configuration of 
the experiment so as to predict, and explain, the EPR-Bell correlations in QLE.  
                                               
120 This quote has been slightly modified per correspondence with the authors to correct a publisher’s 
typo. In the original document they go on to point out that “[we] are unaware of any other quantum 
mechanical experiment that demonstrates such inconsistency.”  
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  Accordingly, spatiotemporal relations provide the ontological basis for our 
geometric interpretation of quantum theory, and on that basis, explanation (qua 
determination) of quantum phenomena can be offered. According to our ontology of 
relations, the distribution of clicks at the detectors reflects the spatiotemporal 
relationships between the source, beam splitters, mirrors, and detectors as described 
by the spacetime symmetry group – spatial translations and reflections in this case. 
The relevant 2D irreducible representations (irreps) for 1-dimensional translations 
and reflections are
(72) 
































aS       (27) 
respectively, in the eigenbasis of T. These are the fundamental elements of our 
geometric description of the MZI. Since, with this ontology of spatiotemporal 
relations, the matter-geometry dualism has been collapsed, both “object” and 
“influence” reduce to spacetime relations. We can then obtain the density matrix for 
such a system via its spacetime symmetry group per Bohr et al. The “entanglement” 
is understood as correlated outcomes in an “all at once” description of the experiment 
per the symmetries of the action. 
Consider now Figure 5, with the RBW interpretation of quantum mechanics in 
mind. We must now re-characterize that experimental set-up in our new geometrical 
language, using the formalism of Bohr et al. Let a detection at D1 correspond to the 
eigenvector |1> of T(a) (associated with eigenvalue e
-ika
) and a detection at D2 
correspond to the eigenvector |2> of T(a) (associated with eigenvalue e
ika
). The 
source-detector combo alone is simply described by the click distribution |1>. The 
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1)( oaQψ         (30). 
This is an eigenstate of the reflection operator, so introducing the mirrors does not 
change the click distribution. Introduction of the second beam splitter, BS2, changes 






































)( ψψ ofinal aQ    (31). 
Note there is no mention of photon interference here. We are simply describing the 
distribution of events (clicks) in spacetime (spatial projection, rest frame of MZI) 
using the fundamental ingredients in this type of explanation, i.e., spacetime 
symmetries (spatial translations and reflections in the MZI, rotations in the case of 
spin measurements). What it means to “explain” a phenomenon in this context is to 
provide the distribution of spacetime events per the spacetime symmetries relevant to 
the experimental configuration. 
To complete our geometrical explanation of QLE we simply introduce another 
detector (D3 as in Figure 6a, say), which changes the MZI description supra prior to 





































































































Again, we need nothing more than Q
+
, which is a function of the reflection symmetry 
operator, S(a), to construct this distribution. And for the distribution of clicks for the 































































finalψ    (33). 
Of course, spin measurements using the MZI boxes (“spin measurements on 
the atoms”) are viewed as binary outcomes in space (spin ½) with respect to the 
orientation of the magnetic poles in a Stern-Gerlach device (SG). This is “how the 
atom was placed in the boxes according to spin.” Successive spin measurements are 




















































where |ψ1> is created by a source, magnet and detector and |ψ2> obtains when 
introducing a second SG measurement at an angle θ with respect to the first. The 
three possible orientations for SG measurments in ℜ2 considered here and in the 
Mermin apparatus (initial X+ orientation aside) are shown in Figure 9. As with MZI 
outcomes, the description of spin measurement is to be understood via the 
spatiotemporal relationships between source(s) and detector(s) per the experimental 
arrangement, i.e., there are no “atoms impinging on the detectors” behind the SG 
magnets per their spins. There are just sources, detectors and magnets whose relative 




This constitutes an acausal and adynamical characterization and explanation 
of entanglement. According to our view, the structure of correlations evidenced by 
QLE is determined by the spacetime relations instantiated by the experiment, 
understood as a spatiotemporal whole (blockworld). This determination is obtained 
by describing the experimental arrangement from beginning to end (including 
outcomes) via an action which contains the spatiotemporal symmetry structure 
relevant to the experimental arrangement and is constructed from self-consistently 
defined trans-temporal objects, space and time. Since 
(i) the explanation lies in the spacetime relations evidenced by (inferred 
from) detector events, 
(ii) the distribution of detector events follows from an “all at once” 
description of the experimental set-up via its spatially discrete action,  
(iii) the action is obtained by a self-consistent definition of trans-temporal 
objects, space and time,  
(iv) the self-consistent construct of the action instantiates the relevant, 
fundamental symmetries characterizing the experiment and 
(v) the ontological structural realism of RBW collapses the matter-geometry 
dualism,  
 our geometrical quantum mechanics provides for an acausal, global and 
adynamical   understanding of NRQM phenomena. 
4.4 QLE and Blockworld. Our analysis of QLE shows the explanatory necessity of the 
reality of all events—in this case the reality of all phases (past, present and future) of 
the QLE experiment. We can provide an illustrative, though qualitative, summary by 
dividing the QLE into three spatiotemporal phases, as depicted in Figures 11 – 13. In 
the first phase the boxes Z1+, Z1-, Z2+, and Z2- are prepared – without such 
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preparation the MZI is unaffected by their presence. In a sense, the boxes are being 
prepared as detectors since they have the potential to respond to the source (“atom 
absorbs the photon” in the language of dynamism). The second phase is to place the 
four boxes in the MZI per Figure 8 and obtain a D1 or D2 click (null results are 
discarded). The third phase is to remove the four boxes and do spin measurements. 
The entire process is repeated many times with all possible Γ, ∆ and Z spin 
measurements conducted randomly in phase 3. As a result, we note that correlations 
in the spin outcomes after D2 clicks violate Bell’s inequality. 
We are not describing “photons” moving through the MZI or “atoms” whose 
spin-states are being measured. According to our ontology, clicks are evidence not of 
an impinging particle-in-motion, but of rarified spacetime relations which are a 
subset of the dense set comprising the equipment of the experiment. If a Z 
measurement is made on either pair of boxes in phase 3, an inference can be made a 
posteriori as to which box acted as a “silent” detector in phase 2. If Γ and/or ∆ 
measurements are done on each pair (Figure 11), then there is no fact of the matter 
concerning the detector status of the original boxes (boxes had to be recombined to 
make Γ and/or ∆ measurements). This is not simply a function of ignorance because 
if it was possible to identify the “silent” detectors before the Γ and/or ∆ 
measurements were made, the Bell assumptions would be met and the resulting spin 
measurements would satisfy the Bell inequality. Therefore, that none of the four 
boxes can be identified as a detector in phase 2 without a Z measurement in phase 3 
is an ontological, not epistemological, fact and points to the necessity of an “all at 
once” explanation. 
Notice that what obtains in phase 3 “determines” what obtains in phase 2, so 
we have a true “delayed-choice” experiment. For example, suppose box Z2- is probed 
in  
phase 3 (Z measurement) and an event is registered (an “atom resides therein,” Figure 
12). Then, the Z2- and Z1- boxes are understood during phase 3 to be detectors in 
phase 2. However, nothing in the blockworld has “changed” – the beings in phase 2 
have not “become aware” of which boxes are detectors. Neither has anything about 
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the boxes in phase 2 “changed.” According to our view, the various possible 
spatiotemporal distributions of events are each determined by NRQM as a whole 
throughout space and time. 
To further illustrate the blockworld nature of the correlations, suppose we 
make spin measurements after a D1 click. Figure 13 shows a spatiotemporal 
configuration of facts in phases 1, 2 and 3 consistent with a D1 click: 
 
Phase 1: No prep 
Phase 2: Boxes are not detectors, D1 click 
Phase 3: Γ2 measurement, ∆1 measurement, No outcomes. 
One can find correlated spatiotemporal facts by starting in any of the three phases: 
Starting with phase 3, “No outcomes”  “No prep” in phase 1 and “Boxes are not 
detectors” and “D1 click” in phase 2. If you insisted on talking dynamically, you 
could say that the “No outcomes” result of phase 3 determined the “Boxes are not 
detectors” result of phase 2. 
Starting with phase 2, “Boxes are not detectors”  “D1 click” in phase 2, “No prep” 
in phase 1 and “No outcomes” in phase 3.  
Starting with phase 1, “No prep”  “No outcomes” in phase 3 and “Boxes are not 
detectors” and “D1 click” in phase 2.  
One can chart implications from phase 1 to phase 3 then back to phase 2, since the 
order in which we chart implications in a spacetime diagram is meaningless (meta-
temporal) to the blockworld inhabitants. In point of fact the collective characteristics 
in all three phases of QLE are acausally and globally (without attention to any 
common cause principle) determined by the spacetime symmetries of the 
experimental set-up; hence, the explanatory necessity of the blockworld. What 
determines the outcomes in QLE is not given in terms of influences or causes. In this 
way we resolve the quantum liar paradox with RBW by showing how “the paradox” 
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is not only consistent with a blockworld structure, but actually strongly suggests an 
adynamical approach such as ours over interpretations involving dynamical entities 
and their histories. It is the spatiotemporal configuration of QLE as a spacetime 
whole and its spacetime symmetries that determine the outcomes and not constructive 
(a la Einstein) entities with dynamical histories. 
5. CONCLUSION 
According to our Relational Blockworld interpretation of non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics, one can do justice to the non-commutative structure of NRQM 
without being a realist about Hilbert space. The trick is to understand that the 
spacetime of NRQM is a non-separable, relational blockworld that respects locality 
per SR. Accordingly, one should not think of this spacetime as an empty vessel 
waiting to be imbued with worldlines and stress-energy because, per the fundamental 
self-consistency criterion, the concepts of time and space only have meaning in the 
context of trans-temporal objects, and vice-versa. While clicks in detectors are 
perfectly classical events, the clicks are not evidence of constructive quantum entities 
such as particles with worldlines. Rather, the clicks are manifestations of the relations 
composing elements of the experimental configuration as illustrated, for example, by 
the way RBW parses the quantum liar experiment via the irreps of spatial translations 
and reflections. This spacetime respects relativistic locality in that there are no faster-
than-light “influences” or “productive” causes between space-like separated events, 
but it does harbor “all at once” geometric “correlations” outside the lightcone as 
determined acausally, adynamically and globally by the spacetime symmetries. Once 
again, such acausal and adynamical global determination relations do not respect any 
common cause principle. This fact should not bother anyone who has truly 
transcended the idea that the dynamical or causal perspective is the most fundamental 
one.  
In short, unlike Rovelli’s or Mermin’s relationalist accounts of quantum 
mechanics which are still dynamical in nature, RBW employs the spatiotemporal 
relations via symmetries of the entire (past, present and future) experimental 
configuration and is thus fundamentally kinematical. And unlike other BW inspired 
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accounts of quantum mechanics such as BCQM, RBW is truly acausal, adynamical 
and atemporal. As well, unlike other relational accounts, to use Einstein’s language 
RBW characterized as a form of ontological structural realism is a complete break 
with the explanatory fundamentality of constructive (to use Einstein’s term) and 
dynamical explanations.  
While this interpretation of NRQM is strongly supported by the work of 
Kaiser, Anandan, Bohr, Ulfbeck, and Mottelson (referenced extensively herein), we 
are only now researching its implied adynamical, acausal ontology, whereby relations 
are fundamental to relata, at the level fundamental to NRQM via a spatiotemporally 
discrete action. Even though the formalism is incomplete, we have enough to 
speculate on its consequences for quantum gravity (QG). As with G4 and M4, the 
spacetime of general relativity (GR4) is an approximation which holds only in the 
large-order limit of spatiotemporally dense sets of relations. Therefore, we expect the 
GR4 approximation to break down in the realm of rarefied relations between two or 
more spatiotemporally dense sets of relations (each dense set requiring a metric per 
GR), e.g., the exchange of ‘entangled particles’ between stars in different galaxies
121
. 
In such cases, the everywhere separable metric of GR4 (providing continuously a 
distance in the empty space between galaxies) must be superceded by a discrete, non-
separable metric a la that for spatial distance in Eq. 25. This implies the classical 
spacetime metric (for dense relations) is only a statistical approximation. Since 
spatiotemporal relationships can only be self-consistently defined in the context of 
trans-temporal objects, it must be the case that the stress-energy tensor is also a 
statistical approximation. Classically, the stress-energy tensor can be obtained by the 
variation of the matter-energy Lagrangian with respect to the metric, so Einstein’s 
equations are probably a classical limit to the proposed self-consistency criterion for 
space, time and trans-temporal objects of our spatiotemporally discrete formalism  
(Figure 3).  
                                               
121 This is distinct from the regime typically understood for QG, i.e., regions where large energy 
densities give rise to GR singularities. Of course, GR’s physical singularities are avoided via discrete 
formalisms, such as that proposed herein, and they do not require a new limiting case for the discrete 
action, a fortiori they do not imply physics beyond that proposed by RBW. 
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QG so obtained would not be viewed as a fundamental theory of physics. 
Rather, QG in this context is just another limiting case of the (relevant) discrete 
action. Since the discrete action is to be obtained via a self-consistent definition of 
space, time and trans-temporal objects, there is no “problem of time” and we 
automatically have a background independent formulation. Thus, RBW produces a 
new direction for QG research which stems from “two things: the foundations of 
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Figure 6 (Fig. 3, App. 1) 
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Figure 13 (Fig. 9, App. 1) 
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APPENDIX 2. Silberstein, Cifone and Stuckey (2008b), Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics 39: 736—751. 
Why Quantum Mechanics Favors Adynamical and Acausal Interpretations such 











Abstract. We articulate the problems posed by the quantum liar experiment (QLE) for 
backwards causation interpretations of quantum mechanics, time-symmetric accounts 
and other dynamically oriented local hidden variable theories. We show that such 
accounts cannot save locality in the case of QLE merely by giving up “lambda-
independence.” In contrast, we show that QLE poses no problems for our acausal 
Relational Blockworld interpretation of quantum mechanics, which invokes instead 
adynamical global constraints to explain EPR correlations and QLE. We make the 
case that the acausal and adynamical perspective is more fundamental and that 
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Introduction. We believe that (especially if one is interested in saving locality and 
thereby securing consistency with special relativity) certain quantum mechanical 
experiments like the quantum liar experiment (QLE) imply that quantum mechanics 
(QM) is deeply contextual in a way that calls into serious question any common-
cause principle and any account of QM that relies on “interactive-forks” to explain, 
for example, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations (Einstein et al., 1935). Our 
Relational Blockworld interpretation (RBW) has the explanatory capability to handle 
the contextuality (what we shall call “spatiotemporal contextuality”) revealed in QLE 
while also preserving locality. RBW is an adynamical account of non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics (NRQM) that invokes acausal and adynamical global 
constraints and is therefore not in essential conflict with special relativity (SR). 
Unlike Huw Price’s backwards causation QM (BCQM) account (Price, 1996) for 
example, we reject any kind of common-cause principle. Like BCQM and time-
symmetric QM (TSQM)
122
 and various local hidden variable theories
123
, RBW is 
consistent with the denial of the “lambda-independence” assumption (that the past 
states of the hidden variables don’t depend on their future states) in Bell’s Theorem, 
but RBW does not rely on that fact to preserve locality.    
Indeed, what will be made clear is that denying the lambda-independence 
assumption is not sufficient to preserve locality and furthermore that the other 
accounts all fail as complete interpretations, whether on more general grounds such as 
the measurement problem or in their lack of ability to explain QLE with locality 
intact. Section 1 will introduce the reader to RBW, section 2 will show why no extant 
account of BCQM, TSQM or local hidden variable theories more generally can 
clearly explain QLE while maintaining locality and section 3 will summarize the 
RBW acausal global constraint account of QLE.  
                                               
122 There are many varieties of TSQM now in the literature. To name a few: there is the “two-vector” 
reconstruction of QM advocated by Aharonov and his collaborators (see e.g. Aharonov et al. 2002), 
which centers around the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz-rule (1964)—hereafter, “TSQM-ABL”, the 
“transactional interpretation” (Cramer 1980, 1986), and the recent version of TSQM by K.B. Wharton 
(2007), which claims to be “the first attempt to combine the symmetric aspects of … previous 
proposals”. Wharton’s proposal applies “two symmetric boundary conditions [as with TSQM-ABL] 
onto a time-symmetric version of the Schrödinger equation [as with Cramer’s interpretation]” (ibid., 
160).  
123 See Lewis (2006) and (2007) for example. 
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1. RBW: Radically Archimedean Physics.  
1.1. Blockhead Dreams. Others have suggested that we ought to take the fact of 
blockworld (BW) seriously when doing physics and modeling reality. For example, 
Huw Price
 
(1996, p. 4) calls it the “Archimedean view from nowhen” and it has 
motivated him to take seriously the idea of a time-symmetric quantum mechanics and 
so-called backwards causation in quantum mechanics. As he says in his book 
defending BCQM: “the aim of the book is to explore the consequences of the block 
universe view in physics and philosophy” (Price, 1996, p. 15). Price is attempting to 
construct a local hidden-variables interpretation of NRQM that explains EPR 
correlations with purely time-like dynamics or backwards causation. According to 
Price, BCQM provides an explanation of the Bell correlations “which shows that they 
are not really non-local at all, in that they depend on purely local interactions between 
particles and measuring devices concerned. They seem non-local only if we overlook 
the present relevance of future interactions”(Price, 1996, p. 224). The key explanatory 
move that Price makes is to have information travel backwards along the light-cones 
of the two EPR particles, converging at the source of the entangled state. Presumably, 
this is the point in spacetime where the entangled state is “prepared.” The picture we 
must think of is this: the future measurement interaction in separate wings of an EPR 
apparatus is the cause of the (earlier) entangled state, so the point at which they are 
created is the “effect” of a causal chain “originating” with the measurement 
interaction. That is, the effect of the causal chain originating with the measurement 
interaction is the directions in which the spin-components of the particles have 
determinate values at the point at which they are created. This is to put the point 
directly in terms of backwards causation. The arrow of causation does not point from 
one spacelike separated wing of the apparatus to the other, across space, but rather it 
points backwards in time to the point at which the particles are created—indeed, there 
are causal “influences” flowing in both directions along the particle trajectories.   
 The connection between BCQM or even time-symmetric accounts of the 
quantum and the BW seems straightforward at first: in a BW the state preparations 
and measurement outcomes are equally real, i.e., already “there” (which is not to say 
equally present). Thus, since a dynamic interpretation or explanation of the BW 
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picture is secondary in some sense, one might as well claim the measurement 
outcomes “effect the state preparations” rather than the converse. However, upon 
inspection, it isn’t obvious that BW entails BCQM or the reverse: a theory of 
causation is required for starters. Of course it may seem trivial to explain the 
outcomes of quantum experiments (or anything else) using the BW. After all, one 
could answer any question in this vein by saying something like “it’s all just there in 
the BW, end of story” (see Barrett 2005). In order to avoid trivializing the BW 
explanation, BW motivated interpretations of NRQM invoke clever devices such as 
time-like backwards causation, advanced action
 
and the two-vector formalism. Do 
these beautiful and clever devices really avoid the charge of triviality and do they 
really involve the BW hypothesis essentially? An answer in the negative will be given 
in section 2.  
We can’t speak for Price and others, but for us the BW motivation is not just 
about preserving locality, nor even just peaceful co-existence with the relativity of 
simultaneity, but rather it is our belief that taking the BW seriously suggests the 
possibility for radically “Archimedean” solutions to many of the problems in QM, 
such as how to interpret EPR correlations and the measurement problem. Thus we are 
bothered by the fact that BCQM and TSQM explanations are no less dynamical than 
standard quantum mechanics, which is puzzling if part of the original blockworld 
motivation for such accounts is that the BW lacks absolute change and becoming. As 
far we know, only Cramer speaks to this worry directly. Cramer notes that the 
backwards-causal elements of his theory are “only a pedagogical convention,” and 
that in fact “the process is atemporal” (Cramer, 1986, 661). In all fairness, Price 
(2007) does emphasize the “perspectival” nature of causal explanations. BCQM and 
the like, even having acknowledged the potential explanatory importance of BW, 
have not, as will become clear, gone far enough in their atemporal, acausal and 
adynamical thinking. Whereas such accounts are willing to think backwardly, 
temporally speaking, it is still essentially dynamical, temporal thinking. All of this 
poses a dilemma, to exploit BW in an essential and non-trivial way to explain 
quantum effects while preserving locality. As we will see in sections 2 and 3, 
dynamically unfettered BW thinking will be mandatory for explaining QLE.  
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We rather believe the key to rendering a BW explanation essential and 
nontrivial is to provide an algorithm for the relevant BW construction. Thus, the 
answer to: “Why did event X follow Y and Z?” is not merely, “Because X is already 
‘there’ in the future of Y and Z per the BW,” but as we will illustrate, “Because this 
must be the spatiotemporal relationship of X, Y and Z in the BW per the self-
consistent definition of the entities involved in X, Y and Z.” If one chooses to read 
dynamical stories from a BW picture, they may where necessary or feasible. 
However, BW descriptions are not limited to the depiction of dynamical/causal 
phenomena, so they are not constrained to dynamical/causal storytelling. In the 
following passage Dainton paints a suggestive picture of what it means to take the 
BW perspective seriously both ontologically and methodologically: 
Imagine that I am a God-like being who has decided to design and then create 
a logically consistent universe with laws of nature similar to those that obtain 
in our universe…Since the universe will be of the block-variety I will have to 
create it as a whole: the beginning, middle and end will come into being 
together…Well, assume that our universe is a static block, even if it never 
‘came into being’, it nonetheless exists (timelessly) as a coherent whole, 
containing a globally consistent spread of events. At the weakest level, 
“consistency” here simply means that the laws of logic are obeyed, but in the 
case of universes like our own, where there are universe-wide laws of nature, 
the consistency constraint is stronger: everything that happens is in accord 
with the laws of nature. In saying that the consistency is “global” I mean that 
the different parts of the universe all have to fit smoothly together, rather like 
the pieces of a well-made mosaic or jigsaw puzzle (Dainton, 2001, 119).  
Does reality contain phenomena which strongly suggest an acausal-global-constraint-
BW-algorithm? According to RBW, standard EPR correlations, other quantum 
oddities such as eraser experiments and the delayed choice experiment for example 
provide reason to answer in the affirmative, but QLE demands such an answer 
especially if locality is to be preserved and consistency with SR maintained. NRQM a 
la RBW is one algorithm for depicting the self-consistent placement of such 
phenomena as EPR and QLE in a blockworld, as will be illustrated via the quantum 
liar experiment itself. Likewise, attempting to explain all QM phenomena via 
dynamism precludes certain unique blockworld explanations rendered by RBW (e.g., 
Stuckey et al., 2008). Thus, the dynamical perspective is overly constrained because 
it constitutes only a proper subset of all possible BW-compatible explanations; 
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dynamical reality is only a proper subset of a spatiotemporally contextual reality 
given globally and some QM phenomena are “mysterious” simply because they’re not 




1.2. Overview of RBW. RBW provides an account of QM that resolves all the 
foundational issues therein (see Stuckey et al. 2008 for details). RBW rejects any 
kind of common-cause principle, i.e., the claim that every systematic quantum 
correlation between events is due to a cause that they share whether in the past or 
future. QM detector clicks are not evidence of microscopic dynamical/diachronic 
entities (with “thusness” as Einstein would say) propagating through space and 
impinging on the detector. Rather, detector clicks evidence rarefied subsets of 
geometric relations comprising the source, detector, beam splitters, mirrors, etc. in the 
entire worldtube of the experimental arrangement from initiation to outcomes (as in 
the case of entanglement), in an “all at once” fashion. Because for RBW, to borrow 
from Mermin (1998, p. 755), it is “relations all the way down” (relations not relata are 
the fundamentals as we ultimately express graph theoretically in Stuckey et al. 2008) 
and because our account is foundationally adynamical in that blockworld is essential 
to the story (the deepest explanation for quantum phenomena is not Schrödinger 
dynamics, i.e., we take the entire history of a system as the explanans and 
explanandum via acausal global determination relations), we call it the Relational 
Blockworld. Dynamical entities and dynamical laws are emergent features in our 
view, not fundamental
125
. Unlike the Everettian “quantum block” of Saunders (1993), 
RBW does not require the actuality of all outcomes and indeed adopts a kind of neo-
statistical interpretation with respect to Schrödinger dynamics
 126
.   
                                               
124 Phenomena begging to be explained in terms of acausal and adynamical global constraints are not 
limited to the quantum. For example, we think this is the right way to explain closed-time-like curves 
(CTCs) as well, rather than as a failure of dynamical determinism as such. 
125 See Stuckey et al. (2008) for the RBW account of an adynamical theory (formalized using discrete 
graph theory) fundamental to both QM and GR that unifies the two and from which both “emerge” in 
an adynamical fashion.  
126
 See Stuckey et al. (2008) for the complete details on exactly how RBW fully resolves the QM 
measurement problem, but suffice it to say that the wavefunction description of a quantum system can 
be interpreted statistically because we now understand that, as far as measurement outcomes are 
concerned, the Born distribution has a basis in the spacetime symmetries of the experimental 
configuration. Each “click,” which some would say corresponds to the impingement of a particle onto 
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The ontology of RBW is best characterized as a form of ontological structural 
realism (see Stuckey et al. 2008 for details). While non-separable, RBW upholds 
locality in the sense that there is no action at a distance, no instantaneous dynamical 
or causal connection between space-like separated events and there are no space-like 
worldlines.  As we said, RBW preserves locality with a non-separable geometric 
ontology of relations. The next section shows why QLE is problematic for BCQM, 
TSQM and local hidden variable accounts.        
 
2. Quantum Liar: Trouble for BCQM, TSQM and Local Hidden Variables. In 
Elitzur and Dolev’s (ED) “quantum liar” experiment (Elitzur and Dolev, 2005), 
extrapolating from the work of Elitzur and Vaidman (1993) and Lucian Hardy (1992, 
1993, 1994), ED show how “atoms” may be brought into an EPR state for which 
there is no causal connection between them in the past or the future. To see this, 
consider Figs. 1 and 2, as discussed by Elitzur and Dolev (2005). This is an example 
of an “interaction free” measurement (IFM), in the sense that no interaction is 
required to extract information about the atom’s state in this situation. We can 
summarize QLE by saying that it combines EPR-entanglement a la IFM (defying any 
common-cause principle) with a delayed-choice component. As follows, we can 
divide QLE into three distinct spatiotemporal phases: (1) prepare the boxes with the 
atoms, (2) place the boxes in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) and turn on the 
lasers (Fig. 2), (3) remove the boxes after a D click and perform spin measurements 
on the atoms therein (if there is a C click or no click, then you must return to phase 1 
and begin again). To describe the first phase of the experiment, let there be two atoms 
in the |X+〉 spin state, which by QM we know is a superposition of its Z-spin states, 
                                                                                                                                      
a measurement device with probability computed from the wavefunction, corresponds to spacetime 
relations in the context of the experimental configuration. The measurement problem exploits the 
possibility of extending the wavefunction description from the quantum system to the whole 
measurement apparatus, whereas the “all at once” description according to RBW already includes the 
apparatus via the spacetime symmetries instantiated by the entire experimental configuration from 
initiation to outcomes. The measurement problem is therefore a non-starter on our view. The 
measurement problem arises because of the assumption that the dynamics are the deepest part of the 
explanatory story, the very heart of quantum mechanics, an assumption RBW rejects. In short, RBW 




Z− and Z+. Let this superposition be spatially divided into two separate boxes, one 
box containing the Z+ outcome and one box containing the Z- outcome. Each atoms’ 
spin is now spatially divided according to its respective (though superposed) spin-
state, Z− and Z+. To describe the second phase of the experiment, let there be two 
coherent laser-sources (denoted S1 and S2) directed at two distant detectors (called D 
and C); and let there also be a beam-splitter between the beams and the detectors 
(equidistant between them). We arrange the laser-sources such that one beam passes 
through one box: S1’s beam through Z1+ while S2’s beam passes through Z2 –. With 
no potentially obstructing atoms in the beams’ way, the lasers are set to constructively 
interfere at path c, while destructively at path d. As ED show, the mere uncertainty in 
“which box” information suffices to entangle the atoms in the familiar EPR state 
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We can infer this because: 1) a D click entails one and only one of the beams is 
blocked thereby thwarting destructive interference, 2) a D click implies that one of 
the atoms was in its ‘blocking box’ and the other in its ‘non-blocking box’ and thus 3) 
the mere uncertainty about which atom is in which box entangles them in the EPR 






       
         Table 1 
 
Given phase 2 has produced the state in Eq. 1 per a D click, we conduct the 
third phase of the experiment which is to “recombine” the spatially separated boxes 
(say, under a reverse magnetic field) and make random spin measurements on the 
atoms in the Γ, ∆ and Z directions (Fig. 4) as detailed by Mermin (1981). We will 
Particle 1Particle 2C-click D-click
Z+ Z+ 50% 50%
Z+ Z- 0% 0%
Z- Z+ 100% 0%
Z- Z- 50% 50%
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repeat phases 1-3 many times such that all combinations of the three spin direction 
measurements are performed. If we amass the results from all trials and check for 
correlations, we find that Bell’s inequality is violated which indicates the Z 
component of spin cannot be inferred as ‘a matter of definite but unknown fact’ in 
trials prior to Γ and/or ∆ measurements. This is not consistent with the apparent 
“matter of fact” that a “silent” detector must have existed in one of the MZI arms in 
order to obtain a D click, which entangled the atoms in the first place.  
 As ED point out, a “puzzling situation now emerges:”  
In 5/9 of the cases
 
 … (assuming random choices of measurement 
directions) one of the atoms will be subjected to a Z measurement – 
namely, checking in which box it resides. Suppose, then, that the first 
atom was found in the intersecting box [Fig. 2]. This seems to imply 
that no photon has ever crossed that path, which is obstructed by the 
atom. But then, by Bell’s proof, the other atom is still affected by the 
measurement of the first atom. But then again, if no photon has 
interacted with the first atom, the two atoms share no causal 
connection, in either past of future! (Elitzur and Dolev, 2005, 343). 
 
The moral of this experimental possibility is that entanglement may be generated 
when there is no interactive point in spacetime by which we may argue that the pair 
was coordinated. In other words, the mere fact that the particles are arranged in a 
certain way, in conjunction with the fact that a photon’s path might effectively 
“measure” in which box our atoms reside, suffices to generate entanglement. But as 
should be clear by now, the situation is weirder than that. To put the point more 
acutely, Elitzur and Dolev (2005, p. 344) conclude their exposition of the paradox 
with the observation that: The very fact that one atom is positioned in a place that 
seems to preclude its interaction with the other atom leads to its being affected by 
that other atom. In other words, there must be a fact of the matter concerning the Z 
spins (i.e., a fact of the matter about the positions of the atoms in the boxes) in order 
to produce a state (entanglement via a D click) in which certain subsequent EPR spin 
measurements imply there was no fact of the matter for the Z spins. One is tempted to 
say that the atoms are entangled IFF they are not.  
Let’s use the QLE experiment to define a particular kind of contextuality 
which is contained in QM – spacetime contextuality – and distinguish this kind from 
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others, which are more properly called contextuality of quantum states or property-
contextuality
127
. Spatiotemporal contextuality implies that entanglement can be 
generated via the spatiotemporal configuration of the experimental set-up in a way 
not explicable by any kind of common-cause principle and whose deepest explanation 
therefore requires invoking the entire actual history of the experiment in question. 
The spacetime contextuality embodied by QLE poses serious problems for BCQM, 
and raises very important questions for the view. As will become even clearer in 
section 3, whether or not Z spin has definite values is a function of spatiotemporal 
context, a fact that would never be revealed were one handed the boxes for phase 3 
measurements without knowledge of how the EPR state had been created in phases 1 
and 2.  
 The way that BCQM was envisioned by Price seems to rely – crucially – on 
EPR experiments of an “interactive-fork” sort, as we can easily see in Fig. 3. Such 
configurations allow for a natural causal interpretation of the violation of lambda-
independence in the sense that we can take there to be information causally 
transmitted along the back light-cone of the particles that will be (separately) 
measured. Causation is a backwards, time-like, entity-/particle-carried sort of process. 
In this case, as Price says, an explanation of EPR: 
does not seem to call for any new field or bearer of the influence that 
one measurement exerts on another. If we think of the fate of a particle 
as a property of that particle – a property which has a bearing on the 
results of its interaction with its twin – then the particles themselves 
‘convey’ the relevant influence to its common effect at the point at 
which they separate. (Price, 1996, 247). 
 
The obvious problem QLE poses is the lack of an interactive-fork – how does atom 
#1 “know” what atom #2 is doing? How is the correlation going to be (locally) pulled 
off if the particles share no causal connection in the past or future? We think this 
worry might rule out BCQM and TSQM accounts in principle, but to be charitable 
perhaps some specific mechanism could overcome it.  
                                               
127 E.g., the contextuality associated with the Kochen-Spekker Theorem. Notice that “spatiotemporal 
contextuality” may be related to KS-type contextuality, but since we’re not interested in the properties 
of quantum states per se, but rather their placement in the context of a particular spatiotemporal 




However, since no ontology is supplied, we just don’t know how the trick is 
going to be pulled off: the devil is in the details. As Callender pointed out, Price’s 
BCQM suffers from not being a full-on interpretation: it’s better called an 
“interpretation schemata” (Callender, 1998). To be a full-on interpretation requires 
that: 
the QM formalism [be supplemented] with an ontology and with some 
plausible physical laws describing how this ontology behaves. This is 
a highly non-trivial task, requiring that one devise a ‘natural-looking’ 
theory that reproduces the phenomena described and predicted by QM. 
(ibid., p.155). 
 
And without this, we have no physical story which underwrites the probabilities – we 
have no idea what the probabilities are probabilities of. It’s one thing to show – as 
Price does – that probabilities satisfying locality (i.e., by violating lambda-
independence) are mathematically possible in principle with the addition of some 
hidden variable to the QM formalism. But it is quite another to show what that hidden 
variable physically is (that’s what an ontology does) such that we may understand 
how the probabilities are physically realized
128
. One thing seems certain, any account 
of BCQM, TSQM, etc., that requires interaction (some sort of common-cause 
principle) such as an “interactive-fork” to explain entanglement will run afoul of 
QLE.   
 There exist at least three potential instances of BCQM-type views that 
(possibly) meet the desiderata for a specific mechanism suggested above: Cramer’s 
“transactional” interpretation (TI) and a version of Time-Symmetric QM centered on 
the now well-known “ABL rule,” which we’ll denote as “TSQM-ABL.” The last, and 
perhaps most interesting, is Peter Lewis’ recent local hidden-variables theory based 
on the “many-histories” approach to QM, which he calls the “single-history” 
interpretation based on the fact that he is able to dispense with all but a single-history 
– the actual one. Unfortunately, Cramer and TSQM fail to provide us with an 
                                               
128 Recall Butterfield’s comment that “physical reality requires something more than just successfully 
modeling the given statistics” and his important distinction between “mathematically possible” 
probabilities and “physically real” probabilities. See Butterfield (1992, p. 78); see also Dickson (1997, 
p. 143ff.) for a discussion. BCQM certainly demonstrates the former, whereas the latter is more 
obscure – and especially in the case of QLE. 
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ontology that obviously and clearly satisfies Einstein locality, whereas Lewis’ view 
faces a number of troubling dilemmas. 
2.1. TSQM-ABL and the Transactional Interpretation. Both Cramer’s “transactional” 
interpretation and the “two-vector” or the TSQM-ABL interpretation supply a 
concrete physical story to the abstract BCQM interpretation schemata. TSQM-ABL 
applies a time-symmetric boundary condition to individual quantum states, and thus 
is open to a worry about whether or not there are any non-local influences exchanged 
between entangled elements at space-like separation in the context of the puzzling 
QLE. This is because TSQM-ABL is (most plausibly) read as an “influences” 
instance of BCQM, as Ruth Kastner notes (1999, p. 237)
129
 and because it’s unclear 
how the time-symmetric boundary condition itself is sufficient to explain the acausal 
local generation of EPR in QLE – especially if we stick to ordinary particles and their 
behavior according to the dynamics of TSQM, as most TSQM-ABL advocates do. 
 According to TSQM-ABL, an individual quantum state is one that has been 
pre- and post-selected, that is, as one to which we have applied an initial and final 
boundary condition (the initial boundary condition being the preparation event itself, 
and the final event its measurement). Thus, when we have an EPR correlation, if the 
TSQM-ABL view is to save locality, it must be the case that upon measurement, 
information about that measurement travels back in time to converge on the EPR 
state, thereby supplying that state with the requisite future boundary condition. In the 
case of QLE, such a convergence point in spacetime is absent, so TSQM-ABL faces 
the same general worry that was raised for BCQM at the beginning of this section: 
how do particles that share no causal connection in the past or the future 
communicate this future boundary condition to each other? By what local process is 
the time-symmetry of this EPR state generated? 
 Cramer’s view is slightly different on this score: his is one where the 
wavefunction is taken realistically and time-symmetrically. In the case of a simple 
                                               
129 Note that Kastner, following Sharp and Shanks (1993), argues quite convincingly against a 
counterfactual reading of the ABL rule central to TSQM-ABL, calling into question a counterfactual 
dependency notion of causation in this case (or at least suggesting that an account of causation in terms 
of counterfactual dependency cannot be tied to ABL itself). This seems to block the possibility of 




EPR set-up (Fig. 3), we have an “offer-wave(function)” and a “retarded-
wave(function)” sent out from the point where the initial wavefunction 
(corresponding to the EPR state) is emitted (the source) and the point where it is 
absorbed (the detectors). A “transaction” is completed once both “offer” and 
“retarded” waves meet and they bounce back and forth until all the boundary 
conditions are met. But notice that this view simply puts the burden of saving 
Einstein locality onto the wavefunction itself. Consider the case of QLE in Fig. 2 
(granting for the moment that Cramer’s view can be coherently applied to this 
particular case). The crucial question is, what brings about the EPR correlation when 
neither correlated partner has shared a causal connection anywhere in spacetime? 
Even if the wavefunction of the photon brings about the EPR correlation between 
atoms 1 and 2, the photon’s wavefunction will be spread out in spacetime, 
encompassing both atoms. Thus, if the photon’s wavefunction is the medium of 
transmission, or the mechanism that brings about the correlation, it is non-local: one 
region of spacetime is non-locally connected to another via the photon’s 
wavefunction. Given that neither atom shares a connection with the other in the past 
or future, then this looks to be, again, a case of side-to-side non-locality, not merely 
“temporal” non-locality. The upshot of all this is that denying lambda-independence 
(what Price calls ‘µ-innocence’) is not sufficient to save locality. 
2.2. Lewis’ “single history” approach. Lewis’ view (2007) lends itself to two very 
different interpretations: (1) a toy model of a universal wavefunction fundamentalism 
view without collapse (based on Gell-Mann and Hartle’s (GH) “many histories” 
interpretation, which is itself a variation of Everett’s view) modified by a hidden-
variable. It is a toy model in that it models time as discrete at a scale at which there is 
no physical motivation for doing so. He doesn’t say what the hidden variables are 
explicitly, but rather regards the many-histories formalism as a recipe for generating 
(time-discrete) hidden variable theories, and says “pick one of the hidden variable 
theories so generated.” Regarding the hidden variable he suggests the following: use 







 seconds (i.e., the “Ghirardi ontology”). Thus we have a wavefunction 
evolving continuously without collapse, in addition to a stop-motion coarse-grained 
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history, which attaches determinate mass densities to little boxes every 10e
-5
 seconds. 
The theory generates many such histories and a probability distribution over them, 
but only one such history is actual. The hidden variable (the stop-motion history) puts 
macroscopic objects at determinate locations and thus determinate measurement 
results are achieved.          
  Though he doesn’t say so explicitly in the article, Lewis admits he will 
need the actual history of the entire universe (past, present and future) as the hidden 
variable in order to preserve locality. This will yield a superdeterministic picture a la 
Bell in that the past doesn’t determine the future, but there are facts about it anyway. 
As he says, it’s (trivially) local, but violates Bell’s independence condition. Lewis 
supplies a recipe for picking out a single history as the actual one, from the many sets 
of mutually decoherent histories implied by the GH view (Lewis, 2007, p. 1463). 
While the details of this recipe are not relevant here, what is important is how Lewis’ 
view satisfies locality. Lewis claims that the single-history approach 
“straightforwardly ascribes probabilities to the histories” and that “since there is no 
interference between histories [in a simple case where the universe consists of just a 
single EPR experiment] … [the] probabilities are exactly the standard Born 
probabilities, and hence violate the Bell inequality” (ibid., p. 1466). Lewis also shows 
that his view satisfies “side-to-side” locality: the probability of the outcomes of 
measurements on the left-side of an EPR set-up are independent of those on the right-
side (recall Fig. 3). The view circumvents Bell’s theorem by denying “independence” 
in the sense that: 
the hidden variables that determine the outcome on the left are not 
independent of the orientation of the measuring device on the left. 
More precisely, the hidden variables in the single-history case – 
constituted by the actual history of the universe – only determine the 
outcomes for measurements that are actually performed along that 
history. (ibid, p. 1466.) 
 
The trick that gets Lewis out of the interactive-fork problem faced by BCQM is that 
he takes causation to be merely counterfactual dependency in the case where others 
wish to postulate a backwards causation “mechanism,” influence or process. He 
writes: “since the current hidden variables of the particles would have been different 
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if the future measurements on the particles had been different, one should say that the 
future measurements causally influence the current hidden variables” (ibid., p. 1467) 
in the sense that the states of the hidden variables counterfactually depend on future 
measurement acts. Thus, no influence need be realized by particles, or some new sort 
of entity; no information needs to be physically carried along a path in spacetime – 
causation qua counterfactual dependence is all the causation you need.   
As Lewis suggests himself, there are two ways to interpret even this first horn 
of his interpretative dilemma (interpretation 1): as an instance of BCQM a la 
counterfactual causal dependence or take the violation of “independence” to be “an 
instance of an acausal constraint on the distribution of events in the universe” (ibid., 
p. 1466). The first interpretation strikes us as no less trivial than merely asserting the 
fact of BW, causation as counterfactual dependence is metaphysically cheap and does 
not advance the actual physics of the situation per our previous discussion. Lewis 
might reply that the many histories machinery makes it non-trivial but unfortunately 
several tough questions arise here. First and foremost, when it comes to explaining 
quantum phenomena and preserving locality, why exactly does the many histories 
machinery make his view any less trivial than merely asserting BW as the 
explanation? There appears to be no story here about how the wavefunction explains 
or gives rise to the actual history. Suppose we want to know what makes one and only 
one of the many histories actual from the set of possible histories? On Lewis’ view 
this is just a brute fact. Suppose we want to know what underwrites or explains the 
counterfactual dependencies invoked to save locality? Same answer, those relations 
are just a brute fact. Since this is presumably a form of wavefunction fundamentalism 
the lack of answers here is distressing. Furthermore, since he acknowledges the 
necessity and reality of BW and blockworlds by definition don’t come into and go out 
of existence, it’s hard to see in principle how the universal wavefunction could 
explain its existence in any robust or productive sense of explanation, that is, it’s very 
hard to resist being a Humean about dynamical laws in a BW setting. Lewis can and 
does say the following about the wavefunction: The quantum state determines the set 
of histories via the Gell-Mann-Hartle formalism—one history is actual (end of story). 
The wavefunction encodes entanglement, which functions as a constraint on histories, 
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but beyond that the wavefunction explains nothing. Of course, even a wavefuction 
anti-realist or instrumentalist can sign on to this talk about “encoding,” so one would 
like more. Finally, it seems like the hidden variable (mass density in small cubes) is 
doing the real ontological work on Lewis’ view.   
Wavefunction fundamentalism aside, if talk of “counterfactual dependence” is 
going provide a non-trivial local explanation for EPR and QLE, then we are owed a 
story as to what underwrites the dependency. More generally, the merely 
philosophical move of employing a counterfactual account of causation in this 
context does not solve the real physical and metaphysical quandary as to whether or 
not Einstein causality is violated by EPR and QLE—in order to answer this question 
we need an interpretation with the physical details elaborated. That is, both 
counterfactual accounts of causation and the BW are compatible with both local and 
non-local interpretations of QM and neutral with respect to whether or not EPR 
correlations conflict with the relativity of simultaneity.    
The second “interpretation” (acausal global constraints) of interpretation (1) 
of Lewis’ view obviously strikes us as the right way to go in principle but again, to 
avoid the charge of triviality and all the other problems of the first interpretation of 
(1), one must underwrite the global constraints in an acausal and adynamical fashion 
and that means providing some sort of account (such as an adynamical and acausal 
hidden variable other than the universe itself!) that supercedes or relinquishes 
wavefunction realism and the like. What gives rise to the locality preserving acausal 
global constraints (what are they and where do they come from) such that the 
measurement problem, etc., is not a worry? Whatever the answer to this question, by 
definition, it can’t be found in the dynamics (e.g., the wavefunction) alone—on any 
interpretation of the dynamics. Not only does invoking acausal and adynamical global 
constraints to save locality entail providing some story fundamental to the dynamics, 
but on pain of triviality it also requires something fundamental to the fact of BW 
itself. And again, BW by itself does not imply locality, it depends on the nature of the 
BW in question. In other words, Lewis provides no story of what the locality 




Lewis in conversation has kindly suggested just such an alternative and that’s 
interpretation (2) of Lewis. On this account, the claim is that classical macroscopic 
objects (tables, chairs, pointers) supervene on the hidden variables and not on the 
wavefunction. Given the mass density ontology, the fundamental stuff that makes up 
the observable world is a mass density distribution, not the wavefunction. On this 
second interpretation, the wavefunction is just a convenient way of expressing the 
constraints on the possible histories of the world, nothing more. The possible histories 
of the world are possible ways the mass density distribution could evolve, one of 
them is actual—that’s what underlies everything we see. Obviously, this is not a form 
of wavefunction fundamentalism. There is just a single history of the world, and the 
wavefunction doesn’t explain it in any causal or production sense. Rather, the 
wavefunction explains our epistemic situation as creatures in this BW. 
It should be clear that Lewis (2) has many of the same problems as Lewis (1). 
We still only know that the wavefunction encodes various kinds of information and 
explains our situatedness in the BW, but we don’t know why this is the case, and we 
don’t know what if anything beyond mere phenomenology connects the wavefunction 
and the BW. That is, we have been provided neither an explanation for quantum 
mechanics nor for other features of the BW, let alone a unifying explanation of 
relativity and the quantum. Talk of macroscopic objects supervening on the mass 
density distribution is no less trivial than merely asserting it’s a BW and everything is 
just “there,” again, the real hidden variable here is the entire actual history of the 
universe, period. And again, we still have not been provided a story about the acausal 
global constraints, nor a clear non-trivial story about why or how locality is preserved 
beyond the invocation of counterfactual causal dependencies. As the next section 
shows, RBW has answers to all these questions with no lacunae. As seen in the next 
section, RBW does provide an “underwriting” story for the acausal global constraints 
and the probability distribution. 
 
3. An RBW Model of QLE. By limiting any account of QLE to a story about the 
interactions of objects or entities in spacetime (such as the intersection of point-
particle-worldlines, or an everywhere-continuous process connecting two or more 
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worldlines), it is on the face of it difficult to account for IFM given entanglement and 
preserve locality since, naively, a necessary condition for an “interaction” per particle 
or thing based physics is the “intersection of two or more worldlines.” However since 
the entire spatiotemporal configuration of the IFM in QLE “generated” the 
entanglement, we can use spacetime symmetries to model the entire spacetime 
configuration of the experiment in a non-trivial way so as to predict and explain the 
EPR correlations in QLE (Stuckey et al., 2008).   
Since spatiotemporal relations provide the ontological basis for our geometric 
interpretation of quantum theory, spacetime symmetries provide the explanation (qua 
mathematical description) of quantum phenomena. That is, the distribution of clicks 
at the detectors reflects the spatiotemporal relationships between the source, beam 
splitters, mirrors, and detectors as described by the spacetime symmetry group – 
spatial translations and reflections in this case. The relevant 2D irreducible 
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respectively, in the eigenbasis of T, and these are the fundamental elements of our 
geometric description of the MZI in the Heisenberg formalism. In Stuckey et al. 
(2008) we show the density operator of an experimental configuration can be 
obtained from the “past, present and future” of the entire spatiotemporal configuration 
a la the spacetime symmetries of the experimental set-up: from the initiation of the 
experiment to its outcomes (as is clear also, for example, in our path-integral 
formalism). Since, with this ontology of spatiotemporal relations, the matter-
geometry dualism has been collapsed per ontological structural realism such that both 
“object” and “influence” reduce to spacetime relations for the purposes of modeling 
QLE. In our path integral approach, for example, “entanglement” is seen as correlated 
outcomes in an “all at once” description of the experiment per the symmetries of the 
action (Stuckey and Silberstein, 2008). Note there is no mention of photon 
interference here. We are simply describing the distribution of events (clicks) in 
spacetime (spatial projection, rest frame of MZI) using the fundamental ingredients in 
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this type of explanation, i.e., spacetime symmetries (spatial translations and 
reflections in the MZI, rotations in the case of spin measurements). What it means to 
“explain” a phenomenon in this context is to provide the distribution of spacetime 
events per the spacetime symmetries relevant to the experimental configuration, so 
RBW constitutes an acausal and adynamical characterization and global (kinematical 
or geometrical) explanation of entanglement.  
3.1 Relata and Relations. Since RBW is predicated upon the claim that dynamic 
entities, e.g., particles and fields, are not ontologically fundamental, it is incumbent 
upon us to provide, if only heuristically, a means by which dynamic entities might be 
constructed via relations. We have done so elsewhere (Stuckey and Silberstein, 2008) 
using a discrete path integral formalism over graphs based on the self-consistent 
definition of trans-temporal objects, space and time. In summary, self-consistency 
principle  discrete action  symmetry amplitude (“discrete transition amplitude” in 
the parlance of quantum field theory). This provides conceptually, if not analytically, 
a basis for the RBW ontology and methodology, enumerated as follows: 
1. Each piece of equipment in an experimental set-up results from a large 
number of spatiotemporally dense relations, so low-intensity sources and 
high-sensitivity detectors must be used to probe the realm of rarefied 
relations described by QM.  
2. A “detector click” is a subset of the detector that also results from a large 
number of spatiotemporally dense relations; we infer the existence of a 
rarified set of relations between the source and the detector at the beginning 
of the click’s worldline.  
3. It is this inferred, rarified set of relations for which we compute the 
symmetry amplitude.  
4. A symmetry amplitude must be computed for each of all possible click 
locations (experimental outcomes) and this calculation must include (tacitly 
if not explicitly) all relevant information concerning the spacetime 
relationships (e.g., distances and angles) and property-defining relations 
(e.g., degree of reflectivity) for the experimental equipment per the action. 
5. The relative probability of any particular experimental outcome can then be 
determined by squaring the symmetry amplitude for each configuration 




3.2 QLE and Blockworld. Our analysis of QLE shows the explanatory necessity of the 
reality of all events—in this case the reality of all phases of the QLE experiment. We 
can provide an illustrative, though qualitative, summary by referring to three phases 
of QLE in Figs. 5 and 6. Again, in the first phase the boxes Z1+, Z1-, Z2+, and Z2 – are 
prepared (turned into “silent” detectors of sorts), in the second phase the four boxes 
are placed in the MZI per Fig. 2 and a D click is obtained, and in the third phase the 
boxes are subjected to EPR spin measurements (Fig. 4). 
We are not describing “photons” moving through the MZI or “atoms” whose 
spin-states are being measured. According to our ontology, clicks are evidence not of 
an impinging particle-in-motion, but of rarified relations which are a subset of the 
dense set comprising the equipment of the experiment. If a Z measurement is made 
on either pair of boxes in phase 3, an inference can be made a posteriori as to which 
box acted as a “silent” detector in phase 2 (Fig. 6). If Γ and/or ∆ measurements are 
done on each pair (Fig. 5), then there is no fact of the matter concerning the detector 
status of the original boxes. This is not simply a function of ignorance because if it 
was possible to identify the “silent” detectors before the Γ and/or ∆ measurements 
were made, the Bell assumptions would be met and the resulting spin measurements 
would satisfy the Bell inequality. Therefore, that none of the four boxes can be 
identified as a detector in phase 2 without a Z measurement in phase 3 is an 
ontological, not epistemological, fact and points to the necessity of, if you will, an 
“all at once” BW explanation. Notice that what obtains in phase 3 “determines” what 
obtains in phase 2, so we have a true “delayed-choice” experiment. For example, 
suppose box Z2 – is probed in phase 3 (Z measurement) and an event is registered (an 
“atom resides therein,” Fig. 6). Then, the Z2 – and Z1 – boxes are understood during 
phase 3 to be detectors in phase 2. However, nothing in the blockworld has “changed” 
– the beings in phase 2 have not “become aware” of which boxes are detectors. 
Neither has anything about the boxes in phase 2 “changed.” According to our view, 
the various possible spatiotemporal distributions of events are each determined by 
QM as a whole throughout space and time.      
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Conclusion. In Figs. 5 & 6, one can chart implications from phase 1 to phase 3 then 
back to phase 2, since the order in which we chart implications in a spacetime 
diagram is meaningless (meta-temporal) to the blockworld  inhabitants. In point of 
fact, the collective characteristics in all three phases of QLE are acausally and 
globally (without attention to any common-cause principle) determined by the 
spacetime symmetries of the entire actual history of the experimental set-up; hence, 
the nontrivial explanatory necessity of the blockworld. What determines the outcomes 
in QLE is not given in terms of influences or causes (in any sense of the word). In this 
way we resolve the quantum liar paradox locally with RBW by showing how “the 
paradox” is not only consistent with a blockworld structure, but, if locality is to be 
preserved, actually demands an adynamical interpretation such as ours over 
interpretations involving dynamical entities and their histories whether forwards or 
backwards in time. It is the spatiotemporal configuration of QLE as a spacetime 
whole and its spacetime symmetries that determine the outcomes and not constructive 
(a la Einstein) entities with dynamical histories. As far as we know, RBW is the only 
fully developed truly acausal and local account of QM consistent with SR that 
explains quantum entanglement and resolves the measurement problem. The key to 
all this is taking seriously the idea that the deepest story underneath QM is an 
adynamical one.    
RBW embraces fundamentally a realism of structure, not trans-temporal 
entities or things and, accordingly, adopts a form of structural explanation that is 
acausal and adynamical in nature. RBW is also fundamentally atemporal, in that the 
reality of all events plays an essential explanatory role. It is sometimes pointed out 
that structural explanation is most clearly understood by considering examples from 
SR, examples such as the well-known relativistic phenomena of length contraction 
and time dilation. Viewed as a “principle” theory, following Einstein’s famous 
remarks, SR introduces, as Jeffrey Bub put it, “abstract structural constraints that 
events are held to satisfy” (as cited in Hughes, 1989). Regarding the phenomenon of 
length contraction, to explain is to, as Hughes put it, 
[sketch] the models of space-time which special relativity provides and 
[to show] that in these models, for a certain family of pairs of events 
[say, the events that constitute the ends of a moving rod], not only is 
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their spatial separation x proportional to their temporal separation t, 
but the quantity x/t is invariant across [inertial] coordinate systems; 
further for all such pairs, x/t always has the same value. (Hughes, 
1989, p. 257). 
The crucial point here is that causality does not figure into the analysis of length 
contraction, yet explanation can nonetheless be had. As Hughes says, 
This [explanation] makes no appeal to causality; rather it points out 
structural features of the models special relativity provides. It is, in 
fact, an example of structural explanation. (ibid, p. 257). 
Hughes thinks that “explanation comes at many levels,” and that, at the 
“foundational level” to explain is simply to show that certain abstract structural 
features must be satisfied by any model of the theory in question (ibid.). But – and 
this is where Hughes’ embrace of structural explanation is left wanting – what sort of 
ontology might we supply for SR such that causal or dynamical explanations are 
obviously not fundamental, unhelpful, irrelevant or, as he says, “misleading?” We are 
left wanting a realistic explanation of the phenomenon of length contraction, in terms 
of a physical ontology whose behavior is determined by dynamical laws of motion—a 
“constructive” account. It is the physical ontology behaving in accordance with the 
dynamical laws of nature that we are “designed” to find illuminating or explanatory; 
not the instantiation of abstract mathematical structures. Structural explanation has 
some precedent in the interpretation of quantum theory (see, for example, the 
discussion in Hughes 1989, p. 256 ff.), but again, it’s often plagued by the fact of an 
unclear or absent ontology, and so it’s open to the objection that what structural 
“explanations” provide are just mathematical descriptions parading as explanations. 
We hope our analysis of QLE a la RBW will go some way towards loosening the grip 


















Fig. 1: Basic Quantum Liar set-up, with spatially separated photon sources



























Fig. 2: entanglement between atoms, yet no causal connection in past/future














































 Fig. 4: Stern-Gerlach angles for spin measurements in the Y-Z plane. 
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No fact of the matter
 
Fig. 5: Experimental sequence consistent with no spin measurements in the Z 






















Z2- Detector Z1- Detector
 
Fig. 6: Experimental sequence consistent with a spin measurement in the Z direction 
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